In 1933 the Imperial Japanese Navy went through a comprehensive restructuring of its organization, through the process of revising its Naval General Staff Regulations and Protocol for Naval Ministry-Staff Liaison Affairs. What these revisions amounted to was the Naval General Staff attaining autonomy from a system formerly dominated by the Naval Ministry. Although we find some mention of these revisions in the research to date on the Imperial Navy, the relative inavailability of source materials has hindered any full-scale, detailed treatment of the subject. Here the author attempts to fill the existing gaps by offering a more detailed account of the response of the Navy's top mind's in an analysis of the information offered by the diary of Iwamura Seiichi, then senior adjutant in the Naval Ministry. In time of war with the establishment of Imperial Headquarters, the Naval General Staff was to be the agency for implementing IH's naval functions, while during peacetime, the Ministry was in charge of naval affairs. Although there was dissatisfaction within the ranks concerning such an arrangement, the Ministry refused to address the problem, thus maintaining the status quo. However, the situation began to change surrounding the issue of supreme command raised at the first London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930. Over the issue of troop strength, the Naval General Staff demanded that the Ministry make concessions, resulting in the implementation in 1933 of measures expanding the authority of the Naval General Staff. These revisions were particularly important for the issues of troop strength and who controlled the flow of military developments. The former issue, which was the source of attacks on the government from the Seiyukai Party and right-wing organization, had not been provided for in the existing Liaison Affairs Protocol; however, provisions were made as the result of a proposal submitted by the Chief of Staff and successful negotiations with the Minister of the Navy. Control over the flow of military developments had been in peacetime part of the Naval General Staff's regimental command authority. For example, when the need arose to protect Japanese citizens residing abroad, the Naval Minister would request the despatch of troops and after cabinet approval, the Naval General Staff would begin strategy planning under the leadership of the Naval Minister. However, following the Protocol revisions, the Naval General Staff was permitted to propose troop deployment independently. In other words, within the revision process, the Naval General Staff was able for the first time to establish autonomous authority over naval affairs.

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This article focuses on the relationship between the campaign to set up a cabinet under the premiership of Hiranuma Kiichiro and the Japanese Navy during the years of the Saito Makoto cabinet (25 May 1932-8 July 1934), in order to place this campaign within the context of the strengthening of the military supreme command system from the 1930's onward and clarify the influence of Hiranuma's plan upon the Navy, and the influence the resulting changes in the Navy exerted upon the campaign. In order to overcome a divided structure of governance, in particular control over military authorities, Hiranuma's campaign won faction leaders over to its side and utilized the authority of the imperial family. Therefore, Hiranuma's plan for controlling the military authorities did call for institutional reorganization, but rather depended on personal connections. Hiranuma made Fushiminomiya Hiroyasu chief of the Naval General Staff (NGS) with the cooperation of the Kantai (Fleet) Faction led by Admiral Kato Hiroharu, going as far as to reorganize the system by extending the authority of the NGS. However, the Kantai Faction lost its unifying position in the Navy when it was criticized for politicizing the NGS and politically utilizing the imperial family. Since Hiranuma's plan to control the military authorities involved winning over the leaders of the various factions, the fall of the Kantai Faction from power brought about the failure Hiranuma to act as the unifier of the divided governance system. Therefore, the campaign to form a Hiranuma Cabinet and the reinforcement of the supreme command in the navy developed under interrelationship of mutual influence. The collapse of the campaign after the Kantai Faction's attempt to utilize the authority of the imperial family resulted in the loss of its unifying position in the Navy means no less than the failure of Hiranuma's efforts to overcome the divided structure of governance by means of personal connections. Only the extension of NGS power-in other words, the strengthened independence of Supreme Command-remained after Kato's retreat and the collapse of the Hiranuma campaign.

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It was in February 1944 that then Prime Minister Tojo Hideki (also Minister of the Army) and Naval Minister Shimada Shigetaro were jointly appointed as Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, respectively. Such a breach of tradition in separating the civil and military administration of the armed forces presented an opportunity for the veteran Naval officers who wanted a quick end to the War to publicly criticize Tojo, criticism that is thought to have been one cause of the Cabinet's downfall. The research to date argues that the joint appointments were made for two reasons : one to overcome opposition between civil ministers and the military chiefs of staff, the other to fight the peace movement being conducted by the naval officers. While it would not be surprising that the peace movement that would be begin in earnest the following year was already brewing, what is puzzling is why Shimada would receive the joint appointment when no opposition existed between his ministry and the naval supreme command. Did Tojo and Shimada really begin to feel the threat posed by the peacenik naval officers? Or could there be some other political reason besides the peace movement that the conventional research has overlooked? In this article, the author focuses on opposition that arose within both the naval ranks and the supreme command, looking at such issues as the conversion of the navy into an air force, unification of the military supreme commands and the supreme command system itself, in order to show that the joint appointments were made to form a system of army-navy cooperation within the supreme command and avoid a change of government. Traditionally, both the Army and the Navy had their own air forces, which were funded on an equal basis. The Army and Naval chiefs of staff both insisted on more emphasis being put on their respective air forces in realizing the slim possibility of winning the War. Since both sides were convinced that funding allocation rates would determine the outcome of the War, the supreme command could not come to a decision about the military strength of the two branches. This resource mobilization problem then began to reverberate within the government and developed into an issue threatening the continuation of the present cabinet. The Emperor, who had given Tojo his vote of confidence, began to hint about a change of government and thus was not able to reach a political compromise over the opposition between the Army and Navy over military strategy. Consequently, the upper ranks of the Army, which was aimed at defending the home front and veteran naval officers who aimed at reviving the War came to odds over where the war front should be positioned. It was this opposition that led directly to the downfall of the Tojo Cabinet.

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A series of political arguments during negotiation and ratification process of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was one of the most serious domestic political situations in modern Japan within the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, the Navy, the political parties such as Minseito and Seiyukai, the Privy Council, the Kizoku-in, the Army and civilian right wingers. The London treaty fight deeply affected the fate of Japan. This study examines the policy argument over the treaty, focusing on Prime Minister Hamaguchi who was a main player to press for the treaty. It has been pointed out that Hamaguchi was moved by budgetary concerns but those who were against ratification of the treaty like Admiral Kato Kanji, were opposed him from military point of view. My interpretation, however, is that there are other significant factors: Hamaguchi's and Kato's argument over how Japanese policy toward the United States and China should be, or the future of Japan should be as a member of international community. Hamaguchi and his opponents' ideas were so different, and that was one of the reasons for their serious conflict. After all the political argument within Japan, it can be said Japan's new state system operated by political parties including the Navy, the Army, and Privy Council was eventually working under the Hamaguchi Cabinet. At the same time, ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 made it possible for Japan to become one of the leading countries in international society, along with the United States and Britain.

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