The provision for a congressional veto permits Congress to monitor the implementation of the policies by the Executive without the enactment of additional legislation. In all cases, the legislation establishing the congressional veto is presented to the president for his signature. The congressional veto is generally composed of the simple resolution or the concurrent resolution of Congress. Actually, they are not presented to the president. So, it is true that there are many people believe that the congressional veto is contrary to the presentation clause of the Constitution(Article 1, section 7, clause 3). Through the congressional veto, Congress delegates some of the law-making role to the President or his appointees. But when Congress defines policy goals of the executive branch and directs the Executive to develop and effect them subject to post hoc review, the presidential veto is functionally unnecessary.

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The United States Constitution gives the President the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate (Art.II, Sec.2, Para.2). The Senate approves a treaty with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present. By adopting such a system, the Framers intended to restrain the presidential treaty-making power and protect the states' interest. The Framers' intent to restrain the presidential treaty power was undeniably respected until the Senate refused to give its consent to the Treaty of Versailles. However, since the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, criticism that the Senate's monopoly of the consenting power is not only undemocratic and inefficient, but also unfitting in the age of internationalization has been constantly raised. At present, many of the United State's international agreements with foreign governments are concluded with the approval of the majority of both Houses of the Congress. Such an international agreement is called a congressional-executive agreement. It covers almost all fields, such as affiliation with international organizations, conclusion of economic and military agreements, etc., which fall within the sphere of the treatymaking power. Moreover, its legal validity is regarded the same as that of a treaty internationally and internally. Therefore, a congressional-executive agreement is said to be an alternative to a treaty. The Constitution has no provision to empower the Congress to approve an international agreement. Nevertheless, Congress' power to approve an international agreement has been under discussion from the beginning, and when the United States tried to join the WTO, vehement controversy arose with respect to the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreement. This problem has drawn further attention since the Senate failed to give its consent to the CTBT. Scholarly views on this issue are roughly divided into two. One is that the Congressional powers enumerated in art.I, Sec.8 including the necessary and proper clause support the constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement. The other is that it is clearly unconstitutional in the light of the words and construction of the constitutional provision in Art.II, Sec.2, and Para.2. So far, the US Supreme Court has not handed down its judgment on the constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement, and so this problem is not legally settled. This paper will examine how the Senate's power of consent has been changing and study the significance and constitutionality of a congressional-executive agreement as an alternative to a treaty.

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1 The significance and contents on the enactment of emergency laws 2 The participation of the Diet and its comparioson between Japan and U.S. (1) the case of U.S. (2) the case of Japan (3) the characteristic and the comparison of the case between Japan and U.S. (4) the clegislative veto or the approval with time limit by the Diet 3 Viewpoints for the laws of protecting nations (1) the outline of Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) in U.S. (1) basic guideline on the foundation of the FEMA (2) structures and functions of the FEMA (2) the present conditions of disaster-prevention organization in Japan -the case Shizuoka Prefecture- Conclusion

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In section 1, constitutional issues of the House supermajority rule are examined. On the opening day of the 104th Congress, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives adopted Rule XXI that requires a three-fifths vote to pass an increase in income tax. In approving this rule, the House relied on its constitutionally delegated power to determine the rules of its proceedings. In section 2, procedual obstacles to a rule challenge are described. Before a decision on the constitutionality of the rule can be reached, two hurdles must be overcome; the doctrine of legislative standing and the doctrine of remedial discretion. This article finds, in this supermajority rule case, that Representatives satisfy standing requirements and that the doctrine of remedial discretion does not act as a bar to judicial review. In section 3, constitutionality of the House supermajority rule is discussed. The principle of majority-rule is so fundamental that the Framers found it unnecessary to explicitly proclaim it in the Constitution. And several provisions of the Constitution support the idea that the Framers intended the majority-rule to govern in all situations besides those specifically enumerated. This article concludes that the majority-rule is a Constitutional norm with which the House cannot interfere.

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