This paper clarifies the malfunctions and insufficiencies of the education policy and system of the Japan Defense Ministry and Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Currently, there is a low number of SDF officers who hold Master’s degrees compared with foreign armed forces, so this paper also addresses the reason why an SDF personnel cannot enjoy the opportunity of attending Professional Military Education (PME) as the same level of higher education (i.e., above Master’s degree level courses) outlined by the Council for Examination of Drastic Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force. I analyzed personal biography data of 91 Marine Generals and discovered the following three findings: (1) the excellence of the United States Marine Education Policy and system (similar to PME); (2) the efficient education system of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) University, which includes Marine Corps War College, School of Advanced Warfighting, and Marine Corps Command & Staff College; and (3) the healthy competition in promotional systems in the USMC that will contribute to the Japan Defense Ministry and SDF policy-making in the education system reforms.

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This paper clarifies the functions of the United States Marine Corps’ Promotion system for the officers and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Promotion system for the officers through two main factors. The first factor is education, the Military Professional Education (PME) at the Marine Corps University, colleges, and schools that allow the marine officers to be promoted to the next higher rank by learning the military professional subjects required for officers to carry out their missions at higher positions. Second, the acquisition of the master’s degrees at the Military universities and colleges is essential for the promotion of marine officers to a higher rank of Major and Lieutenant Colonel. The JGSDF has no higher education system as the US Marine Corps (USMC). However, it has a non-academic degree-oriented career path through the definite military education system. The comparison between the USMC and JGSDF clarifies the reason such a traditional Japanese education system makes a difference to officers and clues why the JGSDF officers are such educated skillful soldiers, even if they have no academic degrees.

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The weapons procurement process in the Soviet Union is crucial in understanding the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics as well as the interconnection in the domestic political dynamics among politics, economy and military factors. This article aims to examine the political dynamics in the Soviet weapon procurement process.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part, “the static anlysis of the weapons procurement in the Soviet Union, ” explains the actors and their role in the process. Specifically, the three-layered structure consisting of the party, the military, and the government is examined. The actors explained here include: the Politburo, the Defense Council, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, each military service, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), each military industrial ministry, its research institutes and design bureaus, and its enterprises.
The second part, “the dynamic analysis of the weapons procurement process, ” examines how these actors interact each other in the actual process of weapons procurement. Requests for weapons development usually originate in one of two ways: from below and from above. From below each military service may request a development of new weapons sytem necessitated from operations requirements. In actuality, it may originate from design bureaus trying to push their new designs. The request must be approved by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the VPK, and the Politburo. When a request originates from above, the VPK will translate the decision into an actual policy. When a decision is made to develop a weapons system, the VPK, through the appropriate military industrial ministry, begins the process of design competitions among design bureaus. Two or three design bureaus are allowed to proceed to the construction of a prototype. After the prototype is tested by the State committee, only then a decision to proceed to a series production is made. Design bureaus and the voenpredy sent by the military service serve to control the quality of the weapons produced in enterprises.
The third part singles out some of the salient characteristics of the Soviet weapons procurement process. First, the Soviets take several measures to ensure the high quality of weapons systems within the framework of the planned economy. These measures include high priority given to the military industry, the existence of the consumer's sovereignty in the military industry, free competition among design bureaus, and stability of the weapons procurement elite. But the high quality of Soviet weapons does not mean efficiency of the military industy. In fact, it has caused waste and delays in modernization. The deepening Soviet economic crisis and the sharp rise in the unit cost of weapons production will no longer make it possible for the Soviet government to treat the military industry as a sacred cow. Second, history and the organizational restrictions have led the Soviets to develop a unique design philosophy, which stresses three principles, “simplicity, ” “commonality, ” and “evelutionary revision.” This approach has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps the Soviet military to be provided with inexpensive, mass-produced weapons, easy to operate and maintain. But the Soviet weapons procurement process is not conducive to generate innovations. Therefore, the systemic crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably engulf the military sector, which has been successfully insulated from the inefficiencies of the command economy.

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This paper examines South Korea’s change of foreign policy toward Japan due to its changes of government since democratic transition in 1987 by taking into account the three points of view: First, I focus on the policy makers’ ideal inclination, conservative or progressive, as well as on power relations among ruling party, opposition party and public opinion; Second, South Korea’s policy toward Japan have to be analyzed in connection with ones toward North Korea and US; Third, I take the 1965 regime, under which diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan was established with containing not merely communism but also post-colonial issues, as an indicator to classify continuity and change of the policy.
The two conservative governments after the 1987 transition, Roh Tae-Woo and KIM Young-Sam administration, showed continuity of foreign policy toward Japan as seen from the perspective of the 1965 regime. The two administrations cooperated with Japan when Japan kept adopting hard-liner policy toward North Korea. The two also continued containing post-colonial issues although South Korea instead confronted Japan when Japan tried soft-liner policy toward North Korea.
The change of power on election in 1997, unprecedented in the South Korean political history, brought about a significant change. Kim Dae-Jung’s “National Government” developed reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and simultaneously maintained cooperation with Japan. Roh Moo-Hyun’s “Participatory Government” forged ahead with such a change. It pursued peace and prosperity with North Korea despite confronting US because a fear of entrapment was mounted among South Korean public opinion. Roh, moreover, promoted policy toward Japan to overcome the colonial past, which have had been contained under the 1965 regime.
Lee Myung-Bak’s “Practical Government”, inaugurated in return of power to conservatives after 10 years’ progressives. Lee administration adopted again hard-liner policy toward North Korea and reintensified the alliance with US while adhered to the 1965 regime with Japan. Lee, however, confused coherence of policy and strategy toward Japan by sudden landing on Takeshima/Dokdo in just before his term expired. The present Park Geun-Hye administration, irrespective of her conservative ideal inclination, couldn’t but tackle with the post-colonial issues from the beginning of the term, as well as is trying a kind of soft-liner policy toward North Korea.

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