日本中東学会年報
Online ISSN : 2433-1872
Print ISSN : 0913-7858
ユダヤ難民問題とパレスチナ問題 : アメリカ合衆国の政策-1938年3月-1939年1月
奈良本 英佑
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ジャーナル フリー

1993 年 8 巻 p. 211-238

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It is well-known that the US government played a crucial role to help the Zionists establish Israel the Jewish state in Palestine during a certain period after the World War II. This American support was a fruit of American Zionists' persistent campaign in 1930s and 1940s to win over the government and public opinion of the United States to creation of their state there. Remarkable success of this campaign was, in a sence, a product of the unprecedent persecution and massacre of the Jewish people by the Nazi Germany. This article deals with American policies toward the Palestine question and refugee problems caused by that harsh oppression of Jews by the German authorities. The author forcuses on the process of decision making related to these policies by the President and government officials in the period from March 1938 to January 1939. Special attention is paid to the days beginning at 6 October '38 toward 20 January '39. The former markes the date when American Zionists started the most intensive campaign trying to influence the government foreign policies in favor of the Zionist cause. The latter is that when Hijamar Schacht the German negotiator on the refugee problem was dismissed. His dismissal meant, in fact, the end of talks betweem Germany and an international body, composed of the U.S., European and other countries, for ordery migration of the European Jews. It was the Americans who took the initiative in starting this collective negotiaion in order to solve the refugee problem. This intergovernmental body was established by a decision of an international confernece known as the "Evian Conference", which President Roosevelt had called for after the "Anschluss". This body, called the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), took the charge of dealing with the Germans. It was also the U.S. which played leading roles in the IGCR activities. The one hundred and ten days from October, '38 to January, '39 were the period when the parties could cherish the highest hopes that the negotiation might produce some positive result for solving the refugee problem. For, the Germans had been temporalily appeased by the "Munchen Decision", and were apparently willing to talk on the refugee question. At a certain stage, they appointed one of Nazimoderates, Schacht, as the negotiator. The Nazi-radicals like Libbentrop, however, soon gained the upper hand in their power struggle; this actually led to the end of the deal. During these days, the most intensive efforts were made to find heavens for the refugees in other areas than Europe by the IGCR. The U.S. government on behalf of the IGCR requested to many governments in Latin American countries and European ones which possesed oversea territories to receive these unfortunate people as immigrants. Most of these governments were unwilling to receive considerable number of the Jewish refugees, however. Thus, the negotiations on the immigration as a whole ended in failure, too. The Nazi persecution, causing mass immigration of European Jews into Palestine, aggravated the political tention in Palestine, which led to the great revolt by Palestine Arabs in 1936-1939. This change of the situation urged the British government to reconsider their policy toward Palestine Mandate. The Britishes began to think of restricting the number of immigrants into Palestine. Alarmed with some indications of changing attitudes of the British government, the Zionists decided to launch a vigorous campaign to affect the U.S. policy makers. The Zionists urgently requested the Americans to intervene so as to prevent the British from the revision of immigration policies in the Palestine Mandate. October 6th was the date when an American Zionist leader sent a telegram to Roosevelt asking for immediate intervention. They mobilized all of their resource available for affecting U.S. Palestine policies

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© 1993 日本中東学会
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