The purpose of this article is to verify the advancement of nuclear weapons under the Kim Jong Un regime and its survivability in terms of Nuclear Deterrence Theory, which would become the first step, to providing an answer to the question: What brought about the historic June 2018 summit between the US and the DPRK that had not been held for over 70 years? Firstly, this article will explore the development of its advanced nuclear weapons by both qualitative and quantitative methods by examining how the Kim Jong Un regime made the decision to accelerate its nuclear development and then put it into practice. Secondly, I will review how the Trump administration and the Kim Jong Un regime changed their perceptions of each other after North Korea proved its ability to invulnerably attack the US mainland and its allies through its advancement of nuclear weapons. Finally, the survivability of the Kim Jong Un regime will be considered according to its analytical framework, namely the nuclear deterrence theory. Based on these verification results where the DPRK’s survivability has been consolidated in a military sense and crisis stability between the US and the DPRK has been improved, this article also clarifies implications for North Korea’s new security strategy, regional studies on the DPRK, and Nuclear Deterrence Theory itself.

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This article first reviews the 30-year history of the recurring nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula, focusing on the U.S. policies, and attempts to find out the reasons why the successive administrations showed a similar pattern of trial and error. From Clinton, who had to deal with the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, to Trump who was faced with North Korea armed with almost operational nuclear-tipped ICBMs, U.S. presidents would begin with strong words and actions, but ended in diplomatic compromises. Most of them even contemplated military options, but they had to back down due to the staggering risks and costs of the possible outbreak of the second Korean War. The compromised deals would also turn out to be insufficient to resolve the crisis.

In terms of foreign policy orientation and personnel, the new Biden Administration has a strong link and continuity with the Clinton and Obama eras. By analyzing the discussions on North Korea by the foreign policy experts in the Biden camp, and influential thinktanks such as the Center for a New American Security, this article offers some insights into how the experiences in the previous administrations would affect the future policies on the issue of denuclearization, such as the change of focus to “threat reduction” by applying the arms control paradigm.

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