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  • 太田 久元
    史学雑誌
    2015年 124 巻 2 号 210-236
    発行日: 2015/02/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1933 the Imperial Japanese Navy went through a comprehensive restructuring of its organization, through the process of revising its Naval General Staff Regulations and Protocol for Naval Ministry-Staff Liaison Affairs. What these revisions amounted to was the Naval General Staff attaining autonomy from a system formerly dominated by the Naval Ministry. Although we find some mention of these revisions in the research to date on the Imperial Navy, the relative inavailability of source materials has hindered any full-scale, detailed treatment of the subject. Here the author attempts to fill the existing gaps by offering a more detailed account of the response of the Navy's top mind's in an analysis of the information offered by the diary of Iwamura Seiichi, then senior adjutant in the Naval Ministry. In time of war with the establishment of Imperial Headquarters, the Naval General Staff was to be the agency for implementing IH's naval functions, while during peacetime, the Ministry was in charge of naval affairs. Although there was dissatisfaction within the ranks concerning such an arrangement, the Ministry refused to address the problem, thus maintaining the status quo. However, the situation began to change surrounding the issue of supreme command raised at the first London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930. Over the issue of troop strength, the Naval General Staff demanded that the Ministry make concessions, resulting in the implementation in 1933 of measures expanding the authority of the Naval General Staff. These revisions were particularly important for the issues of troop strength and who controlled the flow of military developments. The former issue, which was the source of attacks on the government from the Seiyukai Party and right-wing organization, had not been provided for in the existing Liaison Affairs Protocol; however, provisions were made as the result of a proposal submitted by the Chief of Staff and successful negotiations with the Minister of the Navy. Control over the flow of military developments had been in peacetime part of the Naval General Staff's regimental command authority. For example, when the need arose to protect Japanese citizens residing abroad, the Naval Minister would request the despatch of troops and after cabinet approval, the Naval General Staff would begin strategy planning under the leadership of the Naval Minister. However, following the Protocol revisions, the Naval General Staff was permitted to propose troop deployment independently. In other words, within the revision process, the Naval General Staff was able for the first time to establish autonomous authority over naval affairs.
  • 金指 正三
    法制史研究
    1980年 1980 巻 30 号 228-231
    発行日: 1981/03/30
    公開日: 2009/11/16
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ─「協同輔翼」をめぐる慣行─
    浅井 隆宏
    法政論叢
    2018年 54 巻 1 号 35-
    発行日: 2018年
    公開日: 2018/07/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 鈴木 多聞
    史学雑誌
    2004年 113 巻 11 号 1837-1865
    発行日: 2004/11/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It was in February 1944 that then Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (also Minister of the Army) and Naval Minister Shimada Shigetaro were jointly appointed as Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, respectively. Such a breach of tradition in separating the civil and military administration of the armed forces presented an opportunity for the veteran Naval officers who wanted a quick end to the War to publicly criticize Tojo, criticism that is thought to have been one cause of the Cabinet's downfall. The research to date argues that the joint appointments were made for two reasons : one to overcome opposition between civil ministers and the military chiefs of staff, the other to fight the peace movement being conducted by the naval officers. While it would not be surprising that the peace movement that would be begin in earnest the following year was already brewing, what is puzzling is why Shimada would receive the joint appointment when no opposition existed between his ministry and the naval supreme command. Did Tojo and Shimada really begin to feel the threat posed by the peacenik naval officers? Or could there be some other political reason besides the peace movement that the conventional research has overlooked? In this article, the author focuses on opposition that arose within both the naval ranks and the supreme command, looking at such issues as the conversion of the navy into an air force, unification of the military supreme commands and the supreme command system itself, in order to show that the joint appointments were made to form a system of army-navy cooperation within the supreme command and avoid a change of government. Traditionally, both the Army and the Navy had their own air forces, which were funded on an equal basis. The Army and Naval chiefs of staff both insisted on more emphasis being put on their respective air forces in realizing the slim possibility of winning the War. Since both sides were convinced that funding allocation rates would determine the outcome of the War, the supreme command could not come to a decision about the military strength of the two branches. This resource mobilization problem then began to reverberate within the government and developed into an issue threatening the continuation of the present cabinet. The Emperor, who had given Tojo his vote of confidence, began to hint about a change of government and thus was not able to reach a political compromise over the opposition between the Army and Navy over military strategy. Consequently, the upper ranks of the Army, which was aimed at defending the home front and veteran naval officers who aimed at reviving the War came to odds over where the war front should be positioned. It was this opposition that led directly to the downfall of the Tojo Cabinet.
  • ―1920年代の陸軍と統帥権―
    森 靖夫
    年報政治学
    2008年 59 巻 1 号 1_241-1_262
    発行日: 2008年
    公開日: 2012/12/28
    ジャーナル フリー
      This article examines the struggle for the control of the army between the army and political parties.
      In prewar Japan only military offices could assume the military ministers. It has commonly been accepted that this rule made it difficult for civilians to control the Army and it was the decisive power resource of the army. However, this view cannot explain why party cabinets between 1924 and 1932 failed to institutionalize civilian control over the army and how the army reacted to the establishment of party politics in this period.
      This paper mainly provides two new views. First, in the 1920s, the army agreed reluctantly to give up military minister posts to parties due to the rise of parties. Second, in spite of this compromise of the Army, the Army still maintained these posts because the prime ministers and the army ministers agreed to avoid a rapid rule change and control the army by their leadership.
      The failure of civilian control in prewar Japan did not stem solely from formal rules. Party cabinets could develop their power and control the Army by aggressively enforcing formal rules and taking their initiative. Yet, they failed to establish their political supremacy over the Army in the 1920s and it led to militarism afterward.
  • 手嶋 泰伸
    史学雑誌
    2013年 122 巻 9 号 1507-1538
    発行日: 2013/09/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article focuses on the relationship between the campaign to set up a cabinet under the premiership of Hiranuma Kiichiro and the Japanese Navy during the years of the Saito Makoto cabinet (25 May 1932-8 July 1934), in order to place this campaign within the context of the strengthening of the military supreme command system from the 1930's onward and clarify the influence of Hiranuma's plan upon the Navy, and the influence the resulting changes in the Navy exerted upon the campaign. In order to overcome a divided structure of governance, in particular control over military authorities, Hiranuma's campaign won faction leaders over to its side and utilized the authority of the imperial family. Therefore, Hiranuma's plan for controlling the military authorities did call for institutional reorganization, but rather depended on personal connections. Hiranuma made Fushiminomiya Hiroyasu chief of the Naval General Staff (NGS) with the cooperation of the Kantai (Fleet) Faction led by Admiral Kato Hiroharu, going as far as to reorganize the system by extending the authority of the NGS. However, the Kantai Faction lost its unifying position in the Navy when it was criticized for politicizing the NGS and politically utilizing the imperial family. Since Hiranuma's plan to control the military authorities involved winning over the leaders of the various factions, the fall of the Kantai Faction from power brought about the failure Hiranuma to act as the unifier of the divided governance system. Therefore, the campaign to form a Hiranuma Cabinet and the reinforcement of the supreme command in the navy developed under interrelationship of mutual influence. The collapse of the campaign after the Kantai Faction's attempt to utilize the authority of the imperial family resulted in the loss of its unifying position in the Navy means no less than the failure of Hiranuma's efforts to overcome the divided structure of governance by means of personal connections. Only the extension of NGS power-in other words, the strengthened independence of Supreme Command-remained after Kato's retreat and the collapse of the Hiranuma campaign.
  • 義井 博
    史学雑誌
    1976年 85 巻 7 号 1081-1087
    発行日: 1976/07/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 野村 実
    史学雑誌
    1995年 104 巻 2 号 256-
    発行日: 1995/02/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 温
    史学雑誌
    1982年 91 巻 12 号 1876-1877
    発行日: 1982/12/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 池田 清
    史学雑誌
    1982年 91 巻 12 号 1875-1876
    発行日: 1982/12/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 斎藤 聖二
    国際政治
    1998年 1998 巻 119 号 192-208,L22
    発行日: 1998年
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Japan's entry into World War I is often said to have been at the behest of its ally, Britain. The First World War began on 28 July and Britain entered the war on 4 August. Three days later, Britain requested Japan to remove the German fleet from Tsingtao (Qindao) in China as Britain wanted protection for its merchants ships sailing the coast of China.
    However, even before that, Japan had already begun to believe that it would become involved in the war after learning on 2 August that Russia, with which Japan had concluded an entente, would be going to war with Germany. The Minister of the Navy had sent an order to the commander of the Second Fleet to prepare for deployment. The “strategic plan” for the removal of the German fleet from Tsingtao was already being hammered out by the next day. The army also had begun preparing its own battle plans. From 4 August, the entire navy had already begun concrete preparations for fighting the Germans in Tsingtao. Preparations for the Second Fleet were completed along with those for the expeditionary force on the tenth day of that month. The request from Britain came when these preparations were already underway. It is, therefore, clear that Japan's entry into the war was not simply a result of the British request.
    The army, the navy, the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and powerful politicians were all as eager to join the fight with Germany as the Foreign Minister. Leading politicians from the older generation and elderly statesmen (genro) were more cautious, but this proved to be more of an exception. It was the hope of the Foreign Minister and those that agreed with him that by chasing Germany out of China Japan would be able to establish hegemony over the Far East, strengthen its cooperative relationship with China, and furthermore, be able to improve its international standing by maneuvering to be one of the victor naitions after the war. Japan was given a concrete excuse for participating a war in Europe with the appearance of the British request. It is said that the Foreign Minister at that time tried to keep the genro out of the decision process. However, what was more important than anything for him was not the elimination of the genro from this process but to enter the war as quickly as possible.
    Until now, opposition voiced by part of the navy has been cited as evidence of the entire navy's reluctance to joining the war. However, it is not possible to understand the events after 2 August through that kind of interpretation. Furthermore, since the navy were busying themselves with plans forestablishing a central headquarters, it is difficult to say that Japan's entry in the war was a passive event. Although there was some disagreement among the genro and part of the navy, the Japanese-German war in Tsingtao was a war that was unanimously advocated by the cabinet and that was voluntarily started with the same purposes, ambitions and plans as any other war. The war did not happen because of coincidental request from a foreign government; the Japanese government was able to make use of the British request to further its own aims. Even if the Tsingtao war had not occurred, there can be little doubt that Japan would have taken on Germany at some point given Japan's intentions.
  • 細菌學雜誌
    1923年 1923and1924 巻 329 号 158
    発行日: 1923/02/10
    公開日: 2010/01/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―真田幸村と諸葛孔明―
    高橋 圭一
    近世文藝
    2009年 89 巻 31-42
    発行日: 2009年
    公開日: 2017/04/28
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 地学雑誌
    1901年 13 巻 7 号 458
    発行日: 1901/07/15
    公開日: 2010/12/22
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 服部 龍二
    史学雑誌
    2003年 112 巻 7 号 1217-1242
    発行日: 2003/07/20
    公開日: 2017/12/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 川田 稔
    人間環境学研究
    2004年 2 巻 1 号 1_37-1_49
    発行日: 2004年
    公開日: 2009/06/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    A series of political arguments during negotiation and ratification process of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was one of the most serious domestic political situations in modern Japan within the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, the Navy, the political parties such as Minseito and Seiyukai, the Privy Council, the Kizoku-in, the Army and civilian right wingers. The London treaty fight deeply affected the fate of Japan. This study examines the policy argument over the treaty, focusing on Prime Minister Hamaguchi who was a main player to press for the treaty. It has been pointed out that Hamaguchi was moved by budgetary concerns but those who were against ratification of the treaty like Admiral Kato Kanji, were opposed him from military point of view. My interpretation, however, is that there are other significant factors: Hamaguchi's and Kato's argument over how Japanese policy toward the United States and China should be, or the future of Japan should be as a member of international community. Hamaguchi and his opponents' ideas were so different, and that was one of the reasons for their serious conflict. After all the political argument within Japan, it can be said Japan's new state system operated by political parties including the Navy, the Army, and Privy Council was eventually working under the Hamaguchi Cabinet. At the same time, ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 made it possible for Japan to become one of the leading countries in international society, along with the United States and Britain.
  • 高野 大輔
    史学雑誌
    1998年 107 巻 2 号 275-276
    発行日: 1998/02/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 土田 宏成
    史学雑誌
    1998年 107 巻 2 号 274-275
    発行日: 1998/02/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 劉 明修
    史学雑誌
    1979年 88 巻 1 号 103-105
    発行日: 1979/01/20
    公開日: 2017/10/05
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 加藤 陽子
    史学雑誌
    1987年 96 巻 8 号 1257-1291,1407-
    発行日: 1987/08/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    Dai Hon'ei 大本営 (Imperial Military Headquarters) refers to the highest office organizing wartime military operations. This office was set up in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War with China which extended into the Pacific War. This paper deals with Dai Hon'ei established at the beginning of the War with China in November, 1937. It has been said that the Dai Hon'ei was very much the same in function as its Russo-Japanese War counterpart, or that it was merely a kind of the General Staff Office whose function was reorganized to meet the demands the war. World War I, as the first total war in human history, however, must have greatly influenced Japanese military authorities and stimulated them to study seriously the war tactics and the wartime systems of the participating countories. We may therefore conclude that the Japanese military authorities took into consideration the results of this careful study when establishing the third Dai Hon'ei. Based on this assumption, this paper discusses the formation process and characteristics of the Dai Hon'ei during the Japan-China War. The first chapter discusses the great changes which took place in the Dai Hon'ei set up in the Japan-China War in comparison with its predecessors. At the time of establishment it increased the authority of such military administrative authorities as the army minister, the vice minister, the director and the chief of military affairs, and the military chief, vis-a-vis the supreme command authorities. The Dai Hon'ei's functional emphasis on the military administrative authorities theoretically should have caused the Prime Minister to be concerned with the Dai Hon'ei, since the army minister was also Minister of State. What leads us to believe that more emphasis was now being placed on the minltary administration is the recognition that in the case of total war the administration and the supreme command should not be separated, but unified in terms of policy and strategy. The second chapter examines the fact that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei was not an isolated decision, but was made in relation with the Councillor System (Shangi-Sei 参議制), which was created by the government during roughly the same period, and was regarded as a cause of those government reforms which went as far as to totally revamp the cabinet system. Therefore it becomes clear that Konoe Fumimaro and the military authorities attemped to reform the government at the time of the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei, out of consideration that any dualism between state affiars and the military command would cause severe limitations on war mobilization efforts. While the move to the separate the Ministry of State from the Director of the Administrative Affairs was not realized, the successful establishment of the Sangi-Sei, was significant in empowering a minister without portfolio (Muninsho-Daijin-Sei 無任所大臣制). By including the unrealized cabinet reformation plan in the discussion, this paper emphsizes that the establishment of the Dai Hon'ei in the Japan-China War played a number of important roles not only in improving the capabilities for meeting the war demands, but also by being part of the reform plan for a wartime government system.
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