In the context of global efforts in combating terrorism, the European Union has developed a wide range of unique counter-terrorism law and measures which cover all the three pillars under the EU Treaty.
The main features of the EU response to the global threat of terrorism would be summarized as follows:
(1) A top political priority attached and most speedy action taken on its counter-terrorism measures.
(2) Comprehensive multi-layer structure and uniqueness of the measures which include: i. Comprehensive policy measures such as Anti-Terrorism Action Plan, Declaration, Strategy; ii. Measures to freeze financial resources to terrorist groups; iii. Numerous Council Framework Decisions on terrorism, European Arrest Warrant, Joint investigating Teams, etc.; iv. Europol, Euroj ust, Police Chief's Task Force, Schengen Information Systems, EURODAC.
(3) Close cooperation with the US.
(4) Attempt to study the root causes of radicalization and recruitment of terrorists.
(5) Acceleration of efforts in the wake of major terror incidents such as Madrid and London incidents.
With regard to the roles of the member states, the Commission and the European Parliament in the process of making the EU counter-terrorism law and measures, the member states which have had the experiences of major terrorist incidents and have close ties with the US tend to be much keener than those which do not have such experiences. Some other countries which are mindful of basic human rights tend to take cautious attitude toward excessive counter-terrorism measures. The European Commission has been playing a principal role in preparing legislative proposals and action programs. On the other hand, the European Parliament, concerned over the infringements of human rights of EU citizens as result of excessive counter-terrorism measures, has been playing an important role in calling for utmost restraint and caution vis-a-vis the Commission and the Council on counter-terrorism measures.
These different roles are clearly seen on such hot issues as (1) Data Retention, (2) Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement with the US, (3) alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners. In all those cases, the European Parliament has been playing a major role, as representative organ of EU citizens and upholder of EU human rights charter to warn against the infringements of human rights of EU citizens while the Commission and the Council taking counter-terrorism measures.

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Discussions on the dispatch of Japanese personnel to UN Peace-keeping missions generally begin, with the Gulf Crisis of 1990 and the dispatch to Cambodia of 1992. In fact, however, Japanese contributions did not begin with the sudden end of the Cold War. They go back to the “International Cooperation Initiative” of the Takeshita cabinet that was founded upon three pillars, including the contribution of financial support and dispatch of personnel for settlement of regional conflicts. Based on this policy, the UNTAG dispatch may be considered the first full-scale dispatch of personnel due to the temporary nature of the transfers to UNGOMAP and UNIMOG.
In this report, I seek to clarify, using newly released MOFA documents, the policy making process of the Japanese government regarding the dispatch of election observers to UNTAG, a subject which has heretofore received little analysis. I will also make clear the limitations inherent in the MOFA initiatives. In order to throw into relief the political conditions regarding the UNTAG dispatch, I will devote particular attention to the activities of Prime Minister Takeshita and the MOFA authorities directly in charge on this occasion.
Although MOFA which agreed to the “International Co-operation Initiative” of Takeshita, was not able to accomplish a Self-Defense Force (SDF) dispatch, establish relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization, effective use of a postponement technique paradoxically allowed the dispatch to UNTAG to be realized. Such realization of the civilian dispatch to UNTAG was only a provisional step, however, and MOFA needed two phases of technique to realize SDF dispatch after the civilian dispatch.
During MOFA's attempt to realize the Takeshita initiative using this postponement technique, the project to dispatch election observers to UNTAG got somewhat ahead of itself, and measures to ensure their safety of were deemed insufficient. Although Minister for Foreign Affairs Sousuke Uno pointed out in discussions with National Governor's Association chairperson shunichi Suzuki that “bullets won't be flying,” the gun battles which had already broken out in Namibia rendered such optimistic assessments untenable. Actually, however, though the local situation was unstable just before holding the constitution parliamentary election, the above-mentioned optimistic prospect of Uno was maintained throughout. As for the government, its response to these circumstances were remarkable for their inflexibility.
In 1992, the SDF dispatch that MOFA had always aimed at was finally realized. Meanwhile, establishment of relevant legislation and a human resources pool organization are still in postponement. The contribution to UNTAG under the Takeshita administration was the first step in establishing the postponement mode in Japan.

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