Before Islam religion was accepted by the local rulers and inhabitants, Javanese cities and settlements were created according to Hindu-Buddhistic cosmology as described in Negakarertagama about Majapahit palace and cities of Bali Island. This planning concept drastically changed from ritual-oriented to commerce-oriented as soon as the local rulers accepted Islam in the 15^th century as growth of international commerce.
In order to support this supposition, urban pattern of the North coastal cities before and after islamization must be argued. Among the cities, Cirebon and Banten are taken as case study as they played an important role in the process of islamization and still exist after experience of several transformations. Main sources of the research are local chronicles and traveler's account.

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The aim of this paper is to clarify the characteristics and the contributions of Muhammad Balk al-Sadr's political thought, considering his activities in the Da'wa Party and contextualizing his thought in the political history of Iraq. Research on al-Sadr is divided into two streams; analysis of his economic and philosophical thoughts and description of his political activities. Hence, this paper combines these two analyses in order to show dynamism of his thought within the framework of political change in Iraq. Following his initial vision of the realization of an with the concept of the Islamic principle of Shura, al-Sadr proposed to create the Da'wa Party in a relatively democratic period in modern Iraq, legitimatizing it from the Islamic jurisprudence point of view. When the party was firmly established and was gaining more popular supports within Iraq, the Ba'thist regime with its increasing authoritarianism stood as a strong obstacle. Al-Sadr had to develop a revolutionary theory in his course to realize in Iraq. The characteristics of al-Sadr's political thought are; (1) his development in adaptation of Islamic jurisprudence on political change in Iraq, (2) legitimatization of the creation of in the modern state, (3) proposition of concrete ideas about the institutions of a sustainable .

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This article analyzes the Islamic political thought of Abudurrahman Wahid through the reading of his essays in Mengurai Hubungan Agama dan Negara (1999), and other books.
Abdurrahman Wahid states that he approaches the state-religion relation socio-culturally. The aim of this approach is not establishing directly through their penetration into the goverment which is often adopted by Islamic reformist groups, but the socio-cultural reform in a long term through NGO or mass religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyyah.
According to him, the present constitutinal regime of Indonesia is legitimized as Dar Sulh (state of truce), in which Islam is not institutionalized by the government, however the freedom of the muslims to practice their religion is guaranteed.
He says, “the conception of Dar Sulh is so fruitful as to solve a lot of contemporary ploblems if only it is understood properly and fully developed, ” although his understanding of the concept of Dar Sulh is different from what the classical fiqh literatures defined, i. e., a state which has the truce with Dar Islam.
Abdurrahman Wahid rejects the Islamist demand for the establishment of the in Indonesia, saying that it is contrary to the traditional Shafi'i legal theory of Dar Sulh. But his rejection of seems to be the result of his negative assessment on the level of Islamic knowledge among Indonesian muslims as well. He says, “We are still in the process of establishing Tawhid (ke-Esa-an Allah) and are not so far from it” and “we must start our social reform from the society which is still in the stage of Jahiliyah, where the people know only Tawhid and nothing more.”
Thus, according to his bitter perception, what Indonesian society needs now is not the establishment of enacting Islamic laws but the popularization of the teaching of Tawhid through socio-cultural reform based on Islamic universal moral values.

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This paper observes an experience in establishing an in the State of Kelantan, Malaysia, undertaken by the Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS)-led government. From the outset of its establishment, PAS holds to the ideals that political and governing power, hence an , is indeed an important means in executing a complete law of Allah. Without political power, PAS believes, not only an establishment of an is impossible, but the execution of the laws of Allah that binds the complete Islamic way of life would also be unachievable. In the State of Kelantan, the ideal of having the governing and political power has already been accomplished. But this is inadequate. The PAS-led government is facing with two unfavourable realities. Firstly, the realities that are related to external factors, from outside the Party, and secondly to internal factors, from within the Party and the PAS-led government themselves. In the former, one witness the role of the Federal Barisan Nasional government, especially through its Federal Development Department established in the State, in interrupting the endeavours undertaken by the PAS-led government. In the latter, PAS is suffering from at least five realities, viz. leadership identity crisis, lack of practical experience and expertise, the existence of unmotivated civil servants, absence of either a blueprint or a proper operational guideline, and refusal to welcome help from other sympathised Islamic movements. Consequently, the idealism of the PAS-led government in establishing an in the State of Kelantan has yet to be fully realised. Beside these shortcomings, however, the Kelantanese have certainly proved to at least attempt to determine their own lifestyles according to their self-determining character, culminating in the existence of the beauty of Islam already partly felt in the State, with relatively more peacefulness, tranquility and friendly atmosphere.

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The now former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull overthrew his predecessor Tony Abbott in a party room challenge in September 2015, to take leadership of the ruling conservative Liberal Party, which governs in a Coalition with the rural-based conservative National Party. Those who expected the professedly moderate Turnbull to shift the Australian government towards a more liberal national security policy direction were soon disappointed. The Turnbull government maintained the policies of the Abbott government, which have had a generally adverse human security impact. Harsh treatment of asylum seekers arriving by boat continued, being automatically detained in poor conditions, offshore from the Australian continental mainland, a policy which criticised by the United Nations (UN) and human rights organizations. The Turnbull government also continued Australia’s participation in the US-led military coalition against the terrorist network, in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Syria, and in the long- running war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Criticism arose over Australian involvement in airstrikes in Iraq and Syria that led to civilian casualties, and an inquiry was launched into possible violations of human rights law by Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel in Afghanistan. There were also concerns over the ADF taking an advisory role to the Philippines’ military forces. The Turnbull government’s approach to counter-terrorism and counterespionage was another related concern for civil liberties. Similar to its key allies, the USA and Japan, the national security policies of the Turnbull government, ostensibly aimed at preventing terrorism and foreign interference, demonstrate the risk of ‘illiberal’ practices being pursued by liberal democracies. Turnbull was in turn overthrown in August 2018, in yet another party room challenge, with his former Treasurer Scott Morrison succeeding him as Prime Minister. Being from the ‘moderate’ conservative faction of the Liberal Party (rivals to the ‘hardline’ conservative faction of Abbott), under Morrison, the LNP Coalition government is likely to continue the overall policy direction inherited from Abbott and Turnbull. Keywords: Australian Foreign Policy; Asylum Seekers; Expeditionary Warfare; Counter- terrorism; Government Surveillance.

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This article seeks to analyze the evolving development and contestations regarding the interplay of Islam and politics in Malaysia’s public space for a period of 60 years (1957–2017) since its independence as a nation-state. A crucial element in this discourse is the official position of Islam as the “religion of the federation” in the Malaysian Constitution, which simultaneously guarantees the freedom of other religions embraced by almost half of the country’s population. The population became even more diverse ethnically and religiously upon the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which replaced Malaya, on September 16, 1963. Closely related to the discourse of political Islam in Malaysia, the evolving concepts of “religion” and “secularism” in Malaysia’s Islamic context have undergone considerable shifts as a result of constant public engagement by an assortment of politicians, commentators, scholars, bureaucrats, and civil society activists. As the argument develops, Malaysia’s interaction with Islam has been essentialized by political interests such that boundaries are hardened between what is considered Islamic and un-Islamic. The increasingly rigid positions adopted by Islamic stakeholders have arguably worsened both interreligious and intra-Muslim relations, with progressive Muslim voices increasingly finding themselves marginalized in the state-controlled political environment.

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The major militant Islamist network in Indonesia, comprising the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and its associated groups, was believed to have been responsible for dozens of violent incidents after 2000, including the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005. Generally JI sympathized with al-Qaeda’s ideology, openly supported al-Qaeda and other militant ideologues by translating and publishing their work in Indonesia, and sent hundreds of fighters (mujahidin) to Afghanistan for training. The Indonesian militant Islamist groups were not foreign controlled, but they shared some features with a broader militant Islamist network. This essay takes as its point of departure Albert-Laszlo Barabasi’s characterization of al-Qaeda as a matrix of self-organized networks, not a military organization with structured divisions. In Barabasi’s theorization of networks, al-Qaeda appears as a “scale-free network” of a limited number of persons who had accumulated many nodes in a scattered and self-sustaining web. Hence, JI was loosely organized and yet hierarchical, composed of small cells held together by personal loyalties, family, school, and other friendly connections. Faced with intensifying police assaults, militant Islamists increasingly fell back on their networks. Using published reports and the author’s own interviews with relevant individuals, this essay traces the links and nodes of the militant Islamic networks in Indonesia and examines why and how jihadists in Indonesia tenaciously sustained their violent activities.

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Much has been written about Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi-Khomeini’s (1902-1989) doctrine of wilāyat al-faqīh, or the mandate of the jurisprudent. In this article, I will focus on the following two questions: how consistent was he in espousing the doctrine, and what was his major addition to the doctrine? After reviewing his educational and scholarly background, I will first reconstruct constituent components of the doctrine and revisit his relevant writings and statements to determine how consistent his views were over his long academic and political career. Drawing on the existing studies on the divergent doctrines of wilāyat al-faqīh, I will also identify one possible innovation Ayatollah Khomeini likely added to the doctrine. My examination of his 1944 tract, Kashf al-asrār, shows that Khomeini as a young seminary teacher had already believed in wilāyat al-faqīh al-siyāsīyah, or the divine mandate of the juiisprudent to rule. This suggests that his views on wilāyat al-faqīh most likely had solidified much earlier than the existing Western studies surmised and that they remained rather consistent throughout his scholarly and political career. The results will help better discuss various implications of the doctrine as political theory and also in the context of actual political developments in Iran over the last fifty some years.

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Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, secularism and nationalism have been regarded as the only means to religious coexistence in Egypt, home to various religious minorities, including Coptic Christians. However, the religious resurgence beginning in the 1970s and the increase in sectarian conflicts shows that religiosity in the Middle East has not necessarily faded and that coexistence through secularism has already reached its limit. While Islamic political movements are regarded as the main factor reigniting sectarian conflict, no attention has been paid to the movements within Islamic forces, which seek coexistence while respecting Egyptian religiosity. Based on this recognition, this paper is intended to shed light on the debates on religious coexistence under an by a reformist group of Islamic intellectuals called the Islamic Centrist Trend. The author focuses in particular on the ideas of Salīm al-‘Awwā, an international lawyer belonging to this current. While advocating the values of Islamic civilization as the authoritative source of Egyptian state and society, al-‘Awwā argues the need for a liberal government under the rule of law and highlights the importance of human rights from an Islamic perspective. In conclusion, constructing the concepts of civilizational Islam and citizenship, Islamic centrist intellectuals have made efforts to theorize a more inclusive that respects religious autonomy.

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Background:
Maternal and child health handbook (MCHH) consists of records of pregnancy, delivery, child development and immunization, as well as child growth charts. MCHH has been utilized in Japan since 1947 and it is now introduced in more than 20 countries in the world.
Objectives:
The objectives of this study were to collect research documents and reports in the past studies of MCHH and to analysis the effect of MCHH on maternal and child health through systematic review.
Methods:
The systematic searches were conducted for the studies published between 1980 and October 2011. After the initial screening of titles and abstracts of the studies, we reviewed 57 documents which were studied for MCHH in maternal and child health (MCH) programs or activities. After the final selection, we identified only 5 documents with 43 question items in Indonesia (1999 and 2001), Bangladesh (2003), the Philippines (2009) and Cambodia (2010).
Results:
The relationship between MCHH and pregnancy care revealed that mothers who used MCHH during pregnancy had higher level of knowledge (OR 1.44, 95% CI: 1.22-1.70) than whose did not use MCHH during pregnancy. The strong significant effects of MCHH were observed in knowledge of antenatal care visit (OR 1.86, 95% CI: 1.59-2.18), and mother should consume more food during pregnancy (OR 1.97, 95% CI: 1.37-2.83). Mothers who got MCHH during pregnancy had safer practice by skilled birth attendants (OR 1.12, 95% CI: 0.95-1.32) and delivered in health facilities (OR 1.31, 95% CI: 1.12-1.53). MCHH showed the effect of knowledge of child health care (OR 1.22, 95% CI; 1.05-1.41).
Discussion:
This study utilizing meta-analyses showed MCHH had higher association with knowledge of mothers than practice in pregnancy and child health care, although the study has its limitation. The illumination of the relationship between knowledge and practice by the effect of MCHH needs more quantitative analysis in both community and hospital settings in many countries.

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今日の中東諸国において、エジプト、シリア、イラク、リビア、イエメン、アフガニスタン等、統治体制の困難を抱えている国々は地域的な暴力主義の温床となり、ニューヨーク、ロンドン、マドリッド、ジャカルタ、ニューデリー、パリ、ブリュッセルなどを標的にした国際テロリズムの震源となってきた。

これらの背景には社会的な極度の不平等･貧困の問題があるのであり、単に安全保障上の観点のみの対応策では体制の権威主義化を助長することで社会の矛盾を拡大させ、過激主義の拡大に資するだけである。

アラブ世界の諸国家はかつては過激な「アラブ民族主義」の主張で国民の支持を得てきたが、それらの一部は莫大な石油収入に頼ることで国民との正常な関係の構築に失敗し、少数の支配者層による権力の独占に終始してきた。

その結果として現在中東地域の若年層は、世界でも最も自らの社会経済から疎外され、抑圧された状況に置かれている。エジプト･イラクなどの各国では伝統的な農業生産の基盤が長期的に破壊され、食料の多くを輸入に頼るに至っている。域内の各国はこうした現状に対処するどころか全くの機能不全に陥っているのである。

さらに2010年末以降の短い「アラブの春」によって覚醒した若者の一部は、その後の政治状況の暗転のなかで「イスラーム国」などに流入し、アフマド･ダッラーウィーのように悲劇的な最期を迎えた例もある。

これまで米国の対中東政策は成功してきたとは言い難く、むしろ新たな紛争の火種となる社会の分裂と対立を助長することに終始してきた。その最終的な帰結ともいえる「イスラーム国」の問題を乗り越えるためには、軍事的な対抗手段に訴えるのではなく、経済成長と分配の平等、国民に開かれた民主的統治システムなど、まさに「アラブの春」で希求された理想の実現を図っていく以外にはあり得ない。

（文責・鈴木 均）

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In our comparative framework, the first phase of Islamic modernism in the form of liberal-reformism developped at first independent of the orthodox 'Ulama in colonial India on the background of the earliest growth of the modern colonial Muslim elite, later developed in Egypt as a compromise between the traditional orthodox and the modern elite, or a relative dependence of the latter on the former. In Iran, however, the liberal-reformist trend comparable to the above two did not fully developed ideologically because of the lack of the modern middle class.
Following these first phases of Islamic modernism, I have treated the two new trends-the romantic-Islamic and the neo-Islamic-in relation to the development of the new middle class and the lower middle class in each land. The auther pointed out the ideological similarity between the ideal Islamic 'millat' of Iqbal and 'qawmiyah' of the modern 'Arabs. Further he noticed the neo-Islamic trends in Pakistan and Egypt. It is noteworthy that Iran has had no parallel trend. Does this suggest the specifically Iranian way of modernization? Then it seems that the modernization in Iran could, and will be able to, proceed piecemeal without any ideological formulation, preserving intact religious role of the 'Ulama.

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Unlike many Middle Eastern states which have unequivocally resorted to repression to outflank Islamist opposition, Malaysia’s response to Islamic resurgence since the formative decade of 1980s has typically combined cautious encouragement of official dakwah (missionary effort) and checks on activities of independent Islamist groups so as to minimize possibilities of violence. Coercion was employed only as a temporary measure. Enjoying a relatively buoyant economy, problems such as mass demonstrations, riots, “terror” campaigns and assassination attempts, have largely eluded Malaysia. The state's strategy of coopting major Islamists and committing itself to an Islamisation programme has added to the regime's legitimacy. Previously strident Islamists have decided to discard their anti-establishment image and pursue their ambitions through channels acceptable to the dominant political elite. Islamists' verbal and tacit espousal of Islamisation signal the fruition of the state's accommodationist strategy which, in turn, has obviated the need for Islamists to indulge in fifth-column activities. In turn, the mellowing of mainstream Islamist trends have convinced the state that the continuance of piecemeal Islamisation features, coupled with ambiguous assurances as to its long-term intentions of guiding the nation towards a modern Islamic polity, are sufficient to contain the sociopolitical influence of Islamic movements.

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Malaysia is a common law country, and as such the decisions of its courts have a binding and law-making force. This means that the Malaysian judiciary is highly influential in setting the tenor of governance. In this article I examine and analyze some key decisions that had an influence on divisiveness and dissent in the country. I point out that the courts have been poor in ensuring that the legal system protects the nation from divisive elements, and the legal system does not do enough to guarantee the fundamental rights and democratic principles that were envisioned by the founding fathers for the citizenry. The article closes with an attempt to understand why this is the case.

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