In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves “nuclear powers” — a move that shocked the international community and added a newdimension to the rivalries between these two neighbors. This article will attempt to analyze what led both to this nuclearization and what kind of influence it had on the whole world as well as on the region.
From a strategic viewpoint, India had pushed ahead with its nuclear program in order to counter the threat of China, not of Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s program was aimed at reducing the threat posed by India. That is to say, the power imbalance in the region (China > India > Pakistan) encouraged these two countries to go nuclear. India and Pakistan have faced increased security-related concerns since the collapse of the alliance structure that built up during the Cold War. In addition to these security interests, rising nationalism in the midst of globalization has created a political trend that has encouraged nuclearization.
Now, in retrospect, we can ask the question: which side has benefited most from nuclearization?Regionally, Pakistan seems to have seized more advantages militarily and diplomatically, especially regarding the Kashmir issue. Globally, however, nuclearization has helped India to rise in the world: most major powers, including the United States, cannot help regarding and treating India as a global player. In contrast, the international community regards Pakistan with suspicion in the wake of revelations about the “nuclear black market.”
In fact, this nuclearization, which drew international concern about the risk of nuclear war, has not only contributed to sustaining the ongoing peace process since 2003, but has also created aninternational environment in which each side stops short of resorting to war even in times of crisis. “Rising India” will also hesitate to draw a sword. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to conclude that a stable“ nuclear peace” has been established between India and Pakistan considering their geopolitical and strategic characteristics, lack of a relationship of mutual trust, persistent cross-border terrorism, and the fragile state foundations of Pakistan.

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The aim of this essay is to analyze the principle of India's foreign policy, mainly on security. In general, its policy has been illustrated in terms of idealism/realism paradigm. That is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru pursued idealistic policies such as Non-Alignment Movement, whereas Indira Gandhi changed India's policies into more realistic one's, whose lines A. B. Vajpayee also takes over. This essay challenges such dominant discourse and proposes alternative approaches to India's foreign policy.
Firstly, most of the observers exclusively focus on the attitude of political leaders or the trend of the times without taking the different fields into account. Turning our attention to the difference of policy fields, we will easily find historical continuity and political consensus in India's foreign policy. Outside the region, India has consistently demanded the revision of global structure and regime. At the same time, inside the region, it has opposed to any change of the situation as its own superpower. In other words, it has adopted both ‘extraregional revisionism’ and ‘intraregional status quo’ as guides to foreign policy-making since its independence.
Secondly, more importantly, idealism/realism discourse is devoid of the consideration of India's ‘nation-state’ itself which differs entirely from that of Western ideal type. Political leadership in India has never been able to take the unity of the ‘nation-state’ for granted because of its own diverse and plural society as well as the existence of cross-border ethno-religious identities. India's ruling elite has been exposed to the internal threat and has been obliged to counter it first of all. That is why its foreign policy has been worked out and carried out not only based on its geopolitical strategic interest but also constrained by the recognized vulnerability of ‘nation-state’. Successive Governments of India have endeavored to approximate to the ideal of ‘nation-state’ or at least prevent it from breaking up completely. It is this type of realism against the vulnerability of ‘nation-state’ recognized by every political leader that has affected the decision-making in India.

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Facing an acute politico-economic crisis in the mid-60's, India embarked on change in its strategy for self-reliance toward the end of that decade. It was a change from the strategy introduced by the late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. His government had contemplated massive economic liberalization in order to attract foreign money, which might keep the Central Government's superiority in terms of distribution of the resources to the States, while accepting more participation by the State bosses in central affairs. The process of strategic change started in 1966 with the infamous devaluation of the Rupee, and ended up with more isolation from technological development by international standards. The inability of the Aid-India Consortium to raise aid money to meet the Indian need to import the necessary goods for structural reform was the main reason for India to change course.
Indian reaction was to balance its imports and exports so as to accumulate its foreign exchange reserves high enough to be a cushion against the lever of the donors. In this context it began to stress import substitution through which some reduction of imports could be expected. India also promoted more exports of traditional goods and raw materials. But what was central in its modification of self-reliance strategy was the role of East European countries and especially of the Soviet Union. The Indian government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi found its way out in its comparative advantage in the export of light manufactured goods to that region, which was established through the import substitution by having imported capital goods from the developed world till the mid-60's. East Europeans on their side needed to import consumer goods of a certain standard that India was now proud of attaining and did not lag very far behind the international standard at the time of late-1960's. Getting sufficiently confident of its export prospects to them, and finding the availability there of the items India most acutely needed, military weapons, when it decided to save foreign exchange as much as possible, there was established a complementary interdependence between India and East Europe.
This modification could not be a long-term strategy as it was inherently static because it was based on the technological level at certain point of time and attained through its import substitution strategy till the mid-60's. Although India tried to keep up the international standard, there was a limitation to seek them in the open market. The international standards were kept up by the multinational corporations, from which India decisively departed as a result of failed devaluation incidents. In fact, the oil crisis made all efforts at diminishing the trade deficit come to nothing, and India could not help relying on some external means like the export of laborers to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East or accepting the Soviet offer to add crude oil to the list of Soviet exports of barter trade agreement, thus accumulating a contradiction till the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The split of the Congress Party occurred in the same year as the change in strategy started. For most of the State bosses, or the Old Guard or the Syndicate, who had lost their seats in the 1967 elections, the split completed the process of the strategic change, as after all their way back by relying on the central government would be blocked by this change. Their criticism against Indira Gandhi and her supporters as Russian agents was off the point as the new strategy was based on the interdependence between India and the Socialist countries. This can also explain India's non-alignment status after its signing of the alliance treaty with the Soviet Union two years later.

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A series of atomic bomb tests by India in May 1998 was the biggest regional incident that had impact on world affairs in the past five decades. In South Asia there occurred major happenings such as the three Indo-Pakistani wars until 70's and Indo-China border conflict in 1962. But these happenings did not have direct bearings on the international situation at each occasion. Because of their regional characters, US and the Soviet Union did not have any hand in them.
But the tests have been a major international shock. The US was affected severely, as shown by Clinton's remarks that it was the worst event in the 20-century. For the international nuclear control regime which has been promoted by US as the sole super-power in the post cold war period has been challenged and shaken by India, the regional power of South Asia.
The basic objective of this paper is to examine Indo-US relations in the post cold war period. In order to understand the relations between the two countries, it is necessary to check three levels, viz., level of perceptions towards the international system as understood by India and US, level of security and nuclear policy pursued by the two, and level of direct negotiations between the two countries.
The paper will analyze the three levels by turn. Firstly, there is the big divergence between India's “multi-polar system” orientation and US's “unipolar system” preoccupation. Secondly, in the level of policy matters, India has neglected the development of security policy, whereas US has pursued the monopolized nuclear control regime. Thirdly, they have negotiated the main issue, viz., the “credible minimum deterrence, ” from their respective angles. In conclusion, the paper predicts that, though in the post cold war period India and US has dramatically improved their economic relations, the perception gap will persist for a long time, which may jeopardize real improvement in the field of security and political relations.

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In many developing countries, the arms industry is the most advanced sector of all industries, and that has raised the technical level and productivity of civil industries. For those reasons, many countries in the Third World have developed arms industries. Now, India, Korea and Sountheast Asian countries are expanding their arms industries.
Recently, China has emerged as a major arms exporter to the Third World. In the time of Mao Zedong, China exported small weapons to socialist countries and revolutionary forces by its “friendly price.” But after Deng Xiaoping's reforms, national interest took precedence over ideology, and china began to export large and expensive weapons. For example, China exported tactical ballistic missiles to Syria and Pakistan, and China exported nuclear reactors to Algeria. In 1985, China exported fifty medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia for two billion dollars. Saudi Arabia is an anti-communist and fundamental Islamic country.
In 1980's, the objective of arms export was to earn foreignn currency for the “Four Modernizations” Programme. China also sold weapons to both Iran and Iraq. At that time they fought a long war of attrition.
Chinese weapons are competitive in the world arms market. They are basically copies of Soviet weapons of 1950's and 60's. China insists that Chinese weapons are cheap, tough and easy to handle. But complicated weapons, such as tanks and fighters, are said to have many defects. Nevertheless, for developing countries, cheap Chinese weapons are very attractive.
Chinese weapons cannot fight against the high-tech weapons of the advanced countries. But Chinese weapons can fight well against the old weapons of the developing countries. Above all, developing countries can import Chinese weapons in a short period of time. In many advanced countries, arms exports are strictly controlled by the government. Technical procedure of arms exporting has to take lengthy steps, and sometimes it takes a few years. But in China, there is no congress or mass media which can check the Communist Party. For those countries, that may cause political or economic frictions with the advanced countries, China is a convenient country, or the only choice to deal with. Chinese low price weapons, which are easy to import, lower the threshold of war.
China influences the devloping countries not by economic aid but by arms export. Looking back over the Cold War era, one of the most powerful resources of the superpowers was their superior military capability which enabled them to control the world arms market. China's national strategy is to be the hegemon in East Asia and to have influence over the world. China's active arms export strengthens the Chinese influence upon the Third World, and advances its national strategy.

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