American alliance system in Asia is characterized as a unique bundle of bilateral alliances, different from the multilateral collective defense organization in Europe. Why is there no NATO in Asia? To answer the question, scholars in the field of diplomatic history and international relations have debated diverse aspects of the system and its origins. Diplomatic historians tend to focus on the legacy of historical experiences of war and colonization in the form of deep mistrust and suspicion of the regional states against Japan in the postwar Asia-Pacific. While neo-realists emphasize the structural factors such as distribution of power and power gap among regional states, constructivists look to collective identities and norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention.

Agreeing with major findings of historical studies, this article aims to introduce a logical and theoretical framework to put actions and reactions taken by the reginal states, with a focus on Syngman Rhee’s South Korea, vis-à-vis the American design to form regional alliance system in a broader perspective. Usually, President Rhee’s anti-Communist and anti-Japanese policies are described as emotional and irrational. This article suggests that his aggressive Cold War policy was in close coalition with “rollbackers” in the US. By focusing on the structure, this article intends to shed a new light on the interaction between anti-communist and anti-Japanese policies during Rhee administration.