Single Monetary Policy through Euro by the ESCB

Abstract

A single monetary policy for the European countries adopting the Euro will be launched by the ESCB from the beginning of 1999. Technical preparations for supplying and managing the Euro have already been finalised. The ESCB was established in June 1998, and so were its decision-making bodies as well as its cross-border settlement system (TARGET). The EMI, paving the way for the ESCB, has already defined: (1) the primary objective (price stability); (2) the strategy (a flexible mixture of the monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting); and (3) the instruments (open market operations, standing facility and minimum reserves. Open market operations will be the main pillar).
However, there are three reasons why the single monetary policy is going to be a challenging right from the outset. The first is that the demand for the Euro could temporarily be unstable during its introduction process, making it difficult for the ECB to pursue its strategy. However, this is an inevitable process for monetary integration and could technically be over-come as time passes.
The second is that the transmission mechanisms of the single monetary policy may differ from region to region, due mainly to the structural differences in historically formed financial systems. In this respect, the EU countries could be divided into three groups: German-central Europe; France-Latin; and UK-Nordic. Although little is known about differences, among these regions, in terms of magnitude and speed of the monetary transmission process, the ESCB has to fix the single interest rate throughout the Euro area. No one knows exactly whether this will cause a practical problem or not, but if it will, structural convergence of the financial system throughout the Euro area could solve the problem over time, although it is not clear how long it would take.
The third is that the political situation in the EU has drastically changed since 1997. Presently, 9 out of the 11 Euro area governments are led by centre-left parties. They are introducing growth-orientated Keynesian demand management policies, and which are contrary to the stability-orientated policy set by the ECB and supported by supply-side economics. In practice, these discrepancies in policy stance will have both internal and external consequences. Internally, there will be a dispute on: (1) policy rate, although independence of the ESCB from any government is constitutionally guaranteed; (2) interpretation of the ‘price stability’ in the Treaty, presently defined as 0 to 2% increase in the HICP; and (3) the reconsideration of ‘the Stability and Growth Pact’. Externally, if the ECOFIN are to establish a less flexible exchange rate system vis-a-vis the dollar, such as a target zone, this will be a constraint on the ECB in pursuing its ultimate objective of price stability, creating a situation of ‘internal-eternal dilemma’.