The former Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established “the Comprehensive National Security Study Group” in 1979, which mainly consisted of Japanese leading scholars and government officials. However, the term “comprehensive security” was not invented by him, but was already well known to Japanese people at the end of the 1970s.
Many previous studies have discussed the concept from various points of view. However, they have not explained in what ways policy-makers accepted it and regarded it as an integral factor in Japanese security policy.
This study focuses on the impacts of comprehensive security on policy-makers, and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which was in charge of general security issues. It clarifies the situation in which comprehensive security appeared, explains what perceptions the ministry had of the concept, and shows how international and internal factors in those days influenced those perceptions, using declassified Japanese and U.S. government documents.
It also pays attention to the different forms of security, focusing the discussion on the attempt to establish the “National Comprehensive Security Council” during the Zenko Suzuki Administration at the beginning of the 1980s. Comprehensive security did not simply comprise military security – i.e. security in the narrow sense – but also economic security, food security and others, i.e. security in the broad sense. At the same time, into comprehensive security was integrated anything that did not otherwise fall into the category of security.
These elements contributed to jurisdictional disputes. The differentiation of security led other ministries and agencies to become concerned with security in a broader sense. For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was interested in economic security, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, among others, was concerned with food security.
At first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not manifest interest in comprehensive security. Its main concern was security in the narrow sense because of an administrative dispute with the Japan Defense Agency. This study shows how it started to become involved in comprehensive security, and demonstrates what impact the differentiation of security had on ministries and agencies.
Previous studies have regarded the Japanese government as a single actor, and have not revealed the differences between ministries and agencies. This paper demonstrates that for the Japanese government, the concept was not monolithic. Even though ministries and agencies were allied on the surface, they had different opinions and objectives. By investigating the acceptance of comprehensive security, this study aims to clarify the implications of this concept in the context of U.S.-Japan relations in the last phase of the Cold War.
This article analyses the speeches of Japanese prime ministers during the Cold War period to clarify their ideas on foreign aid, including ODA. During this period no single document existed to provide a definitive policy on foreign aid, whereas in the post-Cold War period the ODA Charter of 1992 plays such a role. In light of this, some have argued that there existed no clear doctrine in Japanese foreign assistance during the period. After examining the prime ministers' speeches the author set up a hypothesis regarding the ideas on foreign aid held by each prime minister. This article is an attempt to explain policy-makers' doctrines on foreign aid on the basis of primary sources. The author concentrates his attention on the ideas which clarify the primary motives concerning foreign aid for each prime minister.
The conclusions of this article are as follows. It is possible to identify key words or phrases for each prime minister which represent his ideas on foreign aid, such as Asia, trade, free world, international society, responsibility, contribution, comprehensive security and interdependence. As an attempt to understand better the mutual relations of such key words or phrases, three coordinate axes may be established. The first axis has Asian solidarity on one end and cooperation with Europe and America on the other. The second axis has external economic interests on one end and national security on the other. The third axis is extended upward from the intersection point of the first and second axes and indicates the degree of comprehensiveness. Each prime minister's ideas on foreign aid can be positioned within such a coordinate system by considering mainly the key words and phrases described above.
Was the Sino-American Rapprochement a turning point that changed everything? In 1969, the ROC changed the military strategy from “Offensive Posture” to “Unity of Offensive and Defensive”. Certainly, the advent of Nixon gave a big impact to the ROC’s national security, which heavily relied on the US. However, the ROC Government might decide to change its military strategy from “Retaking the Mainland,” which had been attempted for over a decade, to building up the consolidation of Taiwan’s defense when encountering the escalation of the PRC’s military threat even at the peak of the chaotic Great Leap Forward and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
The chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s provided a chance for the ROC to retake the mainland. The ROC would have been able to initiate military operations if received support from the US Nevertheless, US Government after the Kennedy administration was seeking coexistence with the PRC and therefore rejected all ROC’s requests.
At that time the PRC was strengthening its nuclear capability and conventional forces despite being in a state of political chaos. In response to the growing military threat of the PRC, improvement of the ROC government’s defense capability to secure “Taiwan” became its top priority. Moreover, when the US abolition of Military Assistance Program was announced, the ROC Government was forced to improve military advancement at the expense of its own economy and spend the limited budget on defense in priority. Therefore, the ROC Government had begun to reform the “Offensive Posture” strategy that it adopted since 1949, and decided to change to the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy that focused on defense more than before. This was before Nixon put forth the “Guam Doctrine” and started to approach the PRC.
Division of “China” was incorporated into the Cold War and immobilized. Although the chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s was likely to develop into “hot war” if ROC took military action. The US suppressed the ROC’s action for changing the status quo and avoided military conflict with the PRC. There is no doubt that the current US-China-Taiwan relations was formed in the 1970s, beginning with Nixon’s rapprochement to the PRC. However, the structure of maintaining the status quo of the ROC’s endeavor to acquire the US military commitment to resist the PRC’s continuous military expansion was gradually formed through the 1960s.
In the pre-negotiation stage, the most difficult obstacle to start the Japan-Soviet normalization negotiation turned out to be the issue of the Japan-US Security Treaty. While Japan regarded it as the most fundamental framework to realize its security, the Soviet Union did not change its position that the Treaty was an obstacle to start Japan-Soviet negotiations. This article investigates what kinds of discussions were held within the political leadership of the Soviet Union on the positioning of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the process of normalization with Japan. An analysis of declassified Soviet archival documents reveals the following five points. First, the Korean War changed the Soviet Union’s perception of the threat posed by the US forces stationed in Japan, and the role of the Kuril Islands in their defense policy changed accordingly. Second, as for the issue of peace with Japan, the division in the Soviet Union’s political leadership after Stalin’s death was most evident in the question of whether or not to accept the Japan-US Security Treaty. Third, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with differences in opinion on this point. Fourth, after the start of negotiations, the political leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchev, overturned Foreign Minister Molotov’s negotiating stance of not accepting the Japan-US Security Treaty, and made a decision to “accept” it under certain conditions. Fifth, the Soviets’ proposal on transferring Habomais and Shikotan islands to Japan was closely related with their decision to “accept” the Japan-US Security Treaty.
The ODA charter was enacted in 1992. This document provided a fundamental view of the Japanese ODA policy. The factors which led to this charter's enactment are various. However, the influence of the deliberations on ODA, especially in the House of Councilors, was large. The research committee of the House of Councilors is a committee for investigating. The results of the activities of this committee were summarized in a report, and, as a result, the resolution was passed. Moreover, considerable legislation was also proposed by the members of the House of Councilors about ODA in the meantime. The establishment of the ODA charter can be regarded as a response by the administration to these activities. Thus, it is thought that the activities of the Diet greatly influenced the establishment of the ODA charter. Such activities of the Diet will become a model case for policy making by the Diet. It also became easy for the Diet to control Japanese ODA policy by having made the charter.