Since the 1980s, China has achieved significant economic development by delegating the economic management authority to local governments. This decentralization has been especially evident in the implementation of foreign economic policy, known as the opening-up policy, where local governments play a crucial role. Consequently, many studies have examined the policy implementation process from a decentralization perspective. Previous research indicates that the opening-up policy can lead to conflicts between provincial and municipal governments. However, the intergovernmental relations in this context have not been thoroughly clarified. This study focuses on the relationship between Liaoning Province and Dalian City during the opening-up policy in the 1980s. It argues that intergovernmental conflicts were caused by attempts to modify vertical leadership relations between provincial and municipal bureaucratic sectors (tiao) and cross-sectoral relations among bureaucratic departments within municipal governments (kuai).

The opening-up policy was driven centrally and proceeded in tandem with urban economic reform. The central government delegated economic management authority to several municipal governments, including Dalian, by opening up coastal cities and through the separately listed city policy. However, intergovernmental relations were not fully considered, resulting in considerable confusion during policy implementation. To build a system conducive to foreign capital introduction, Dalian leaders established cross-departmental organizations within the municipal government, considering personnel arrangements to secure cooperation from each bureaucratic department. These organizations strengthened the unity of the kuai within the Dalian government. Conversely, the strong kuai within Dalian confused the vertical relationship (tiao) between the Liaoning Province and Dalian, leading to intergovernmental conflict over foreign trade. Other cities in Liaoning were dissatisfied with the concentration of foreign investment in Dalian. However, decentralization increased Dalian’s autonomy in economic management, making it difficult for Liaoning to maintain an economic balance within the province.

The analysis revealed that these intergovernmental conflicts were due to the municipal leaders’ attempts to reform the tiao-kuai relationship within the local bureaucracy. As lower-level governments are more inclined to strengthen the cohesion of the kuai, the central government’s delegation of authority to municipal governments without considering intergovernmental relations led municipal leaders to strengthen the kuai within their governments to facilitate foreign economy while weakening the tiao between provincial and municipal bureaucracies. This study suggests that the tiao-kuai relationship within the local bureaucracy holds the potential for intergovernmental conflict in implementing the opening-up policy.

This article addresses two questions regarding Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. First, why did the production of logic ICs concentrate in Taiwan? Second, at what speed and to what extent will logic IC production be deconcentrated in the wake of today’s de-globalization? The answer to the first question is twofold: (1) the division of labor for logic IC production developed internationally, which created and expanded the foundry market, and (2) the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) obtained and maintained a large share of the market by the merit of its pure-play foundry model as well as its sustained and multiplied advantage as the industry pioneer. Regarding the second question, requests from developed countries anxious about geopolitical risks and Taiwan’s resource constraints have forced TSMC to increase overseas production sites. However, diversification of TSMC’s production sites will be moderate and substantially limited because, given operation efficiency, the company is determined to keep R&D and its most advanced production in Taiwan.

This paper is a case study of the Korean semiconductor industry, which has leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing technology and is exposed to the risk of US-China trade friction. We discuss the following. First, the competitiveness of Samsung Electronics, Korea’s leading semiconductor firm, is based on its advantage of vertical integration in the global semiconductor value chain. Second, Korean semiconductor firms have been affected by trade frictions among the United States, China, and Japan as they have built competitive advantages in the global market since the 2000s. Third, it is important for the Korean government to resolve growing disparities within society to develop a successful semiconductor industrial policy. Finally, we consider the future of globalization based on a case study of the semiconductor industry.

This paper reexamines China’s industrial policy, which has attracted worldwide attention, from a long-term and universal perspective. The recent trend of reviving industrial policies to promote competition and innovation is a global phenomenon. China’s industrial policy, which dwarfs other countries in scale, also aligns with this trend. Yet, what are the characteristics of China’s industrial policy beyond its impressive scale? In examining the connections between “demand-expansion industrial policy” and a “flooded market,” the paper suggests that a virtuous cycle may be at work as follows. First, the market is expanded through government subsidies and infrastructure construction. Private firms then rush into intermediate goods sectors, which advances the division of labor, lowering costs and further expanding the market. The paper also considers industrial policies aimed at new energy vehicles (NEVs), which are currently attracting attention from the perspective of such a virtuous cycle. Conversely, industrial policies that do not involve such demand expansion and favor certain firms, such as state-owned enterprises, do not necessarily produce the desired results.

This paper examines how the ongoing structural rivalry between the United States and China might influence both international and regional orders from the perspective of international relations. With the underlying question of how US-China tensions are unfolding and impacting the structures and relationships that underpin global and regional order, the paper explores the dynamics of this bilateral contest. The concept of the Indo-Pacific System is introduced to analyze the reconfiguration of the regional security and economic frameworks currently pursued by America’s allies and partner countries, which form the foundation of regional order. Countries are strengthening alliances and forging new mini-lateral partnerships, incorporating security considerations into economic activities. By discussing the impacts of the US-China rivalry and regional architecture reconfiguration, the paper concludes that multilayered regional institutions are essential for stabilizing order.