Dummett and Wright doubt the coherence of vague predicates. Dummett claims that the rules for such predicates are themselves inconsistent. Wright takes the sorites paradox to constitute a great difficulty for the view that a user of a vague term follows a rule. Wittgenstein says that rules can be created or modified, if they need to be. Here is a clue to solve the problem of the coherence of vague predicates. But cannot we explain their consistency without recourse to the idea of following a rule? Davidson's theory of inter-pretation sheds light on the question. For, according to Davidson, our linguistic activity presupposes that we should treat an interpretee as a rational being who has a lot of true beliefs about the world. This approach opens up the possibility of thinking of vagueness as a semantic matter. The meaning of a vague predicate depends on the situation in which it is used. But, even if the situation is determined, another kind of indeterminacy (which I think is semantic) remains. Hence the sorites paradox. Epistemicism holds that vagueness comes from ignorance (which I think is also semantic). Does vagueness as semantic indeterminacy or ignorance imply the renunciation of bivalence? Not necessarily. As indeterminacy of translation is compatible with bivalence, so is semantic indeterminacy or ignorance.

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Science systematically re-organizes our ordinary experience. It seems to me that we can speak of the idea of a conceptual scheme here, while avoiding difficulties which Davidson points out. The idea of a conceptual scheme does not necessarily lead either to scheme-content dualism or to relativism. We have our ordinary experience as organized from the outset, not as totally unorganized. We do not need the notion of totally unorganized content. If a defender of the idea of a conceptual scheme distinguishes incomparability and incommensurability, he does not have to be committed to relativism. Davidson claims that translatability makes the difference of conceptual schemes nonsensical. But his identification of a conceptual scheme with a language is disputable. For we can use the words 'elm' and 'beech', even if we cannot tell an elm from a beech. The principle of charity that Davidson resorts to does not work well for such highly theoretical knowledge as science, though it is important in itself. The process of coming to know is analogous to an action in that it follows a certain set of norms. A conceptual scheme serves as a system of norms. Davidson ignores the normative aspect of conceptual schemes. For he accepts only causation as the source of knowledge.

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Pierre assents to both ‘Londres est jolie, ’ which can be translated into ‘London is pretty, ’ and ‘London is not pretty.’ Does he believe that London is pretty? This is Kripke's Puzzle. In order to create the puzzle, says Kripke, we need only the disquotational principle and the principle of translation, not the principle of substitutivity. But the principle of translation is also irrelevant, as the case of Paderewski illustrates.
Davidson calls into question the method of disquotation as an approach to the concept of truth, and his remarks apply to the disquotational principle above mentioned. It is the disquatational principle that brings about the puzzle. Davidson's holism suggests that disquotation is not the only way of ascribing beliefs. Therefore we are not in trouble at all because the disquotational principle does not hold. —a fact Kripke seems to ignore.
When Pierre moved to London and saw a part of the city which is not pretty, did he change his mind? We can treat this question in terms of belief revision. Pierre's ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ cannot both refer to the capital of England at the same time, given normal logical acumen. One of them must fail to refer to something in the actual world. Which does fail? We cannot decide. By the same token we cannot answer the question which of the two sentences is true: ‘Pierre believes that London is pretty’ and ‘Pierre believes that London is not pretty.’ What, then, should we say about the puzzle? Our latitude of choice in truth value redistribution and the inscrutability of reference make it impossible to decide whether or not Pierre believes that London is pretty. It is ineradicably indeterminate. In this way, I think that the title of Kripke's paper ‘A Puzzle about Belief’ is misleading, since it inclines us to assume that there is a single determinate solution.

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