Official Chinese Communist Party history simply indicates that Deng Xiaoping launched the open-door policy in 1978, largely discounting international factors, such as China’s joining the United Nations and China-U.S. reconciliation. With regards to the pre-1978 era, most studies focused on inter-Politburo politics, because during the Cultural Revolution power struggles often occurred among the leadership. According to the literature, the political situation after the death of Lin Biao is described as the struggle between Zhou Enlai, who aimed at economic reconstruction, and the radicals such as the “Gang of Four,” but they were under the almost complete dominance of Mao Zedong. Previous studies describe how Zhou’s economic policy was at the mercy of politics, and do not analyze his intention and policy. This article reconsiders the conception and limitation of the open-door policy which was launched as a part of Zhou’s policy, considering the importance of the changing international circumstances through analyzing a project designed to import large industrial plants from Western countries. This project was called the “4-3” development strategy, because its total projected cost was US$4.3 billion.
Closer examination reveals that the industrial development strategy underlying the open-door policy was formed gradually in the early 1970s, in association with the change in the leadership’s perception towards new international circumstances. Until then, the Chinese leadership had pursued the construction of “the third front” as a preparation for war, which was a massive construction of defense and heavy industries in inland China. However, the change in the international situation in the early 1970s reduced the necessity of preparing for a war. Zhou Enlai and the bureaucrats therefore proceeded with the “4-3” development strategy as a part of a new national strategy, which included the reorganization of the bureaucracy to support the open-door policy and the shift of investment from military industry to agriculture and light industry and from inland to coastal areas. They implemented these policies through modifications of the 4th Five Year Plan.
However, there was a conflict between the open-door policy and Mao’s revolutionary diplomatic strategies, despite Mao’s support for the former. The conflict came to the surface as the U.S.-Soviet détente emerged, and the pursuit of the opening was hampered. However, the open-door policy was gradually transformed into a comprehensive industrial policy. As a result, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were able to launch a systematic open-door policy soon after Mao’s death.

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It is well known that economic substructure determines the superstructure. On the other hand, the superstructure has also tremendous impact to the development of the economic substructure. Governments have been actively developing policies and constructing the institutional environment to facilitate and foster the development of their economies. Upholding the continuous economic reform and opening up policy, China has witnessed repaid economic development and exposed to abundant growth opportunities favored by globalization and development of information technologies. Its WTO membership, huge market potential and the about 10% economic growth per annum have made China the focus of the globe.

In order to understand the economic development of China, it is necessary for us to look back to the history of this country. From 1949 to 1978, the period of planned economy, guided by the policy of ‘Distribution According to Work’, Chinese government had sought for fairness and rationality in wage distribution, and set up a standard graded wage system, that is so called ‘eight-grade wage system’. At the same time, another one wage system, ‘piecework pay’, was been set up too. How did the wage system of the planned economy develop and revolute? What are the ‘eight-grade wage system’ and the ‘piecework pay’? What kind of characteristics they have?

From the paper, we can know that the ‘eight-grade wage system’ and the ‘piecework pay’ could not draw out labor-desire in the period of planned economy in China. There was no way for China except reformation.

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本稿では、史料に基づきながら、中国における工業設計行政の始まりとみられる「中国工業美術協会」の設立経緯を整理・考察した。協会設立の社会的・時代的背景、経済的背景と照らし合わせながら、1970年代後半における中国の工業設計の事情を考察した。それらは次のように要約される。(1)中国の工業設計行政は、1978年の「中国工業美術協会」の設立を契機に始まっている。「工業設計」は「工業美術」の概念として把握され、〓小平が提唱する「改革開放」と軌を一にして展開された。(2)当時の活動のほとんどは、中央政府「軽工業部」の指導のもとで行われた。(3)設立後の約10年間は、イベントなどの開催は特段行われることなく、「大会」形式で、主に組織の結成に精力が注がれた。関連業界、関係政府部署などでは工業設計に関する一定程度の意識共有がなされていたが、工業設計振興の方向は一途に先進諸国の模倣の域を出るものではなかった。(4)しかしながら、「中国工業美術協会」の創設はその後の中国における工業設計行政の始点であり、その歴史的意義は計り知れない。

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Opinions are divided among scholars about the corruption situation before China’s Reform and Opening. Some scholars argued that, as China was still under the planned economy at that time, all the planning, production, and distribution were controlled by the government, the corruption phenomenon was rare under such a rigid management system. Meanwhile, some other scholars pointed out that when the market economy of China was underdeveloped, the market did not function effectively as a mechanism for allocating resources, thus there was much room for “connection” (Guanxi) to enter in, which resulted in serious corruption. This paper will provide a perspective to this disputation by discussing an embezzlement case of the Heilongjiang Province.

This embezzlement case was made public under the “twin-hitting” (Shuang Da) campaign implemented in 1978 with the advocacy of Hua Guofeng. This paper also focuses on the exposing process of the case and points out the disadvantages of anti-corruption campaign.

After this embezzlement case, Liu Binyan, a famous writer and reporter of the People’s Daily, went to Heilongjiang Province, carried out field study, and wrote the reportage Between human and demon (Ren Yao Zhi Jian) which received a warm response. This reportage not only includes a lot of details of the embezzlement case that were not mentioned by the authorities, but also analyzed the basic social reasons of it. Since Liu Binyan’s argument was different from the mainstream opinion within the Party, a fierce debate took place afterwards, which revealed the limitation of anti-corruption activities led by the Chinese Communist Party.

By the discussion of the case, it can be concluded that there had been serious corruption under the China’s planned economy. And three reasons of corruption can be summarized: 1) “absence of ownership” caused by public ownership, 2) serious human dependence in bureaucratized companies, and 3) the over-importance of connection due to shortage economy. Meanwhile, the anti-corruption campaigns, like the “twin-hitting” (Shuang Da) campaign, tend to transform into private conflicts on the local level, thus weakening the effect of anti-corruption. Furthermore, the corruption exposure activities supported by the Party’s high level officials, like Liu Binyan’ reportage, would not be allowed by the Party when they challenged the reign of the Party. These are considered to be important reasons why China can not eradicate corruption.

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