It is often the case that when economic ties expand through trade, and the exchange of people expands, diplomacy will also take a favorable turn. However, in terms of the Japan-China relationship, which is symbolized by “cold political relations but hot economical relations,” such progress is not occurring. Because of incidents such as the collision of fishing boats off the coast of the Senkaku Islands, political tensions do not seem to be withering. Both Japan and China admit that the reason for this is the existence of the historical perception issue.
However, until the 1970s, the historical perception issue was a domestic Japanese issue rather than a pending problem between Japan and China; but in 1982, with the textbook incident, it became an international issue. During this process, both the Japanese and Chinese governments have made certain political “compromises,” but this has instead stimulated domestic radical claims and both nations strengthening their nationalism, and this has created the structure of a vicious cycle.
Furthermore, in the background, a composition was made involving the “politicization” of the historical perceptions of both countries and the “asymmetry” of respecting Chinese claims.
Moreover, in recent years, the downturn of Japan and the rise of China have been making the historical perception issue more complex. In other words, the historical situation that Japan and China have never experienced coexistence as great powers, has been promoting a sense of mutual rivalry,which has undeniably led to the historical perception issue becoming more complicated.
The historical perception issue has become a complex phenomenon as a result of its expansion in both countries after the textbook incident, such that the issue spans several dimensions of political diplomacy, academic research,and national sentiment; and it is becoming difficult to discuss it only within the framework of each government’s diplomacy. Therefore, it is necessary to work on the historical perception issue not only by considering diplomacy,but also by keeping watch on the achievements of academic research and on public opinion in both countries.

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Since the end of World War II, historical legacy has caused a series of disputes between Japan and South Korea. Scholars attribute these repeated disputes to Japan’s failure to settle the compensation problem, American foreign policy toward Japan in the early period of the Cold War, the unequal distribution of national capabilities between Japan and South Korea during the Cold War, and the particularities of nationalism in both countries. The literature emphasizes the peculiarities in the Japan-South Korea disputes. However, this does not mean that we are not able to explain the Japan-South Korea disputes in a systematic manner. For example, Kagotani, Kimura, and Weber (2014) argue that South Korean leaders are more likely to initiate a political dispute with Japan in order to divert public attention from economic turmoil to Japan-South Korea disputes. What else drives South Korean leaders to start a political dispute with Japan?
In this article, we focus on South Korean leaders’ motives and policy alternatives to explain how a trade dispute evolves into a political dispute between Japan and South Korea. We assume that a South Korean president is a policy-oriented actor and prefers to take a soft line toward Japan to manage Japan-South Korea relationships. The president also needs political support from the legislature in order to implement public policy. As the presidential approval rate declines, a candidate for the next president tends to behave as a hard-liner to attract public attention, and the legislature follows the candidate, not the president. To implement good public policy, the president is required to maintain his/her popularity and take a hard line.
Given such political constraints, we examine the president’s choice. When the president faces a large trade deficit, he prefers to start a trade negotiation with Japan, not to initiate a political dispute to divert public attention. Only if the negotiation fails, the president initiates a political dispute by addressing historical legacy because issue-linkage can induce mutual concessions, and because even a concession in the political dispute, not the trade dispute, can help the president maintain his/her popularity in order to move back to a soft-line in the subsequent periods. Thus, the president often engages in this diversionary tactic and a trade dispute often evolves into a political dispute.
We test whether a trade deficit is more likely to induce more South Korean hostile actions toward Japan. The statistical analysis using the event data confirms that trade imbalance favoring Japan often causes a political dispute regarding historical legacy. The case studies of Presidents Rho Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam reveal political decisions behind the escalation of Japan-South Korean disputes.

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China’s transition process in its manner of approaching the Anti-Japan War history (known as the Second Sino–Japanese War in China) in different stages is characterized by the following features. (1) From 1949 to 1978, “history” was understood to be Revolutionary history; the Anti-Japan War history was not accorded much importance and addressing historical facts was determined by political considerations. (2) From 1978 to 1989, even though the Anti-Japan War history received greater emphasis, it was mainly necessary to counter historical revisionist currents in Japan and work toward unification with Taiwan; further, all this while, China was committed to maintaining friendly relations with Japan. (3) The era of rocketing patriotism that began in 1989 witnessed a steady increase in the Chinese emphasis on the history of the Anti-Japan War; thus, currently, along with countering historical revisionism from Japan’s viewpoint, domestic political considerations, modifications to foreign policy, and a revised perception regarding the two countries’ relationship in the wake of China’s rise as a major world power are the main driving forces.

China’s approach to the history of the Anti-Japan War is not a simple historiographical problem; the fact that it is a general problem with a high degree of political sensitivity suggests that, for the reasons provided below, it is one that is fraught with side effects for the Chinese authorities. First, the close relation of the Anti-Japan War’s history to a more multifaceted history implies that the rise of interest in the former will not stop with the China–Japan relations but will highlight the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) history and its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT). On the other hand, the diversification and increased availability of sources of information indicates that information with a bearing on history can no longer be controlled as in the past. Thus, the expanding interest into historical problems associated with the anti-Japan war’s history suggests that the Chinese populace is gaining awareness regarding some historical facts avoided by the ruling authorities until now. Second, applying a “proper view of history,” which China had demanded from Japan, is certainly also being demanded from China. Thus, how China recognizes and responds to its own history has been questioned inside and outside the country.

Manifestation of these side effects is palpable in the China–Taiwan dispute regarding claims to leadership in the anti-Japanese war and the internal Chinese controversy about the authenticity of its “historical nihilism.” Considering the China–Japan interactions, China’s demand to take a “direct view of history” has not only spurred improvements in Japan’s historical awareness but also served to promote improvement in China’s own historical awareness.

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