This thesis is discussing about the reconstruction process of Ukraine economy as the aspect of currency policy. The author recommends that Ukraine should adopt the currency board system as the currency policy under the economic reconstruction process.

　The Ukrainian Hryvnia, the currency of Ukraine is the symbolic existence of the unstable Ukrainian economy after its independence from the USSR. The currency authority in Ukraine cannot manage its currency policy healthy so that Hryvnia continues to devaluate since its adoption. Additionally, Hryvnia faced significant devaluation by the world financial crisis in 2008-2009, the Crimea crisis in 2014 and the Russian invasion in 2022.

　To promote the reconstruction after the war, Ukraine must stabilize its macro economy and financial market. For that purpose, Ukraine must stabilize the currency rate of Hryvnia immediately. The currency board is known that its adoption country can stabilize its macro economy and financial market immediately. Instead, the currency board restricts the discretion of economic policies in its adopted country significantly.

　If Ukraine adopts the currency board regime, Ukraine must tackle the extensive economic structural reform to work the currency board functionally. Especially, Ukraine needs to reform its labor market more fluidly. Of course, such a reform has pain to Ukrainian people. So that, the labor market reform is very difficult to do generally. But, unless Ukraine does such a reform, Ukraine cannot win the stability of macro economy and financial market, in other words, the basement of the economic reconstruction after the war.

　The process of economic reconstruction in Ukraine will be the long and winding load. Ukraine needs to have the strong intention doing such a reform. As the same time, the international society, especially European Union must support Ukraine proactively. If EU has the will to embrace Ukraine economy to the EU economy, the author think that EU should recommend Ukraine to adopt currency board regime. And then, EU should allow to use Euro as the anchor currency of the currency board in Ukraine. What is at stake is nothing but the strength of the EU’s will to reconstruct of Ukraine.

　The theme of this public symposium was “EU fiscal and monetary policy under the energy crisis and the euro.” The purpose of the symposium was as follows. The EU economy, which had been recovering from the economic recession caused by the novel coronavirus, has been hit by a surge in energy prices triggered by the Ukraine crisis, and the EU member states seem to be suffering a so-called supply shock. Inflation in the EU jumped to nearly 10％ year-on-year in the first half of this year, prompting the ECB to shift sharply from monetary easing to tightening. On the fiscal front, it seeks targeted aid to prevent inflation from accelerating. However, concerns are raised that this will dampen the economy and risk amplifying regional disparities. The symposium will examine how to assess the fate of the energy crisis and the fiscal and monetary policy mix in response to these issues, as well as how to proceed. It will also examine how that policy mix affects confidence in the euro. The forum will be an interdisciplinary forum, with mainly economic reporters and commentators from the political field.

　The rapporteurs were Kento Horio （Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry）, Osamu Tanaka （The Dai-ichi Life Research Institute）, Mana Nakazora （BNP Paribas Securities JapanLtd）, Tomomi Saito（Meijo University）, and Sara Konoe （Kansai University）.

　Mr. Horio explained the current rise in energy prices and the EU’s response to the crisis under the title “The EU’s Response to the Energy Crisis and the European Green Deal.” In response, it was pointed out that the EU is trying to challenge the international competition for the transition to net zero while taking advantage of some of the measures introduced to respond to the crisis.

　Next, Mr. Tanaka explained the EU’s economic policy mix in recent years and the current review of fiscal discipline under the title “EU Fiscal and Monetary Policy and the Euro under the Energy Crisis.” It was exciting to note that there were concerns that the supply-demand environment for government bonds would deteriorate due to quantitative tightening.

　Under the theme of “Europe at the Crossroads,” Ms.Nakazora explained the relationship between economic sentiment, fiscal conditions, and credit ratings in Europe and the current situation. She expressed their view that Europe’s confidence lies in fiscal rules, and if such rules are shaken in the future, it will hurt the economy, as well as a decline in credit ratings. At the end of the session, Ms. Saito gave an empirical explanation of how the use of the euro as an international currency has changed since the coronavirus crisis and the crisis in Ukraine under the theme of “The Ukraine Crisis and the Euro.” In the report, he pointed out that the use of the euro for government bonds has not made much progress because of the crisis in Ukraine and that if fiscal concerns spread in the future, the use of the euro could be hindered by the impact on the rating.

　In response to these reports, Ms. Konoe pointed out many essential points from the political science viewpoint. For example, under the energy crisis, the response of monetary policy（tightening） preceded fiscal policy, but it was pointed out that this might increase fiscal risk, and discussions were held.

　Each rapporteur reported his/her area of expertise and asked questions. What was expected was the future course of fiscal policy by the EU and its member states. It reminded me that fiscal policy and how fiscal rules will change confidence in the European economy in the future is an essential issue for me.

　This paper examines the impact of several factors on core inflation in the Eurozone.

　The innovations of this paper are as follows. First, most of the analyses of inflation so far have been based on a hybrid New Keynesian-Phillips curve, but no previous studies have explicitly factored into supply constraints in the labor, raw materials and equipment in the model. In this paper, we estimate the impact of fluctuations in energy prices and constraints in the labor, raw materials and equipment markets on core inflation. Second, unlike the usual New Keynesian-Phillips curve model, this model also takes into account the effects of fiscal and monetary policy support invoked during the coronavirus crisis.

　Third, the analysis in this paper reveals the impact of major events such as the coronavirus crisis and the war in Ukraine on core inflation by changing the estimation period. Specifically, the impact of each variable on core inflation is compared in three categories: the period before the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, the period from the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis to the start of the war in Ukraine, and the period after the start of the war in Ukraine.

　The empirical results based on Structural vector autoregressive（SVAR） model for the period of 2002Q1-2023Q1 show energy prices, shortages of labor, raw materials and equipment, inflation expectations, price market-up, fiscal expansion, monetary easing, and euro depreciation increased core inflation. Particularly the labor shortage is one of the driving forces in accelerating core inflation in the medium term.

　Furthermore, we find that the supply-side factors, such as shortages of labor, raw materials and equipment, have become more important factors in changes in the core inflation rate since the coronavirus crisis. Particularly after the start of the war in Ukraine war, as energy prices rose sharply and labor shortage became more pronounced, the European companies’ marginal costs rose significantly and prices were revised, which may have pushed up the core inflation rate.

　Based on the estimated results, we need to focus on the labor shortage in terms of one of the influential factors for inflation. Tightening of fiscal policy, the ECB’s shrinking balance sheet, a deteriorating economy, and a strong euro may not be expected to significantly reduce inflationary pressures on their own.

　The purpose of this paper is to identify the processes that led to the “market fragmentation” in the regulation of OTC derivatives in the 2010s, and to clarify the roles played by the UK and Japan in resolving the “market fragmentation”. At the G20 Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, G20 leaders agreed on financial regulations requiring standardised OTC derivatives transactions to be cleared through a central counterparty （CCP）. However, legislation to implement the agreement was left to individual countries, with the Financial Stability Board （FSB） tasked with monitoring implementation. The deadline for legislation was set at the end of 2012.

　This paper focuses on “market fragmentation” in the execution and clearing of OTC derivatives transactions and analyses it from the perspective of state regulatory action, in particular the “extraterritorial application of regulatory laws in each country”. From this perspective, this paper defines “market fragmentation” as “a phenomenon in which market participants avoid cross-border transactions and are geographically divided, resulting in differences between regional markets in the prices of the same transaction”. To put “market fragmentation” into concrete figures, transactions in euro-denominated interest rate derivatives between US dealers and European dealers declined by 77％ in terms of transaction value between 2013 and 2014 due to regulatory discrepancies on cross-border transactions between the US and the EU.

　This paper analyses the policy process of OTC derivatives regulatory negotiations in the G20 from two perspectives: “policy intentions and policy norms of governments and regulators” and “the role of the UK and Japan in overcoming market fragmentation”. The analysis reveals ⑴ the mechanism of “market fragmentation” and ⑵ the role of the UK and Japan in trying to overcome “market fragmentation”.

　From an early stage, the UK and Japan recognised the different approaches to “deference” between the US and the EU as a problem and played a role in harmonising “deference” by calling for a bridge between the approaches of the two sides. The UK played an important role in developing rules and harmonising deference, albeit from a national interest perspective in defence of the London financial centre. Japan, on the other hand, represented the views of both the public and private sectors in the major Asia-Pacific countries and worked to promote a common understanding among regulators to harmonise deference.

　This paper examines how the banking sectors of eleven EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe （CEE） were affected by the COVID-19 induced economic shock. The central research question is: Did the banking markets in CEE States prove resilient during the pandemic and if so, which factors were driving such resilience?

　The paper begins with an overview of the banking indicators of CEE States prior to 2020 and demonstrates that due to the EU’s comprehensive supervisory and regulatory reforms （the latter encompassed in the Single Rulebook） implemented after the global financial crisis, banks in CEE States had strong balance sheets with high capital ratios. High capital ratios help banks to absorb potential losses. The paper then examines the banking indicators of CEE States between 2020 and 2022 and observes that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their banking sectors proved to be only short-lived and not severe.

　What factors can explain such resilience of the banking sectors of CEE States during the pandemic? The paper distinguishes the two following factors: ⑴ policy measures and ⑵ EU’s unified bank regulation.

　Regarding ⑴, the paper argues that promptly implemented wide-scaled fiscal measures （such as loan moratoria） in CEE acted as an immediate first line of defence. These measures effectively contained the direct impact of the pandemic by supporting liquidity and solvency of firms and households and therefore mitigated the pandemic’s negative impact on the banking sectors in CEE. The paper stresses that besides the fiscal measures, ECB’s monetary policy and supervisory measures combined with the EU’s coordinated policy response have also supported the financial stability in CEE since 2020.

　The paper points out that when the policy measures expire, banks in CEE could face the second-round risks, such as an increase in Non-Performing Loans （NPLs） when moratoria expire. At this stage ⑵ bank regulation plays a crucial role in maintaining the strong balance sheets of banks （e.g. having high capital ratios） and thus effectively acts as a second line of defence. The paper examines the latest available data as of Q2/2023 and highlights that banks in CEE have maintained stable levels of their NPLs.

　The paper also shows how the pandemic accelerated two recent trends in banking- digitalization and the move towards sustainable finance and illustrates these trends with examples from CEE States.

　In response to the economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, European Union （EU） member states initiated substantial economic recovery projects from 2020 onward to support their domestic industries. This trend presented a major challenge to the state aid control system of the EU. The European Commission had to swiftly evaluate hundreds of state aid plans submitted by the member states while upholding the basic legal framework to ensure effective competition within the EU’s internal market.

　Studies have shown that the policy-making process of the EU’s state aid control was largely resilient during the 2008 global financial crisis. However, there is a dearth of research on whether the pandemic also had a limited impact on the policy-making process.

　Therefore, this study examines how the Commission responded to the pandemic regarding state aid control, and what kind of policy change was caused by the pandemic. In terms of analytical framework, the study draws on recent public policy studies on ‘crises and policy change’, which delineate three key concepts: normalization, adaptation, and acceleration. The main primary sources used in this paper are official publications of the Commission and interviews with three officials from the Directorate-General for Competition.

　The analysis shows that the Commission’s main response to the pandemic was the adoption and frequent amendments of a ‘temporary framework’, a form of soft law, to accelerate the review process while clarifying its criteria. The analysis highlights the General Court of the EU as a key actor, conducting rigorous judicial reviews and annulling nine Commission decisions to approve state aid measures between February 2021 and February 2024.

　These observations indicate that the policy change in this field prompted by the pandemic is best understood as ‘adaptation’ rather than a fundamental shift in policy. In other words, the pandemic did not represent a ‘historical juncture’ concerning the policy-making process in EU state aid control. The Commission and EU courts remain key actors, and soft law remains an important regulatory instrument. The Commission flexibly applied EU state aid law during the pandemic, akin to the global financial crisis. None of these characteristics are new. Overall, this paper contributes to the study of EU competition policy by showing that the supranational system of EU state aid control has been largely resilient even amidst the economic crisis sparked by the pandemic.

　The purpose of this paper is to analyze EU law challenge toward ecocide, environmental crimes, in the war in Ukraine from the perspective of possible contribution to international criminal law and future environmental reconstruction. War is the biggest environmental destruction. The military attack and occupation of Chernobyl and Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, or destruction of Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant violates Article 56 of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Ukraine war revived the discussion and proposal to add ecocide as the fifth international crime through the revision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court （ICC）, mainly in Europe due to the limitation of the current human-centered international criminal and humanitarian law, as well as jurisdiction of the ICC. Theoretical framework of ecocide is also expected to boost Ukraine’s future reconstruction process and accession to the EU, beyond the existing EU environmental cooperation or the European Reconstruction Fund. The deterrence of intentional huge environmental destruction and its clear positioning as international crime has grave importance to the affected future generations under the Anthropocene. EU initiatives, in particular, the establishment of the special international criminal tribunal and hybrid tribunal to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression, preservation of evidence on core crimes by the Eurojust, launch of the Ukraine Facility and the Register of Damage for Ukraine, supplements the current limitations and contributes to the future development of the ICC and international criminal law. European Commission’s 2021 proposal on the revised Environmental Crime Directive defines ecocide as “when an environmental criminal offence causes severe and either widespread or long-term or irreversible damage” and, once adopted, is also expected to enhance international recognition of ecocide through the transposed domestic laws of member states. Once of the international community agrees on the revision of the Rome Statute, ICC Party EU member states have to incorporate ecocide in their domestic criminal laws. If not, once Ukraine as the candidates for membership of the EU were admitted as member state, and revise its weak ecocide article in the current criminal code, ecocide in Ukraine might be accused based on EU law. Gathering of huge satellite data through the development of information technology and report from the citizens contribute to preserve the evidence necessary to make Russia responsible for the environmental losses in the future, strengthen legal basis of ecocide and recognize ecocide as international crime.

　In the wake of the war in Ukraine, which commenced on February 24, 2022, the international community has grappled with the war crimes perpetrated by the Russian military. While efforts to collect and preserve evidence of these crimes have primarily been led by the ICC, the EU and its Member States have also played an active role in supporting ICC investigations, thereby advancing international criminal justice norms. However, there exists a significant disparity between the conditions under which punishment is deemed effective in prior studies on the deterrent effect of international criminal tribunals and the current scenario where Russia remains firmly entrenched in power. This presents a challenge in discerning immediate practical implications for the EU’s actions. Nonetheless, if the EU is viewed as a ‘normative power’ during this period of crisis in the liberal international order, there are profound implications for its pursuit of international criminal justice norms.

　This paper aims to explore the implications of the EU’s efforts to address Russian war crimes. Drawing upon insights gleaned from previous research, the paper will assess the actions taken by the EU and its Member States following the onset of the conflict in Ukraine. By comparing these actions with those of other international actors, such as the United States and African countries, the paper will analyse the impact of the EU’s commitment to international criminal justice norms on its standing as a ‘normative power’. Specifically, it will examine how this pursuit of norms influence the behaviours of other actors in the international arena.

　In conclusion, several key points emerge. Firstly, there is a discernible momentum within the EU towards promoting international criminal justice norms, evidenced by institutional reforms and the establishment of specialized international tribunals, which reinforces its normative orientation. Secondly, the significance of the values championed by the EU has grown, as evidenced by increased cooperation between the ICC and the United States, a supporter of the liberal international order. This convergence of norms among so-called ‘liberal states’ indicates progress in norm diffusion. However, thirdly, when it comes to engagement with African states, while norms may be transmitted through trade agreements and financial aid in other policy domains, African states may not necessarily share the EU’s and ICC’s commitment to promoting international criminal justice norms. Consequently, the influence of the EU’s ‘normative power’ in advancing international criminal justice may be limited in this regard.

　In its endeavors to advocate participatory democracy, cooperation with transnational actors such as NGOs is increasingly becoming an integral part of the EU’s policy making activities. As the EU’s role as a policy maker has been expanding, it has increasingly strived to establish channels for dialogue and discussion with NGOs as well as to utilize their knowledge and experiences in policy development. The goal of this cooperation is both to address issues that the EU cannot deal with alone as well as to develop civil society at the EU level. Particularly regarding migration integration policy, due to the wide range of policies and issues involved, NGOs have proven a valuable source of information for the EU and simultaneously significant partners in policy implementation. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to the EU’s relationship with NGOs in migration integration policy.

　This paper addresses how the EU through the establishment of the European Integration Forum （EIF） has provided a ‘venue’ for dialogue with NGOs on migration integration policy at the EU level. In accordance with A Common Agenda on Integration 2005, the European Commission and the European Economic and Social Committee created the EIF as a platform for comprehensive dialogue between the EU and its stakeholders. The EIF discusses topics that follow the Common Basic Principles on Integration to provide ‘useful input’ into the progress of integration policies in the EU. This paper focuses on the technical aspects of the management and operation of the EU side due to resource constraints, explaining how the EU attempted to provide NGOs and other civil society organizations with a platform for dialogue on integration policy and to make it a meaningful forum for common immigration policy. The paper argues three key factors contributed to the EIF’s role as a dialogue venue: ⑴ it focused on broadening understanding towards existing policies and sharing ‘good practices’ in EU-wide integration policy rather than creating new integration policies, ⑵ it used the existing policy framework of the EU for discussion, and ⑶ EU institutions played a leading role in the EIF. Through the EIF, the EU has thus attempted to increase the involvement of stakeholders such as NGOs and other civil society organizations in policy making to promote migration integration policy within its limited mandate.