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Based on R.Brubaker’s sociological framework for “eventful” nationalisms,this paper presented the formation processes of the dominant “we” vision (so called “national identity”) of the post-war Okinawa in the early 1950s. It focused on the transaction between the vision formation and the institutions/policies of the two relating governments, the U.S. and Japan.
The term “Complex Nation” refers to the “we” vision represented by simultaneous employment of the two different categories of “nation”, in this case “Japanese” and “Okinawan”. This concept was introduced to avoid the dominant, but theoretically invalid presumption that see “national identities” are mutually exclusive.
In pre-WWII Okinawa, the modern “we” vision was formulated as a distinctive ethnic group that constitutes a segment of the Japanese nation. The term “Okinawan” was not expressively linked to the thought of Self-Determination.
This “we” vision, however, was destabilized when the Japanese rule was replaced by that of the American’s after the war. I argued that the reconfiguration processes of the “we” vision in the early post-war period may be revealed by paying attention to the formation and relating processes of the three Self-Determination derived ideals arose at that time. These are Jichi (self-governance), KeizaiJiritsu (economic self-support) of the Okinawan Nation and Fukki (reversion to the Japanese Nation).
After verifying the fact that Jichi and keizaiJiritsu became idiomatic phases by 1950,
I argued that the “national identity” formation processes of the two different vectors occurred simultaneously in 1951.
One was the process of the strengthening Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, caused by the American institutions/policies conflictive to these ideals.
The frequent American interventions in the civil affairs that were supposed to be reserved for the self-governance of Okinawan left the Okinawa Gunto Government with little self-deciding power to practice.
The keizaiJiritsu ideal, put forward by the Okinawa Gunto Government in its economic plan, was also denied by the U.S., because the “native” industrial growth was considered as of secondly importance.
The resulted grievances strengthened the Okinawan’s normative attachment to Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, and the vision of “we” as a self-determining subject.
The process of the other vector, the formation and mainstreaming of Fukki proceeded simultaneously.
The trade with Japan, reopened in 1950, constituted the structural factor. The Japanese government institutions/policies that established the tariff and non-tariff barriers against Okinawan commodities stimulated the Okinawan perception that the Okinawan export industries could only survive if it had a free access to the Japanese market, and placed under the Japanese Government protection.
The actual reversionist movement arose when the negotiation on the political status of Okinawa after the peace treaty started between Japan and the U.S. in the early 1951.
The “we” vision put forward by the reversionists, however, was qualitatively different from the “we” vision of the pre-war type since the category “Okinawan” now connoted “the self-determining subject”. What came into being was a frame of vision in which the two categories of self-determining subject are rhetorically connected to represent “we”.

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The expansion and convergence of Japan's “borders” at first glance looks natural. However, if we shift it to the “periphery,” one can see some artificialness. Previous research discussed Japan's border and boundary, presenting novel views on Japan's past and present.
As an island nation, Japan has been beset with problems and conflicts. It is difficult to attribute these contradictions by using simple oppositional relations such as the ‘central’ and the ‘periphery.’ The formation of modern Japan as an island nation is a product of peripherally located islands integrated towards the central mainland. On the other hand, the fact that war, coercion, and competition among islands ended diversification cannot be overlooked.
The boundary formation of Japan's islands possibly went through four phases: “blur,” a bound area without a defined range but with a spread; “zone,” a boundary with a recognized width; “dashed line,” a confirmed but unofficial line demarcating sphere of influence); and “solid line,” a legally defined border.
This change may have been affected by the expansion of the power sphere and the island groups being separated by the straits. However, ancient Japan, or Wa, could not have had territorial ambition towards the Asian continent. On the contrary, Wa acquired its authority from the Chinese and was on its way to building a unified legal state. The straits were a buffer zone between ancient Japan and China and Korea.
Soon, Japan's sphere of power expanded to distant islands by developing an occupational foundation. In the modern era, to the west and to the south, Japan expanded to the Korean peninsula and the inlands of the Asian continent, and eventually expanded to the Inner and the Outer South Seas. In those areas, the use of armed forces to wage war assumed a major role in the formation of the “border.” To the north, despite Japan's peaceful acquisition of Chishima, the history of border transformation, after the complete occupation of Sakhalin following the Russo-Japanese War, has been irrevocably tied to war.
This article reconsiders the meaning of the Japan's ‘border’ and the processes that lead from its expansion to its reduction following World War II. This will be done by highlighting the issues and problems relating to border islands. The author pays particular attention to islands where turbulent changes lead to confusion in the society, to decline, and to being ‘peripheralized.’ Examining how these border islands managed hardships will prove indispensable for viewing and establishing policies on Japan's future border islands.
There have been arguments against studying the meaning of “boundaries” in the context of Japanese history, but this article challenges the present conditions.

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