抄録
The aim of this paper is to propose a “relational model” of the normative grounds of obligations of care, with a view to clarifying how caring relations can be theoretically prevented from becoming normatively problematic. The provision of “care” plays an important and indispensable role in various aspects of our daily lives, from childcare and the caring of the sick and injured, to care for the elderly. This fact is reflected in the recent rise of the position known as the “ethics of care” or “care ethics” in normative ethics and political philosophy.
At the same time, however, there are worries about the value of care when viewed from a liberal perspective. For emphasizing the value of caring may lead us to place excessive demands on those who provide care. This worry leads us to the following question: how can we understand the obligations that standing in caring relations place on us, in a way that avoids making such obligations excessively demanding for those who provide care?
This paper takes up the question of how to understand the nature of obligations of care by focusing on the work of Eva Feder Kittay, a representative theorist of the ethics of care. Kittay rejects what she calls the “voluntaristic model” of obligations of care and endorses a qualified version of a “vulnerability model”: however, we argue that Kittay’s own vulnerability model fails to avoid the problem of overdemandingness. Next, we propose a novel account of the obligations of care, called the “relational model,” which views obligations as grounded in a particular relation that we stand in with others. Finally, we argue that this relational account of the obligations of care can avoid the problems faced by both the voluntarist and vulnerability models.
