The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between the Tokugawa Bakufu and Japan's feudal domains from the time of the Kansei Era reforms, which began in 1787, through the Kyowa Era, ending in 1804, by portraying a comprehensive picture of the scandal of 1801 involving feudal domain representatives stationed in Edo (rusui ) and their concurrent punishment. The author begins by analyzing the Bakufu deliberations regarding how the rusui were to be punished, questioning of the suspects by Bakufu superintendent Inoue Moritoshi and Moritoshi's recommendations to top feudal domain officers concerning punishment, in order to understand the incident from beginning to end. Of the 59 top domain officers ordered to punish their rusui, 30 were feudal lords (daimyo 大名) who were in attendance before the Shogun in the Teikan Hall at Edo Castle, meaning that they had been allies (fudai 譜代) of Tokugawa Ieyasu. Next, the author turns to the developments within the feudal establishment after the incident and the problems facing the related research to date, which has been retarded due to historiographical reasons. In particular, the author points to the spontaneity with which the Teikan Hall daimyo chose to discipline their rusui, showing that there were those among them who were not marked for punishment, a fact which demonstrates the great impact which the scandal exerted on the feudal domains. Finally, the author examines reasons why the rusui under provincial scale (kunimochi 国持) daimyo and the Tokugawa Ieyasu family domains (gosanke 御三家) were not punished. He shows that punishing the kunimochi rusui would have dealt a serious blow to the Shogunates's prestige and authority, while punishing the gosanke rusui would have provided the pretense for the elders (tukekaro 付家老) of those domains, many of whom were descendants of fudai daimyo vassals, to elevate themselves to the level of "daimyo." The author concludes that while the Bakufu during the Kyowa Era exhibited a high degree of severity in dealing with the rusui scandal, it was also forced to give careful consideration to all of the affair's possible ramifications and nuances. Moreover, such thoroughness was a characteristic feature of Bakufu operations during that time and an important factor in its relationship with the country's feudal domains.

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　近年公議所の研究は進展してきたが、誰がその役をつとめてきたかという基本的なデータについてはまとめられてこなかった。そこで本論文は、公議所とその後身である集議院の構成員（公議人・議員）について、明治2 年3 月、5 月、10 月の３つの段階でそれぞれ明らかにした。また、公議人は近世の江戸

役の系譜をひき、酒楼などで多くの会合を重ねる「茶屋政治」も引き継がれていることが指摘されてきた。しかし、役組合と公議所分課の構成員をみると単純な連続性ではなく、近世以来のネットワークと公議所でのグルーピングが重層構造である可能性を指摘した。

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 Shiga-in Temple is a Tendai sect temple located in Sakamoto Otsu, Shiga Prefecture, Japan. While this structure was built in the first half of the 17^th century, ruled over by the Rinnouzi-Monzeki priesthood who were of royal blood, it is currently the main temple of the Hiezan Enryakuji-temple concourse, the leading site of the Tendai sect, and at the same time is a residence for the Tendai master.
 Buildings constructed by Nikai-Syoin, Kyakuden, and Kuri can be found within the precincts of Shiga-in Temple; the Edo period buildings that were previously located on this site burned down during 1877.
 Early research on Shiga-in Temple initially assumed that the site functioned as a private academic training or retirement facility for Rinnouzi-Monzeki at Mt. Hieizan, and secondarily as an officially controlled temple. However, while these initial studies did partly discuss the function of Shiga-in Temple, no research to date has dealt with either the construction or management system of this site. This study uses newly available historical materials in the collection of Eizan Bunko on Hieizan Enryakuzi to clarify the management system and prefectural organization of the Shiga-in Temple.
 First, we demonstrate the presence of three organizations that controlled the operation of Shiga-in Temple, Tendaizasu, Rinnouzi-Monzeki, and Shiga-in Rusui. Of these, Tendaizasu was the top level of a sect denominated from ancient times in Hieizan, while Rinnouzi-Monzeki was the top level of the newly established Tendai sect denominated in Kanto. Finally, Shiga-in Rusui was a worker for an organization responsible for the temple of Hieizan Enryakuzi. Although previous research has argued that the Tendaizasu and the Rinnouzi-Monzeki were unified subsequent to the Edo period, the two organizations were formally at the top level of Shiga-in Temple. This is because these sects were always present in Kanto, while Shiga-in Temple was always managed by a Shiga-in Rusui on this mountain. Shiga-in Rusui was a priest appointed to fulfill a number of duties, including that of representing the temple in external relations, of serving as deputy for the head of the temple when he was absent, as well as managing internal tasks and receiving guests.
 The second aim of this study is an attempt to verify that Shiga-in Temple building was not reconstructed during the modern era. To do this, we used documents and pictures from historical records.
 Our analysis shows that building work at Shiga-in Temple started in 1645, and that initial restoration work was carried out in 1748, before large earthquakes occurred in 1751 and 1830. Documents and comparisons of pictorial records of construction show that six periods of restoration and maintenance work took place in the early Edo period. From 1744, four images provide evidence for this. The first shows the first restoration, and the second, from 1767, shows painting before repairs as a result of extensive restorations carried out by the shogunate government. The third image shows repairs carried out by the shogunate government in the 19^th century, while the fourth is a picture from the Meiji era, towards the end of the Edo period. These images show the extent of restorations in each period up until the present.
 Historical documents and diary materials reveal that repair work to Shiga-in Temple was carried out repeatedly. In addition, using historical drawings, we are able to elucidate the appearance of Shiga-in Temple during each period of restoration work. For example, we are able to elucidate the construction of the precinct from historical drawings, and verify a group of northern boundaries as a Kyakuden, a Kosyoin, and a Kitchen, while a Nikai-syoin is represented by a group in the south.

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After the Meireki Fire (1657), many daimyos received new estates from the Tokugawa shogunate to refuge from fire which were located in the suburbs of Edo city. In this process, the places were chosen on the dimyos' preferences and the shogunate adjusted their conflicts. The regulation of those estates fixed only dimensions, therefore the lack of deliberate city planning caused sprawl ad affected the suburban structure of Edo.

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The previous paper discussed the structures of 18 mountain monasteries at Hieizan-Enryakuji during the Tokugawa period. This paper discusses three renowned monasteries, Nankōbō, Shougaku-in, and Nichizou-in. Nankōbō burnt down in 1833. A comparison of the blueprints of Shougaku-in and Nichizou-in, planned as the replacements for Nankōbō, reveals Nankōbō’s role as a villa of Rinnōji-miya, the prince who ruled the whole of Tendai Buddhism through the Tokugawa period, including the requested rooms and the zoning according to the status of the users. Rich information in the blueprints has helped elucidate the everyday activities of the mountain-dwelling religious community in that period.

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