This study reconfigures the Chinese notions of Lian (moral face) and Mianzi (social face) from sociological and institutional perspectives, transcending conventional social–psychological interpretations. It argues that these concepts are not merely expressions of personal emotion or interpersonal sensitivity, but operate as cultural–institutional mechanisms that sustain the Qing–Li framework of Chinese social life—the dynamic interplay between Qing (emotion and human sentiment) and Li (moral and rational principle) that underpins the moral order of Chinese society.

Drawing on cultural sociology and institutional theory, the study reconceptualizes Lian as moral trust capital grounded in ethical self-discipline and social integrity, while defining Mianzi as relational capital mediated through the circulation of Renqing (social sentiment and obligation). Within this distinction, Lian constitutes the moral foundation of social trust, whereas Mianzi functions as a symbolic and strategic resource that regulates interpersonal relations and redistributes social capital. The analysis advances a three-tiered analytical framework—definition, function, and operation—corresponding respectively to normative, institutional, and behavioral dimensions.

Furthermore, the study situates these face mechanisms within the broader context of Qing–Li society, illustrating how Lian and Mianzi operate through Renqing as mediating currencies in social exchange and moral evaluation. By comparing these concepts with Western face theory and the Japanese culture of shame, the study elucidates both the cultural specificity of Chinese face and its structural affinities within East Asian moral systems.

Ultimately, this study theorizes Lian and Mianzi as cultural–institutional devices that integrate emotional morality with social rationality, thereby sustaining the reproduction of trust, hierarchy, and harmony in contemporary Chinese society. This framework contributes to the institutional sociology of East Asian moral culture by revealing how symbolic moral resources maintain social order beyond formal legal and contractual structures.

This paper examines the development of immigrant and immigration control systems in Singapore from the 1910s to the 1920s, focusing on the relationship between the economic development of the Chinese community and the reorganization and adoption of new technologies by the colonial police in the Straits Settlements.

Since its colonization, Singapore has been governed based on the principle of laissez-faire with regard to the human migration, in order to realize the British Empire’s free trade policy. From the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, several systems were introduced that effectively functioned to control local immigrants and their immigration, but this principle itself has been maintained. Then, a limit was set on the maximum capacity of the number of male Chinese labor immigrants in 1930, and the principle of laissez-faire with regard to the human migration in Singapore was clearly revoked.

Several research works have pointed out the significance of this event in the colonial history of Singapore. However, these studies do not explain in detail why Colonial Government in Singapore suddenly made such an important decision and abolished its long traditions since colonization in 1930.

In fact, this decision was prompted by two important changes in Singapore between the 1910s and 1920s. The first was the rapid development of the Chinese rubber industry and the resulting destabilization of the colonial economy. The second was the reorganization of the colonial police and the introduction of new investigative techniques such as fingerprinting for personal identification. These two changes occurred simultaneously.

Regarding the first change, the excessive concentration of capital and human resources in the rubber industry and the decline in rubber prices led to an increase in the number of poor, un­employed, and vagrant people in the local Chinese community. The second change enabled the police to crack down on these people and deport them back to their home country as a countermeasure. However, the impact of the Great Depression in the end of 1920s was so severe that the colonial government was forced to make that decision in 1930.

This decision marked the beginning of the collapse of laissez-faire of human migration not only in Singapore but also in the British Empire’s colonial territories in Asia. At the same time, the progress of the techniques to record and collect the personal information such as fingerprints which was prepared during this period reflected a tendency to monitor and control not just individual immigrants but entire groups of them, and this approach would be utilized in the later history of Singapore.

This paper examines the formation of Hong Kong’s immigration control system in the 1950s within a comparative East Asian postwar perspective. While much scholarship on the history of border regimes has focused on Europe and North America from the 19th century to the early 20th century, East Asia presents a distinct context, in which immigration control systems emerged rapidly after World War II. The dismantling of colonial empires and the geopolitical divisions of the Cold War deeply shaped each region’s border policies, particularly regarding the categorization of former colonial subjects and overseas compatriots.

Unlike Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, where immigration regimes were closely tied to redefining national belonging and managing “foreigners” or “overseas compatriots,” Hong Kong under continued British colonial rule faced unique challenges. With the Communist takeover of mainland China and subsequent mass refugee influx, Hong Kong introduced immigration regulations in 1949–50. Initially, distinctions were made between “Cantonese” and “non-Cantonese” Chinese, with the latter more strictly controlled. However, by 1955, the notion of the “bona fide Hong Kong resident” emerged. This category, defined pragmatically by residence history (at least six months of documented stay), allowed individuals to re-enter Hong Kong outside quota restrictions, effectively recognizing belonging without relying on nationality.

Concurrently, the category of “illegal immigrants” appeared in official discourse by the mid-1950s, reinforced by the 1958 Immigration (Control and Offences) Ordinance. Yet, in practice, enforcement remained lenient. Many who entered without authorization were able to regularize their status and obtain Hong Kong identity documents, blurring the boundary between “resident” and “illegal immigrant.” The 1960 Moore Report reveals how officials regarded these migrants as burdensome and socially undesirable, but it also shows the limited capacity and political constraints that prevented large-scale deportations.

This study argues that Hong Kong’s immigration regime developed as a system that deliberately avoided nationality-based definitions of membership, instead giving precedence to residence as the basis for inclusion. This contrasts with Japan’s exclusionary approach toward former colonial subjects and with divided states’ attempts to control overseas compatriots as political resources or threats. The Hong Kong case illustrates how colonial governance, Cold War geopolitics, and practical constraints produced a hybrid immigration regime, which foreshadowed later permanent residency frameworks. Ultimately, the 1950s formation of the categories of “Hong Kong resident” and “illegal immigrant” underscores both the ambiguities and the innovations of postwar East Asian border control beyond the nation-state paradigm.

This article proposes the concept of “Displaced Chinese” to analyze the complex cross-border movements of Chinese in East Asia following World War II. Focusing on the critical period from 1945 to 1957, it aims to firmly situate these migrations within the evolving dynamics of postwar international politics and decolonization. Prior to the war, ethnic Chinese could move relatively freely across colonial spaces under the laissez-faire framework of the imperial order imposed by European powers. However, the postwar emergence of sovereign states in Southeast and East Asia and the establishment of rigid national borders increasingly subjected them to immigration controls as foreigners. Despite such restrictions, the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War compelled vast numbers of Chinese soldiers and civilians to cross borders and become displaced.

This study adopts the Allies’ wartime term, “Displaced Persons,” to conceptualize these individuals as “Displaced Chinese.” Having fled Communist China, they were frequently deemed undesirable by local authorities. Although many sought asylums in Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC) government, wary of demographic burdens, was reluctant to admit them. Consequently, the “Displaced Chinese” were effectively left in a position where they could not receive protection from any state, lacking both legal status and state sponsorship.

From a contemporary perspective, their predicament closely resembled that of a refugee. However, the international refugee protection regime established in the early 1950s did not recognize them as such. This was partly because the international community viewed the ROC as the sovereign state responsible for their protection, and partly because the European nations that created the regime under the 1951 Convention primarily restricted aid to European refugees.

As local governments proved incapable of managing the “Displaced Chinese,” their presence escalated into an international concern. ROC military units stranded in Indochina were perceived as security threats, while civilian refugees in Hong Kong garnered international sympathy. In response, the United States, the ROC, and the United Kingdom pursued resettlement and local integration strategies shaped by Cold War imperatives. In conclusion, the “Displaced Chinese” became an integral part of 1950s Cold War politics as an international problem that existed outside formal refugee status. Recognition and relief for them were contingent not on humanitarian need alone, but on geopolitical utility, anti-communist credentials, and perceived strategic value within the escalating Cold War confrontation.