This article starts with discussing principles for a globally just system of refugee protection to which states contribute either by admitting refugees for resettlement or by supporting refugee integration in other states. Such a system requires relatively strong assurances of compliance by the states involved, which are absent in the international arena. In the international state system, sharing the burdens of refugee protection requires therefore a coalition of willing states who are ready to ‘take up the slack’ resulting from the failure of other states to do what a fair sharing of burdens would require. In the European Union, however, the Member States form a predetermined set with prior commitments and supranational institutions that ought to facilitate effective burden sharing. The article argues that none of the specific features of the recent refugee flows justifies giving priority to deterring access to asylum over burden-sharing. It traces the failure of the EU’s relocation scheme to misconceptions how to determine fair shares, to incomplete prior harmonization of normative standards, and to contradictions between the Dublin Regulation’s principle of assigning responsibility to first countries of entry, on the one hand, and the Schengen principle of open internal borders, on the other hand.
The internal and external security nexus has become increasingly important for the EU in terms of policy and in its implementation. The 2003 “European Security Strategy” the first European Union security strategy, called attention to this aspect. The later revised strategy, the “EU Global Strategy” in June 2016 explains that “Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions.” This attaches significant importance to an integral and comprehensive approach in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, development assistance, as well as enhanced cooperation with the European Commission. Many CSDP （Common Security and Defence Policy） field missions, operating outside the EU area, have contributed to the internal security of the EU.
The major security threats that have been identified by the EU have been terrorism, organized crime and cyber crime. Massive migration flows into the EU area are perceived as a threat. Given this, the role of the European Commission in security has been significantly developed, and President Juncker’s Commission launched concrete policies towards a “Security Union” in order to protect citizens.
The European Commission launched the “European Agenda for Security” in April 2015, which set out actions in order to ensure an effective response to terrorism and other security threats. Since then, the Commission proposed to revise the Firearms Directive, and a new Directive on Combatting Terrorism.
On the issue of external border control, Frontex was strengthened and the European Border and Coast Guard was launched in October 2016. It is expected to agree on an Entry/Exit System and a European Travel Information and Authorization System for visa-exempt travelers in 2017.
Brexit should enhance CSDP cooperation since previously the UK had obstructed its progress. The new US administration under President Trump will likely push European countries to increase their defence budgets. These elements, as well as its internal and external security threats, will enhance security cooperation in the EU.
EU migration diplomacy is at a crossroads. The EU has long sought for an effective mechanism of immigration control by extending the sphere of governance. However, deepened European integration has not been their choice. The EU is not headed for closer cooperation in the field of redistributive policies which would include policies with regard to the Third Country Nationals (TCNs) becoming better integrated into their host societies. Instead, in the field of migration policy, the EU has opted for a system of burden-sharing where non-EU countries are expected to share the responsibility with the EU. The diplomatic strategy to set up effective policy linkages has become increasingly significant along this line. This paper claims that the current set of policy packages presented by the EU to the rest of the world is becoming less effective than before. Although the strengthened economic and political ties with the EU has been one of the significant objectives of many non-EU countries in the neighboring regions of the EU in particular, these countries are more prone to keep the status quo, selecting not to cooperate to satisfy the EU’s needs. Through a case analysis on EU-Turkey, EU-Africa (Morocco) and EU-ASEAN relations, this paper shows that the power of the EU (be it normative or not) is waning because non-EU countries do not appreciate the global institutional framework in which the EU burden is “pushed back” on them. Underneath is the transformation of the international structure where the economic growth has made the EU’s neighboring countries more stabilized, while the EU member states are in turmoil due to factors that could jeopardize the foundation of the union. The “Enlargement” is no longer attractive to some non-EU countries. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult for the EU member states to form an agreement to build the strategy because the burden of accepting refugees (and asylum seekers) is already unequally distributed among them.
Italy has not had a coherent migration policy for long period because of a series of unstable coalition governments and high political cost of reforms against public views on migrants. Its immigration law and citizenship law have been one of the most severest ones in Europe. These factors has caused many diffculties on resucue activities and integration of migrants.
Recent massive flow of sea arrivals from the Mediterranean has set Italy and the EU in dispute on migration controls. Confronted by many incidents offshore of Lampedusa, Italian political leaders had felt to be isolated by the EU, without appropriate cooperation. Among them, most active were local goverments’ chiefs of Sicily Region and of Lampedusa who claimed directly to the European Parliament for help to aid offshore rescues and asked Italian government to amend the problematic Bossi-Fini immigration law of 1998. Political leaders of the Left criticized the EU and campaigned for amendment of Bossi-Fini law. From the viewpoint of the EU and other member states, however, Italy seemed to have lacked of well defined immigration laws and systems.
The severe incident of migrant ship of October 3, 2013, made Italian government proceed its independent rescue operations called Mare Nostrum, however, it was replaced in a year by the EU’s operation Triton led by the FRONTEX. Nevertheless, even with the rise of public opinion on this occasion, the Italian government and parliament have not fulfilled to abolish the Bossi-Fini law. Although Prime Minister Renzi succeeded to “europeanize” immigrantion problems by virtue of massive migrant flow in the Balkans in 2015, migrant replecement from Italy has been done in a very slow pace. To breakthrough present difficulties, Italy should have a coherent immigration policy with a good balance between human rights and security so that it could be respected by other member states of the EU.
In February 2016, European Council agreed upon the Special Decision for the UK, which would hold BREXIT referendum. The content of the decision would become a disadvantage for Eastern European countries and violate EU citizens’ equality criteria. Why did Eastern European countries tolerate? Why did not other Western European countries dispute this content? In order to account for these questions, I explore the logic of bargaining dynamics that bridges the issues of internal migration and transnational posted workers.
Main discussion materials are the political process of two EU directive drafts. The preferences of major political parties of UK, France, Germany and Poland are examined mainly on the results of voting behaviors at the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. As a result, the following (A) and (B) are presented, along with the logic of bargaining mechanics that stretchily affected the Special Decision in February 2016.
(A) Regarding the Eastern European countries, UK Conservative government, while giving losses in terms of internal migration, tried to give benefits in terms of transnational posted workers. On the other hand, French Socialist government, to the Eastern countries, while giving losses in terms of transnational posted workers, tried to guarantee benefits in terms of internal migration. The strategies to the Eastern countries by both UK and French governments, despite their opposite composition, were common in terms of protectionism of their own country. UK Conservative Party, in collaboration with the Eastern European countries, have opposed to the “posted workers directive” which had been strongly desired by French Socialist Party from the viewpoint of French own protectionism, however, eventually UK Conservatives turned to agree and realize French Socialists’ hope. As a return of this, French Socialist government has tolerated the UK requirements including justification of discriminatory measures against EU internal immigrants in February 2016 Special Decision.
(B) In the process of negotiating “posted workers directive”, the Polish Tusk government, originally in cooperation with UK Conservative party, betrayed UK and ultimately sided with French Socialist Government. The reason for this was that the French Government gave a promise to establish the “Immigrants’ rights promotion directive”. It would be beneficial to Poland, however, had uncertainty in establishment. The reason why Poland, one of Eastern European countries, accepted UK requirements in February 2016 Special Decision can be understood as a price of betrayal against UK Conservative Party during the negotiation process above mentioned.
This paper demonstrates structural factors of recent influx of asylum seekers into the European Union, and exhibits that there is a trade-off between the policy measures to reduce influx of refugees and the EU’s normative foreign policy so far.
In contrast to migration of labors, the most important push factor of refugee is intra-state conflict and the biggest pull factor is a norm/practice that has lead to the records and expectations of refugee protections. Push-pull factors tell us that conflict management of source countries is essential to decrease the number of refugees. This paper also demonstrates the development of concepts, norms and practices that relate to migration control and refugee protection, and emphasizes that most of them have been developed mainly in Europe but have not been shared by all of the major powers: it implies that a failure of cease-fire agreement between the major powers as well as the source country precisely means that there is an increase in the number of refugees and they leave for Europe that has developed concepts, norms and practices of refugee protection.
In case of Syria, strong national interests motivate Russia to take a different position from that of Europe and the United States. Russia’s national interests and European norms are not compatible and the EU failed to exercise diplomatic influence to Russia. In terms of diplomatic influence, the EU had taken sanctions against Syria after the Arab Spring, although Syria was once seen as ‘partners’ in the EU’s neighborhood policy. As for Russia, the EU had also taken sanctions after a crisis had happened in Ukraine. Despite of its normative foreign policy, the EU could not change behaviors of counerparts, and could not conclude a cease-fire in Syria. Europe has to tackle with conflict management in the source countries in order to decrease high pressures of influx, but the EU’s foreign policy so far has failed to stabilize such countries: here builds a trade off relationship between measures to reduce influx of refugees and the EU’s normative foreign policy so far.
This paper analyses the formation process of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), with particular focus on the interaction between international organizations (IOs), namely, inter-organizational relations. It attempts to answer why and how the fundamental rights protection under the Dublin system has been improved.
Section 1 exhibits the background of the research. The Dublin system, which allocates the responsibility to examine an application for international protection lodged in an EU member state, has been criticized for the insufficient protection of asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights in particular member states. Although this problem emerged through interrelations vis-à-vis external actors other than EU institutions nor member states, such interaction has been largely ignored. As a corollary, the existing explanations for the formation of the CEAS have not paid due attention to the intersection of multiple actors as well as the outcome thereof.
Against this background, Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature with regard to the CEAS formation. It begins by criticizing the traditional debate between the member-state-governments-centric approach and the supranational-organizations-centric one. They are, so to speak, inward-looking thus cannot duly consider the interaction with external actors nor the information inflow from outside. Then the paper examines the external governance approach, thereby theoretically justifies focusing on inter-organizational relations. Particularly, this paper highlights the mode that can be called contestation between IOs, such as reference, criticism and indirect review.
Drawing on that framework, Section 3 traces how the legislation process of Dublin III regulation was influenced by criticism and indirect review by other IOs, specifically the Council of Europe (CoE) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These organizations criticize some member states, specifically Greece, for the inadequate reception conditions, based on the information they gain on the ground. Although these criticisms themselves are not legally-binding, they gradually gained legal relevance by being referred to by the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the Court of Justice of the EU. Consequently, the recast regulation substantively reflected the criticisms raised by other IOs. After describing the development, this paper mentions twofold theoretical implications. First, it restates the contributions to the literature reviewed above. Second, it suggests connecting the viewpoint of inter-organizational relations with the literature on global constitutionalism and global democracy.
In the end, Section 4 summarizes the overall argument, and shows some remaining agenda.
Poland started the transition to a market economy since January 1, 1990. Despite of negative 7％ GDP growth rate in 1990 and 1991 respectively, Poland continues favorable development for 25 years thereafter. It is the fruit of Poland’s accession to the EU 2004, realizing Poland into the single EU market, expansion of export opportunities, allocation of EU funds, also foreign direct investment (FDI), as powerful engine for economic development.
For investigating factors of successively favorable economic performance in Poland, it is worthwhile to focus on the agricultural sector, because the sector shows implicit issues to be solved. Polish agricultural sector keeps an output ratio to GDP at 3％, also worker’s share at 12％ of total employee, both of which are rather high in the EU, especially in the new member-state countries. Polish labor productivity is low at 60％ of OECD average, and salary remains at one third of advanced economies. Author judges that the cause is due to the power and role of foreign enterprises as the microeconomic view.
Several studies refer to the EU funds and FDI for good performance of Polish economic development. It is the fact that a large amount of the said capital flows into Poland, and acts as strong driver for successive growth. The big enterprises including famous automobile companies invested in Poland, and their presence becomes rather strong, and plays an important role to drive Polish economy. It is obvious that foreign enterprises give a lot of to Poland, which is a positive side of contribution. But it is needed to recognize a negative side as well, because excessive power or activity of foreign enterprises causes unwanted results such as stagnation or deterioration of domestic entities’ activity. Despite the investment of foreign enterprises can be evaluated as the reliable tool for good economic development in short term, it could be a risk factor in middle and long terms.
Polish authorities paid their strong attention to secure much foreign capitals as possible in past decade. But such policy led Poland to face the Middle-Income Trap due to excessive dependence on foreign capitals. In February, 2016, Polish authority admitted possible risks for future economic development in an Action Plan for responsible development of Poland, and is turning their policy to avoid the Middle-Income Trap.