抄録
According to David Hume (1711–76), moral evaluations are not judgments by reason but sentiments that arise when we consider the objects of evaluation “in general, without reference to our particular interest.” To make considerations this way, he also says, we need to put ourselves on a shareable standpoint, which he calls a “general point of view.” Why, however, do we adopt such a point of view? His answer is that, otherwise, we would experience intolerable conflicts of opinions and feelings between each other in society and conversation.
Based on these statements, some commentators, such as John Mackie, argue that according to Hume’s theory, all moral evaluations have as their basis an “artificial” element in the same sense in which Humean “artificial virtues” originate from human conventions. I think this interpretation is on the right track, but its details remain to be clarified. For example, Mackie and others have not explained what social conditions demand people to seek and take a general point of view.
Therefore, in this paper, relying on A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), I clarify the specific process by which people invent morality according to their social conditions. First, I review Hume’s conception of “morality” and distinguish different aspects of moral practice, such as the recognition of virtue and the motivation to pursue it (Section 1). Next, I show that a general point of view is established by a human convention to eliminate inconveniences that arise in the social interaction of people (Section 2). I then find out at which stage of society people must deal with such inconveniences in such a manner (Section 3). Finally, I answer a possible objection based on Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues (Section 4).
Through these arguments, this study shows that it is only after the establishment of a society maintained by the rules of justice that we can evaluate and act from a moral point of view.
