The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had a great influence on Japan's diplomatic policy during the Sino-Japanese War era. After the two countries concluded the Pact on October 23, 1939, the Japanese Army was forced to abandon its policy for the settlement of hostilities in China by strengthening the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact. So far the Army had considered that the strengthened Pact would have led to the settlement of hostilities, while would have made the Japanese national defense against the Soviet Union more secure. On the other hand, the Japanese Navy tried to play a leading role in Japan's policy-making towards foreign countries, especially towards China, after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact. The Navy, which had taken steps to advance southward, had been apprehensive over that it would increasingly lose a voice over policy-making following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and the Chang-Ku-Feng and Nomonhan incidents between Japan and the Soviet Union. It had functioned as a brake to control the Army and then had searched for an opportunity to get a powerful voice back. The German-Soviet Pact gave the Navy such a golden opportunity. And Japan took advantage of the new phase of the international political situation that resulted from the signature of the German-Soviet Pact. Britain and France carried out their appeasement policy towards Japan in Asia, while they confronted Germany and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Chinese National Government at Chungking was deeply shocked that the Britain and France considered stopping the Sino-Japanese War once the Wang Jing-Wei regime at Nanking had come into existence. The formation of a united government by Chungking, Nanking and the Chinese Provisional Government at Peking seemed to be possible. What measures Japan took to settle hostilities after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact is the matter to be examined in this article, which focuses on the activities of the Navy for the establishment of the Wang regime.
In order to end the War, the Abe Nobuyuki Cabinet, which was formed shortly after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Pact, began to grope for détente with the United States. In those days, the United States was the only country that could intervene in the China problem, while all other counries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, had to grapple with the issues of Europe. Both the Navy and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which also had a voice in policy-making after the signature of the Pact, prompted this moderate policy towards the United States. The Navy, however, did not agree with the Foreign Ministry as to what measures Japan should take to settle the hostilities in China. The latter had the idea to use the Wang Jing-Wei regime as an intermediary with Chungking Government with a view to the settlement of hostilities. It seemed that Japan's strong measures towards the Wang regime would force him to be Japanese puppet and prevent an intervention by him or the United States with the Chungking Government. The former had a strategic plan that the Wang regime would be obliged to closely cooperate with Japan in a war against the United States. In fact, the United States criticized the Japanese hard-line policy towards the Wang regime and reckoned that there was no use in entering into further negotiations with Japan over th China problem.

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 Following the end of the First World War, the Japanese economy remained stagnant with a decline in foreign trade and the depression continued. To cope with this economic crisis, the Kiyoura Cabinet in 1924 held the Imperial Economic Conference (Teikoku Keizai Kaigi), which was attended by experts from both government and private sectors. Little resulted from this conference, however, since the Cabinet survived only for three months. In 1926 the South Sea Trade Conference (Nanyo Boeki Kaigi) was convened under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote international trade with the South Seas. In 1934 the Government-General of Taiwan established the Research Committee for Tropical Industries (Nettaisangyo Chosakai) in Taihoku (Taipei) to study such problems as trade between Taiwan and South China as well as the South Seas and the financing of tropical industries. It also decided to establish the Taiwan Colonizing Company (Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Gaisha). The Foreign Relations Section (Gaijika) of the Government-General of Taiwan was active in arranging the establishment of the above-mentioned Company which was controlled by Japanese Government. With the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the Sino-Japanese War in 1937,this Foreign Relations Section grew in importance and it was expanded into the Department of Foreign Relations (Gaijibu) to implement the foreign policy of the government of Japan. This Department played a central role in coordinating such various activities as investment, survey and research, education, cultural exchange, and medical service.

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This article examines the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (RGRP), which was established in Nanjing in 1938 under the protection of the Japanese Army and was in power until 1940. The RGRP has been regarded in the research to date as a Japanese-controlled puppet regime, similar to that established in Manchukuo. There is no doubt that the RGRP did exhibit some features indicating puppetry ; however, it would have been very difficult for that government to exist if it functioned solely as a Japanese tool. Therefore, the author has chosen to forgo the term "puppet" before determining the true nature of the RGRP. By clarifying its aim and its political stance, the author intends to show that the RGRP did in fact function as a government of China. He begins by considering the RGRP's leadership---Liang Hongzhi, Chen Qun, Wen Zongyao and Wang Zihui---in particular, how they defined the objectives of the new government, delineated visions of China's future and articulated their positions. In fact, the RGRP could not have functioned according to the wishes of these leaders in the midst of any direct intervention on the part of the Japanese military. Moreover, government leaders like Wen Zongyao and Wang Zihui had their own individual political ideas and opinions, as shown by the articles they published, enabling us to grasp the whole picture involving Chinese political discourse during the era in question. Such political ideas and opinions can be observed as having been well embedded within the China's historical experience from the latter half of 19th century through the first half of 20th, as exemplified by views concerning foreign diplomacy. By analyzing the ideas and opinions expressed by the leaders of the RGRP, it becomes possible to learn its true significance in the modern history of China. While taking pro-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kaishek and anti-Nationalist and anti-Communist Party political stances, the RGRP leaders also objectively analyzed the current situation and requested the Japanese to restore the occupied territories to their former condition. The author shows that RGRP was far more independent compared to the previously established the Great Way Government of the Municipality of Shanghai. That being said, the ideas and opinions adopted by the RGRP leadership were no doubt based on the premise that China had lost the Sino-Japanese War ; therefore these ideas and opinions had to change as soon as Wang Jingwei of the Nationalist Party started peace talks with Japan at the end of 1938.

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