1991 年 1991 巻 96 号 p. 85-98,L10
Czechoslovak foreign policy, led by Dr. Edvard Beneš during the interwar period, is characterized as “Western Oriented”. However, its policy toward Soviet Russia is crucial to understanding its diplomacy as a whole. This article aims to describe Czechoslovak policy toward Soviet Russia, 1920-1922, in the context of its relations with Western Powers, East Central European countries, and domestic politics.
While Beneš advocated the idea of collective security and the League of Nations, he admitted the existence of power politics. After World War I, Czechoslovakia endeavoured to promote friendship with the victorious Western Powers, and to maintain freedom of diplomatic action in East Central Europe Though Beneš's diplomacy was less affected by domestic politics, he had to preserve a delicate balance between the left and right wings in his contacts with Soviet Russia.
Negotiations between Czechoslovak and Soviet Governments started at the beginning of 1920. They agreed to exchange unofficial commercial missions in the summer of 1921. In August, 1920, Czechoslovakia proclaimed neutrality toward the Soviet-Polish war and began to create the Little Entente against French wishes to organize East Central Europe in cooperation with Poland and Hungary. Beneš's initiatives were appreciated by Soviet Russia and accelerated negotiations.
At the end of 1921, negotiations on the commercial treaty between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia became deadlocked. The Soviet government demanded a neutral clause and recognition as the only representative of Russia in the treaty, which Beneš refused. He observed that the Soviet system was in transition and adovocated “economic intervention” in Russia through the commercial relations. Soviet diplomats criticized this policy of Beneš toward Russia.
Beneš assumed the role of intermediary between France and Great Britain to clear the way for the Genoa Conference of April, 1922. In Genoa, Beneš tried to realize his economic intervention policy toward Russia as a compromise between France and Great Britain. After the conclusion of the Rapallo treaty, which made the agreement between France and Great Britain impossible, Beneš turned to the alternative of a separate agreement with the Soviet government. During the course of the Genoa Conference, he agreed with Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreion Affairs, on the provisional commercial treaties with Russia and the Ukraine, including a neutrality clause and recognition of single representation. With this treaty, Czechoslovakia recognized the Soviet Government de facto. However, Czechoslovakia could not recognize it de jure until 1934 because Beneš could not overcome opposition in the coalition cabinets and among the members of the Little Entente.