The former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established “the Comprehensive National Security Study Group” in 1979, which mainly consisted of Japanese leading scholars and government officials. However, the term “comprehensive security” was not invented by him, but was already well known to Japanese people at the end of the 1970s.
Many previous studies have discussed the concept from various points of view. However, they have not explained in what ways policy-makers accepted it and regarded it as an integral factor in Japanese security policy.
This study focuses on the impacts of comprehensive security on policy-makers, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which was in charge of general security issues. It clarifies the situation in which comprehensive security appeared, explains what perceptions the ministry had of the concept, and shows how international and internal factors in those days influenced those perceptions, using declassified Japanese and U.S. government documents.
It also pays attention to the different forms of security, focusing the discussion on the attempt to establish the “National Comprehensive Security Council” during the Zenko Suzuki Administration at the beginning of the 1980s. Comprehensive security did not simply comprise military security – i.e. security in the narrow sense – but also economic security, food security and others, i.e. security in the broad sense. At the same time, into comprehensive security was integrated anything that did not otherwise fall into the category of security.
These elements contributed to jurisdictional disputes. The differentiation of security led other ministries and agencies to become concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was interested in economic security, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, among others, was concerned with food security.
At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manifest interest in comprehensive security. Its main concern was security in the narrow sense because of an administrative dispute with the Japan Defense Agency. This study shows how it started to become involved in comprehensive security, and demonstrates what impact the differentiation of security had on ministries and agencies.
Previous studies have regarded the Japanese government as a single actor, and have not revealed the differences between ministries and agencies. This paper demonstrates that for the Japanese government, the concept was not monolithic. Even though ministries and agencies were allied on the surface, they had different opinions and objectives. By investigating the acceptance of comprehensive security, this study aims to clarify the implications of this concept in the context of U.S.-Japan relations in the last phase of the Cold War.
This article analyses the speeches of Japanese prime ministers during the Cold War period to clarify their ideas on foreign aid, including ODA. During this period no single document existed to provide a definitive policy on foreign aid, whereas in the post-Cold War period the ODA Charter of 1992 plays such a role. In light of this, some have argued that there existed no clear doctrine in Japanese foreign assistance during the period. After examining the prime ministers' speeches the author set up a hypothesis regarding the ideas on foreign aid held by each prime minister. This article is an attempt to explain policy-makers' doctrines on foreign aid on the basis of primary sources. The author concentrates his attention on the ideas which clarify the primary motives concerning foreign aid for each prime minister.
The conclusions of this article are as follows. It is possible to identify key words or phrases for each prime minister which represent his ideas on foreign aid, such as Asia, trade, free world, international society, responsibility, contribution, comprehensive security and interdependence. As an attempt to understand better the mutual relations of such key words or phrases, three coordinate axes may be established. The first axis has Asian solidarity on one end and cooperation with Europe and America on the other. The second axis has external economic interests on one end and national security on the other. The third axis is extended upward from the intersection point of the first and second axes and indicates the degree of comprehensiveness. Each prime minister's ideas on foreign aid can be positioned within such a coordinate system by considering mainly the key words and phrases described above.