抄録
This paper analyzes European debt crisis since 2009, which includes not only Greece but other southern European countries.
At first, we point out four problems with introduction of the Euro, which are insufficient convergence criteria, Greek participation, lack of economic governance for economic crisis, disparities of productivity among member countries.
Convergence criteria in Maastricht did not include external balance criteria, and real economic factor criteria, such as productivity parities. This is fundamental reason for the crisis. As operational problem, Greek participation should not have been authorized because of fiscal deficits. Also, Economic Governance after introduction of the Euro does not have some equipment for prevention of financial and fiscal crisis.
Especially, lack of fiscal integration causes to be late for determination of bail-out toward fiscal crisis countries. Such as a case of Greek fiscal crisis, Euro area countries insufficiently execute bail-out with default.
As a result, we propose new economic governance for prevention and safety-net of the crisis. This original plan proposes fiscal integration in the euro area by the means of European fiscal authority and Euro common bonds. However, we suggest introduction of default for a fiscal crisis country because the burdens of the country should be decreased for the future growth and stability. Of course, the default gives serious negative shock toward investors, including financial institutions. Therefore, introduction of regime with default should be secured by cooperation among the Euro area countries, such as Euro common bonds, Our proposal may strengthen fiscal integration with single monetary policy in the Euro area.
