The fourth round of the Arab-Israeli War was started on 6 October 1973 by the Arabs. Before the War, the Arabs deliberately prepared their military build-up. Israeli intelligence noted these preparations along the ceasefire lines. But the military elite misinterpreted the intentions of the Arab leaders, believing that the Arabs would never renew the fighting because of their poor military capabilities and the opposing Israeli superiority in the military balance. Should the Arabs intend to surprise Israel, Israeli early-warning systems would founction, a standing army would hold the enemy forces, and the rapid mobilization would be carried out.
In the early morning of 6 October, the decisive information that the war would break out that evening reached the military elite. Chief of Staff Elazar took the necessary steps immediately. He met the Defence Minister and proposed a pre-emptive strike and general mobilization of reserves. The political elite, such as the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister, however, turned down the former proposal, but concerning the latter one they authorized Gen. Elazar to mobilize 100, 000 men. These two decisions were based on a political consideration. The factors which induced the political elite to adopt these decisions were mainly their image of the external environment and the political decision-making system itself. The Israeli political elite had viewed their environment as follows: (1) regionally, Israeli military supremacy and the maintenance of the ceasefire in the border areas ruled out any possibility of warfare; but (2) globally, her political position in the international area was symbolized by her isolation. Especially in 1973, two dramatic incidents, the downing of a Libyan airplane by Israeli warplanes in February and the hijacking of an Iraqi jet liner in August, deepened the isolation. In the latter case, the US Government condemned the Israeli action. The decisions not to pre-empt and not to call up all the reserves are explained by Israel's deteriorating pnlitical environment. Moreover there was no machinery in the decision-making organization to check the evaluations presented by the military intelligence.

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The diplomatic recognition extended to Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh Regime by Communist China and Soviet Russia in January 1950 had worldwide repercussions which were felt not only in Indochina but also in East Asia. The Western powers at that time, especially America, quickly reacted to this recognition, which they considered to be definite evidence of the monolithic unity of Sino-Russian-Vietminh communists. It was also thought to be a reflection of the intention to expand communist influence throughout Southeast Asia. The Franco-Vietminh War, which had began as a colonial war, was thus transformed into a part of the Cold War.
 But some western observers even at that time doubted whether the “friendly” Sino-Russian-Vietminh relationship manifested publicly by communist side was indeed monolithic. This article examines the truth of the “friendly” Sino-Russian-Vietminh relationship established in 1950, which has not been fully discussed in spite of its historical significance in both the Franco-Vietminh War and the Cold War.

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