ASC-TUFS Working Papers
Online ISSN : 2436-1607
Print ISSN : 2436-1542
ISSN-L : 2436-1542
Decentralised Presidentialism and the ‘Independence’ of the Judiciary in Ghana’s Public Governance
Charles Prempeh
著者情報
ジャーナル オープンアクセス

2026 年 6 巻 p. 43-60

詳細
抄録
In September 2025, relying on Article 146(9) of Ghana’s Constitution, Ghana’s president removed the country’s Chief Justice (CJ). Unusually, the act of the president did not draw criticism from the religious bodies and traditional political figures, as stakeholders of democratic governance. However, the opposition party raised concerns about a breach in the principle of separation of powers and suggested a need to revise the constitutional provision that empowers the president to appoint the CJ. Using the case of the CJ, I discuss decentralization by exploring three mutually related questions: First, how can the CJ whose appointment heavily depends on the president of Ghana, manage his or her function as a major branch of government in a way that moves beyond presidentialism to emphasize the importance of separation of powers and checks and balances? Second, how can the CJ draw on the support of the mainstay institutions of public governance? Third, what role does the CJ oath play in ensuring effective decentralization of power? Addressing these questions, the purpose of this paper is to argue that both the independence of the CJ and the support the office draws from the public is intimately aligned with the CJ’s fidelity to his or her oath of office.
著者関連情報
© 2026 African Studies Center - Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons [Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International] license.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
前の記事 次の記事
feedback
Top