社会的コンフリクトとしてみた談合のゲーム論的考察 : 談合の数理 第3報
2004 年 69 巻 580 号 p. 93-97
詳細
2004 年 69 巻 580 号 p. 93-97
A deductive study, as opposed to our previous works, was presented to depict the collusive tendering, which was derived from the Game Theory. The model has two agents. 0ne is a group of enterprise agents who determine either a collusive tendering of a normal competetion in order to maximize their benefits. Another is an agent representing the government or citizens to protect the collusive dealings by watching the enterprize agents. Their profits afe conflicting mutually. Presented deductive process indicates a certin criterion if a collosive tendering is emerged or opressed depending upon several conditions related to revealed rate, penalty and self-controled benefit in case of collusive tendering.
