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  • 白田 耕蔵, 上原 博通
    年会講演予稿集
    1983年 38.3 巻
    発行日: 1983/03/11
    公開日: 2018/03/27
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
  • 金沢 健一, 鶴淵 誠二, 田久保 嘉隆, 蟻川 達男
    年会講演予稿集
    1983年 38.3 巻
    発行日: 1983/03/11
    公開日: 2018/03/27
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
  • 久世 敏雄
    日本教育心理学会総会発表論文集
    1974年 16 巻
    発行日: 1974/09/01
    公開日: 2017/03/30
    会議録・要旨集 フリー
  • 中世文学
    1968年 13 巻 81-88
    発行日: 1968年
    公開日: 2018/02/09
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 梶原 正昭
    日本文学
    1962年 11 巻 3 号 187-195
    発行日: 1962/03/15
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 會田 実
    日本文学
    1990年 39 巻 9 号 74-82
    発行日: 1990/09/10
    公開日: 2017/08/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    物語の叙述する頼朝体制確立過程で、物事の<公><私>の区分けが明確化されてくると同時に、<公>が<私>をとりこもうとする意識があることがわかった。その考察から作品構成上、物語冒頭部の寿祝が体制確立の予祝であることがわかった。また、王殺し神話を曾我五郎の頼朝殺害未遂に見る上で、「昼間の王頼朝」と「夜の王曾我兄弟」との象徴的対立がそこにあるをみた。昼側が夜側を超克する表現構造が先の<公>を支え、また新時代の建国神話を成立させるのである。
  • 冷戦変容期の国際政治
    大津留(北川) 智恵子
    国際政治
    1994年 1994 巻 107 号 131-144,L14
    発行日: 1994/09/30
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Third World nations are often the target of intervention. Especially during the cold war period, but not limited to then, the United States intervened in the internal affairs of those nations, claiming to protect its national interest. What constitutes American national interest which should be protected by intervening in other nations, however, remains dubious at best.
    Aiding the Angolan civil war was among such intervention policies, but was exercised over two different time periods: failing détente in the 1970s and emerging new cold war in the 1980s. This article examines what factors were given priority in each of the decision makings, and points out the problems.
    The first covert aid was a typical cold-war intervention, although delayed in time. Wherever the Soviet Union expands into, the United States should also get in and stand tall. In the decision making process on covert aid to FNLA and UNITA among the limited circle, consideration for Angolan interests was missing. Moreover, covert manipulation gave an open invitation for South African intervention, which complicated the southern African situation.
    The legacy of such covert aid remained even through the Carter administration. While the political landscape of the Angolan civil war shifted from U. S. -Soviet rivalry to struggle among African nations over Apartheid, the United States entered the new round of intervention with old mind set.
    The United States intervened again using covert aid to UNITA, but this time such covert policy was publicly mentioned by the President and others. This is so-called overt-covert action. While promoting the public approval of this policy, the administration denied the opportunity for Congress to openly discuss the policy content of Angolan intervention.
    Deprived of the proper Congressional function to terminate the wrong policy, covert aid to UNITA continued to flow, thus dragging out the process of peace agreement, and the subsequent establishment of the national government. Although elections were finally conducted, UNITA, which enjoyed the distorted image of national popularity, could not accept its loss and refused to go along with the terms of the agreement. A new round of civil war was thus launched.
    American covert aid first avoided the opportunity for a national government by turning the Angolan civil war into an East-West confrontation. The second intervention did not help strengthen the basis for democratic government among the Angolan population either, but rather helped Savimbi's individual aspiration at the cost of the nation at large. American Angolan policy may have been a lost cause from the beginning but covert action cannot be the method to promote constructive foreign policy. For its decision making by-passes the democratic system at home and thus fails to enjoy a lasting support, while the hidden aid is subject to manipulation which fails to convey a clear message to the recipient nation.
  • 任 〓樹
    社会言語科学
    2004年 6 巻 2 号 27-43
    発行日: 2004/03/31
    公開日: 2017/04/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    本稿の目的は,日本語と韓国語の断り談話においてポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーがどのように現れるかを明らかにすることにある.ロールプレイ調査から得られた資料を基にして,ポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーを「量的・質的差異」「ウチ・ソト・ヨソによる差異」「男女差」という観点から分析した結果,以下のことが検証された.(1)ポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーの量は,日本語より韓国語のほうが多い.(2)ポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーの質に関しては,日本語より韓国語のほうが相手のポジティブ・フェイスを重んじる表現が多用される.(3)日本語に見られるポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーは「ウチ・ソト・ヨソ」という3つの区切りをもつのに対して,韓国語に見られるそれは「ウチ・ソト・ヨソ」という3分類には従わない.(4)ポジティブ・ポライトネス・ストラテジーの男女差は,韓国語より日本語のほうが顕著である.
  • ――カオダイ教の変質から
    北澤 直宏
    東南アジア -歴史と文化-
    2015年 2015 巻 44 号 64-82
    発行日: 2015年
    公開日: 2017/06/01
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper aims at assessing the religious policy in the Republic of Vietnam from 1955 to 1963, with a focus on separation of church and state in Cao Dai religion. Ngo Dinh Diem, the president in this era, is notorious as a dictator. However, it is obvious that empirical research has been too scarce to consider his policy. To overcome these problems and to understand the South Vietnamese history more objectively, this study clarifies the intent and outcome of Diem’s religious policy by using provincial government’s and religious documents.

    After WWII, Cao Dai formed an autonomous area with a private army which the government could not interfere with. The purpose of Ngo Dinh Diem’s reform was to correct this situation. Even if the government could intervene in religious personnel affairs, the purpose of government was not to manipulate the religions. In other words, the result of the reformation was introduction of westernized concept by force, and there was neither protection nor suppression of the religions. Although all religions had to obey the Republic’s order like anti-communism, religious activity itself did not attract government’s attention at all.

  • 斎藤 聖二
    国際政治
    1986年 1986 巻 83 号 143-161
    発行日: 1986/10/18
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 大葉 昇一
    史学雑誌
    1986年 95 巻 7 号 1135-1172,1286-
    発行日: 1986/07/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Chinghis khan reorganized his troops in accordance with the decimal system in 1204 before he attacked the Naiman tribe. This formation was a military unit, but on the other hand, it was also an administrative unit. This system is called the Ch'ien-hu-zhi 千戸制, which has remained the standard system in the Mongol Empire since then. The features of this formation are a simple chain of command, a simple style of organization and ease of mobilization. It functioned very effectively. But this formation had irregular characteristics and various ploblems. For example, the chief of the Ch'ien-hu 千戸 (chiliarchs) posessed a Po-hu 百戸 (centurions) which was under his direct control. He held the post of the chief of the Po-hu concurrently. And the chief of the Po-hu posessed a Shi-hu 十戸 (decurions), which was under his direct control. He held the post of the chief of the Shi-hu concurrently. In these cases, we find the traces remaining of the body guard formation of clan faction organization. These cases do not describe the usual military formation of the Mongol empire. At least in the period of the Yuan dynasty, the hierarchy of officers was systematized bureaucratically and the officer's compentence was restricted reasonably. However, in the cace of the Shih-wei-ch'in-chun 侍衛親軍 (the imperial personal army), there was not a solitary commander who could lead the whole army in the bureaucratic system, in order to prevent an army clique from appearing. On the contrary, high officers of the central government were able to occupy the post of the solitary commander. It was too difficult to prevent men from concentrating power. They were the Mongolian and the Se-mu-ren 色目人 who stood on the basis of the Shih-wei-ch'in-chun. There are various explanations about the Ch'ien-hu. The correct explanation is that it was organized with one thousand hu 戸 (households), which were able to offer one thousand soldiers. In Mongol, the general idea of hu was that it was a kinship group, each such group with one manhood was counted as one hu, whose man was destined to be a soldier. A group with two soldiers was counted as too hu, and so on. Therefore, every hu had only one male member who should be a soldier. In Mongol it was the social custom that they counted the number of hu this way. The Ch'ien-hu was the military and administrative unit organized with one thousand hu each of which offered one soldier. However the number of members or hu was not mathematically strict. The Yuan dynasty used the system of Ch'ien-hu when it organized the Chinese into the Han-chun 漢軍. But the households of Han-chun could not stand the military economic burden. Therefore, the Yuan dynasty had to allow military households, which could not offer a soldier, to mainly bear military expenses. Consequently, the capacity for mobilization did not correspond to the fixed numbers in accordance with the decimal system. This difference resulted from the fact that the military formation of the nomadic society was applied without revision to the farming society. However, after the middle of the Yuan period, the formations of Han-chun were completed relatively, resulting in the military of the Mongols and the Se-mu-ren severely lacking in soldiers. This paper aims at describing the general idea of the military formation of the Mongol empire and the Yuan dynasty and how to solve it's structural deficiencies from the viewpoint of both the chain of command system and the style of organization.
  • 大野 徹
    東南アジア研究
    1971年 8 巻 4 号 534-565
    発行日: 1971/03/31
    公開日: 2019/06/06
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中央アジア・カフカス
    廣瀬 陽子
    国際政治
    2004年 2004 巻 138 号 117-141,L11
    発行日: 2004/09/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theory and the movements of the politics in Azerbaijan, still in the midst of upheaval, and to offer a key to penetrate the future developments of the authoritarian system of the former Soviet Union.
    Many of the post-Soviet republics established authoritarian regimes after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the negative aspects of the authoritarian regimes are emphasized, they are often positively accepted as a necessary process for the former Soviet Union. However, there are different types of authoritarian regimes, thus should not be generalized.
    Ayaz Mutaribov, the last communist leader, took the presidency of Azerbaijan, but he resigned due to the mismanagement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Abulfez Elchibei, then leader of the Popular Front, was elected President. Though, Elchibei was an idealist who believed in democracy, his idealism was far removed from the realities of Azerbaijan, which caused military losses, bringing chaos to the economy and to the society. Elchbei fell from power by a coup d'etat only a year after inauguration, generating skepticism over democracy among the people.
    What people needed was Heydar Alyiev's return to power. Alyiev, a former elite politician of the Soviet era, became President in 1993. He established a firm authoritarianism by tightening domestic policies and keeping diplomatic balance. He established a cease-fire to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994, which he utilized for domestic affairs. The first half of the Alyiev's administration is regarded as “war-time authoritarianism.”
    However, as the cease-fire and 1 million refugees and IDPs' in the country were taken for granted, and as the changing situation exposed the limits of the Soviet-style politics, the vulnerability of “war-time authoritarianism” was revealed. Moreover, since 1999, Alyiev suffered health problems and he gradually shifted his regime to what one may call “presidential monarchy”. Alyiev maintained monarchic rule gaining both domestic and international confidence by disguised democracy, with hereditary transfer of power to his son in mind.
    He revised the constitution in August 2002 so as to appoint his son, Ilkham Alyiev, as his successor. Alyiev was running for the third term in October 2003 presidential election, but his health conditions failed him. He withdrew from the race in the last minute. Ilkham Alyiev won an overwhelming victory. It was the first hereditary transfer of power in the post-Soviet era.
    Now that the “war-time authoritarianism” is no longer accepted, and Heydar Aliev, a symbol for the unification, lost, Ilkham Alyiev is exploring ways to rule his country. There are signs of democracy such as the release of political prisoners. Yet, his political power remains unknown.
    The authoritarian system of Azerbaijan, now in the hands of the son of the first authoritarian by heredity, is transforming under the changing situation of the country. The experience of Azerbaijan, organizational changes and hereditary fiefdom, will be an example for other post-Soviet republics.
  • 久保田 一洋
    浮世絵芸術
    1989年 95 巻 3-37
    発行日: 1989年
    公開日: 2020/11/10
    ジャーナル オープンアクセス
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