抄録
According to T.M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value（BPA）, goodness
is not a property that can provide a reason in itself, but is the purely formal,
higher-order property of having some lower-order property that provides a reason.
If this is correct, whenever we have reason to have a certain attitude toward
something or to behave in a certain way, the object is valuable in some
sense: that is, the relationship between reasons and values is biconditional. In
addition, it implies the eliminativism of value, in the sense that it reduces the
fact that something has value into a mere relationship between a reason-giving
property and reasons, and it deprives value of its normative power to give reason.
The present study attempts to defend the implications of the biconditonality
of reasons and values. To undermine this, objectors need only establish one case
where a reason does not bear on evaluations. We may have reason to respond to
objects in favourable ways ─ for example, we might desire, respect, or recommend
them ─ even though the objects are not at all valuable in themselves, or
because we have reasons that have nothing to do with the objects’ value. Or, one
may have a strong intuition that purely deontological reasons are completely
separated from values. On the contrary, this study posits that we can affirm the
consistency of BPA by introducing a distinction between derivative reasons and
non-derivative reasons（what one might call “ultimate reasons”）, or by clarifying
the difference between the normativity of reasons and the normativity of
deontology. In comparing the normative character of reasons and the deontic, I
will also demonstrate the similarity between the normative feature of reasons
and the evaluative function. In so doing, BPA becomes more plausible.
