In the early 1950s the United States government pursued conflicting policies with regard to Japan. While anxious to see a - become economically self-supporting, Washington initiated a rigid trade restriction policy against mainland China after China's military intervention in the Korean War, and forced Japan to observe a China embargo list which was stricter than that for the other European allies. Since mainland China was Japan's traditional market and source of raw materials, this policy created serious friction between Japan and the United States. This article describes the following—utilizing United States government documents:
(1) During and after the Allied occupation of Japan, the United States wished to see Japan become a loyal western ally with a healthy, self-sustaining economy;
(2) When Japan expressed its desire to take part in the COCOM, the United States tried to create a separate organization for Far Eastern trade—chiefly out of its desire to maintain the existing stricter controls on China than on the European Soviet Bloc. The major advocates of this hard-line policy within the United States government were the military and the Commerce Department;
(3) When this attempt failed, the United States government obtained a promise from the Japanese government—in the form of a secret bilateral agreement—to maintain stricter controls on Chinese trade than the other COCOM countries except the United States and Canada;
(4) This created a dilemma for top Washington officials who were deeply concerned with the economic condition in Japan and with the mounting pressure within Japan for relaxed trade with China. Great Britain and France also pressed on Washington for freer East-West trade;
(5) After twenty months of negotiations between Japan and the United States, Washington officials finally decided in early 1954 to nullify the bilateral agreement with Japan, and accord Japan an equal status with the European COCOM countries in terms of China trade control.

抄録全体を表示