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  • 倉山 満
    法政論叢
    2006年 42 巻 2 号 31-48
    発行日: 2006/05/15
    公開日: 2017/11/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article analyzes the documents of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Navy in 1932. In the Shanghai incident, the corporation of army and navy commanded orthodoxy and it was successful. All the Militants and Diplomats recognized the value of their negotiation for peace. So, the aim of the conflict that Japan tried to protect for resident people was achieved. The Shanghai incident is the last conflict that the Empire of Japan has succeeded not only in military but also in diplomatic. Although Foreign Minister Yosizawa and War Minister Araki have been ignored on our history, in fact their decision making was admissible.
  • 日中戦争から日英米戦争へ
    大木 毅
    国際政治
    1989年 1989 巻 91 号 101-119,L11
    発行日: 1989/05/20
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.
    Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.
    But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.
    German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.
    However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.
    But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from
  • システム要因と戦争の因果分析
    野口 和彦
    アジア研究
    2007年 53 巻 4 号 37-55
    発行日: 2007/10/31
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.
    According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.
    The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.
    The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.
    This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
  • 樋口 秀実
    史学雑誌
    1999年 108 巻 4 号 527-552,618-62
    発行日: 1999/04/20
    公開日: 2017/11/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    In modern times, especially after the Russio-Japanese War, how to deal with China was one of the most important problems for Japan. It was not just as a common diplomatic problem, but also was closely related to Japan's secuity-its independence and national security-and also to matters influencing daily life in Japan, such as resources, population, provisions, and foreign trade. Most of the research so far on the history of Sino-Japanese relations has focused on the antagonism between the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Navy's policy towards China has been almost neglected. In order to grasp the whole image of this history, however, it is necessary to restudy it from the viewpoint of the Navy by examining the role it played in Japan's policy-making towards China. Because Japan's policy towards China, as above mentioned, bore great in those days, the Navy also had to grapple with the China problem after the Russio-Japanese War, the Navy had foresaw that the outbreak of a Japanese-American War could be caused by the China question, Modern Japan's diplomatic policy was mostly decided in the tripartite meeting by the Army, the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is the matter to be examined in the present article which focuses on the Navy's activities before and after the time when Japan made its North China maneuver which led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. After the Manchurian Incident, the Army had an increasingly powerful voice on the issue of China, and "the policy towards China" began to become a "synonym of the policy towards the Army." It has been said that the Navy function-d as "a brake" to control the Army, but recent studies, mainly of the Meiji and Taisho eras, have begun to focuson the cooperative relations between the Army and the Navy on the China problem. This matter is taken up here by considering the aspect not only of the Navy's role of slowing the Army down, but also of advancing into China under the cooperation with the Army.After 1935, the Navy shifted its policy towards China to a more moderate one. Up to 1935, it had proceeded with the "South China maneuver" that aimed to make that region's local governments pro-Japanese, just like the Army had done in Manchuria and North China. The Navy forcefully urged the Kuomintang government to adopt a pro-Japanese attitude by using the pressure of the North and South China maneuvers, since they had already planned a Sino-Japanese united front against the United States in the midst of friction over naval disarmament. On the other hand, after the Second London Naval Conferenceof 1935, the Navy began to grope for detente with the U.S. and they suspended its plan to partition of China. It can be said, however, that the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War meant that the Navy failed to moderate Japan's policy towards China. Considering also that up to 1935 the Navy had carried out a China partition policy like the Army, its role did not serve as a brake on Japan's hardline measures, but rather accelerated them. And, in the view of China, the Navy's policy constantly forced China to take stronger measures against Japan before and after 1935. This is because the Navy had up to 1935 caused anti-Japanese sentiment in China by carrying out the partition policy, while after 1935 it encouraged the Kuomintang govern-ment to unify China.
  • 森山 優
    史学雑誌
    1992年 101 巻 9 号 1587-1622,1713-
    発行日: 1992/09/20
    公開日: 2017/11/29
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper analyzes the political processes of 'Guidelines for Implementing National Policy' (Teikohu Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo) which was adopted by the Third Konoe Cabinet. During the term of the Third Konoe Cabinet, Japanese foreign policy was formulated at the Imperial Court by the Imperial Head-quarters-Government Liaison Conference (Dai-hon'ei Seifu Renraku kaigi). The decisions of this Conference were more influential than those of the Cabinet. Issues concerning National Policy (kokusaku) proposed by the Army and Navy were debated and constructed at the Liaison Conference. However, the Liaison Conference was unsuccessful in overcoming the structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution which saw legislative power shared between the Cabinet and the General Staff. The Liaison Conference could not override the Cabinet or General Staff in decision making. In cases where the interests of the various government organs conflicted, the Liaison Conference either avoided making a decision, or forwarded policies for imperial ratification that incorporated the interests of all the opposing government institutions by processes called Ryoron-Heiki. It is through these processes of compromise that National Policy was formulated. The formation of the Guidelines for Implementing National Policy is seen as the cornerstone for Japan's decision to go to war. This paper analyzes the political processes involved in the formation of National Policy. It examines the following points. 1)The political goals of the Army and Navy immediately after the establishment of the Third Konoe Cabinet. 2)The reaction of the Army and Navy towards the 'freezing' of Japanese funds in the United States by the United States Government. 3)The influence of assertions as to attacking the Soviet Union. 4) How the Army and Navy perceived the domestic and international situation when the Guidelines was first adopted. The chief aim of the Guidelines originally proposed by the Navy was to accelerate its arming against its potential enemy, the US. The summit meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe was the other dimension of the policy, as Navy Minister Oikawa was optimistic that a successful diplomatic agreement would be reached by the two leaders. The war Offlce stated that if diplomacy failed, the next step was war. The General Staff Office's position was that Japan must set a date for the commencement of war, but at the same time must persist through all diplomatic avenues available to try and reach some agreement. The stance of the Navy office was to continue to prepare its forces for war, but refuse to commit itself to a date when hostilities would commence. In the end, however, a compromise was reached with the deadline for any diplomatic solution being set for early October. This deadline was set immediately after Japanese authorities received a telegram reporting that Roosevelt was positive towards a summit meeting. Furthermore, the Navy Office was also successful in increasing the number of political procedures required in reaching a decision for war, effectively making any such decision harder to obtain. In the opinion of the Navy, a Japanese victory depended on a favourable change in the international situation. In short, the Guidelines was an ambiguous move to compromise. On one hand, diplomatic negotiations were still being pursued. On the other, preparations were being made for war. Yet, the success of either of the two objectives depended upon a change in the prevailing international situation. The inability to reach a decision led to Konoe to dissolve his cabinet in the middle of October, 1941.
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