The U.S. withdrew the troops from South Vietnam and the ROK on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, implemented détente that supported relaxing international tension by U.S.-China reconciliation, and pursued peaceful coexistence on the premise of the status quo in Asia. This is the reason why I focus on the Vietnam War which had been the background that caused structural changes of the Cold War in East Asia. And, the Vietnam War was the first test case that the U.S. and South Korea cooperated in the actual combat since the formation of the alliance. The experience in Vietnam was the opportunity for the ROK government to know the possibility and the degree of the support from the U. S. in times of emergency.

However, few previous studies have ever been done on the Vietnam War from South Korean viewpoints of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In that sense, the questions caused by the foreign policy of the U.S. must be demonstrated as follows; first, as a divided country like South Vietnam, what did the ROK government think about the U.S. support in combat? Secondly, while peace negotiations went on, what was considered necessary by the South Koreans? Thirdly, after Paris Peace Accords, what were South Korean views on it and how did the ROK government respond to the problem by its policy? Lastly, how did Koreans feel about the fall of Saigon and what was the difference between the U.S. and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula issues of post-Vietnam War?

The purpose of this paper is to explore further into the Vietnam War, associated with the ROK and the U.S.-ROK alliance, based on the diplomatic archives. Especially, I would like to focus attention on the question of how the ROK government dealt with Vietnam’s situation in the process of US withdrawal and what happened to its way between self-defense and the alliance since then.

Through the whole analysis, the following conclusions were obtained; the first is South Korea became aware of partnership from the patron-client relationship and the transferring of operational control of South Korean forces because of the Vietnam War. The second is unilateral US withdrawal plan and the end of the war by negotiations decreased reliability of US military commitment in ROK. Nevertheless, South Korea also reconfirmed that the alliance was indispensable to the national security. The third is the U. S. reduced the possibility of direct intervention in conflict on the Korean peninsula after the Vietnam War. One final point is the Vietnam War was a factor to accelerate self-defense policy in Seoul.

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North Korea's foreign policy and its policy toward South Korea obviously wavered after the Cold War. Why did North Korea's policy toward the South seesaw between cooperation and conflict? The purpose of this article is to examine under what conditions North Korea cooperates with South Korea.
Firstly, although during the Cold War North Korea had shown conflictive behavior toward the South, the U. S. and Japan, after the Cold War its policy distinctively shifted to cooperation. For balance of power on Korean peninsula in this period, South Korea was remarkably superior to the North. Was balance of power the causal element of North Korea's cooperation? An investigation of the article demonstrates that objective balance of power did not draw on the North's cooperative behavior. Change of South Korea's policy toward the North and cleavage in the South's domestic politics affected the North's policy, while the North reviewed its definition of “nation” and “nationalism” which could be seen as subjective element of the North's behavior toward the South.
Secondly, North Korea's policy, in turn, shifted to conflict after its declaration of withdrawal from NPT. Strictly speaking, around its declaration of withdrawal North Korea explored cooperation with the South in contrast to confrontation against the U. S., but, as soon as the U. S. -North talk launched, the North intensified cooperation with the U. S. in reverse to conflict against the South. How can such a distortion of North Korea's policy be coherent? An examination of the article shows that South Korea's policy was reversed to a hard-line in terms of “legitimacy” of state, subsequently the North's policy also returned to conflictive and exclusive one. And here also balance of power did not necessarily affect the North's policy into cooperation as well as above-observation. Rather, above-mentioned subjective element produced the North's exclusive behavior against the South, which was regarded, according to a North Korean peculiar view, as “treacherous” or “a puppet of the American Imperialism”.
Thirdly, there have been talks and agreements between North and South Korea, such as the North-South Joint Statement in July 1972, mutual visit of divided families in the mid 1980's, the basic Agreements between the South and the North in December 1991, and the North-South Summit Meeting in June 2000. A comparative analysis indicates the following: North Korea's policy and behavior in 1970's and the mid-1980's could not be seen cooperative in spite of some talks and agreements, because there had been prevailing view of “legitimacy” of state and “liberation of The South” with North Korea. After the Cold War, it was verified that North Korea's behavior and policy changed with the South's policy and their domestic politics, and more than anything-else, the North' cooperation with the South was conditioned under whether of appeasing “legitimacy” of state.

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