1980年代後半の行政訴訟法の制定過程における中国共産党の論理―体制内エリートの統制と人民法院の「民主的な」機能

抄録

One of the problems that an authoritarian leader will face is that of power sharing with regime insiders; there is a dilemma in when and how much power is shared. This paper explores the institutionalization of judicial function as a solution to this problem through the case of the Administrative Procedure Law (APL) in China revealing how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) institutionalized the “democratic” function of the People’s Court to control regime insiders. Previous work has explained that the CCP aimed to normalize the relationships between the Party and the government, and between the upper and lower government, by installing the APL which has often been recognized as a fire-alarm system. However, the benefits of such a system cannot be expected under the CCP’s political system. The specific research question here is why the CCP focused on judicial function to supervise the administrative organs of government. As such, this paper first considers the political circumstances of the CCP when it began to develop the APL. Under Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “Democracy and Legality” from 1978, the CCP encouraged regime insiders to develop a legal sensibility with the idea of supervising them by judicial means. The CCP particularly emphasized the supervision of the administrative organ by the citizen which required the “democratic” function of the People’s Court. Second, this paper explores the personnel administration of the Political-Legal Committee to analyze how the CCP worked to establish an environment that avoided conflict with regime insiders during the law-making process. For example, the Committee started evaluating a person who held a position in the legislature or judicial branch therefore it reflects to weakening the influence of public security. Third, the paper explains the legislative process of the APL as an example of how the CCP resolved conflict with regime insiders. The CCP constantly claimed that the administrative branch must follow the law and emphasized the role of the People’s Court; this attitude was summarized in the APL which regime insiders could not refuse because the CCP stressed supervision from the citizenry. According to the paper’s analysis, it is concluded that the CCP, in developing the APL, was attempting to obtain control of regime insiders while emphasizing the “democratic” function of the People’s Court to avoid or resolve conflict.