ニヤーヤ・ヴァイシェーシカ学派の「普遍の定義」の再検討

抄録

A study of the word universal (sāmānya) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school shows a change in its definition. The difference is that the older definition includes the problematic qualification of “the cause of the notion of commonality” (anuvṛttipratyayahetu), while the later (new) definition is composed of three qualifications—oneness (ekatva), eternality (nityatva), and the state of being inherent in many individual entities (anekasamavetatva). The reason why the problematic qualification was eliminated from the new definition is logically unsatisfactory, since not all notions of commonality are caused by universals. However, even such an unsatisfactory over-statement does not explain its elimination, since it applies to the three qualifications of the new definition too. This paper argues and builds a hypothesis for its elimination. Oneness along with the state of being inherent in many individual entities, both of which are parts of the new definition, cause the notion of commonality. Therefore, if “the cause of the notion of commonality” were included in the new definition, then the definition would be too verbose a description. Thus, the elimination may have occurred for the sake of brevity. A significant effect of the new definition is that it now succeeds in showing that universal is a cause of the notion of commonality.