2018 年 67 巻 1 号 p. 390-387
Previous researches have pointed out that Kamalaśīla, a Mādhyamika, engages the criticism of the inference system of Bhāviveka, and defends Bhāviveka. Because of this, it can be said that when Kamalaśīla proves the absence of Self-nature, his standpoint is basically the same as that of Bhāviveka. However, is this true? I consider the point through the proof of being not from no cause.
Candrakīrti criticizes Bhāviveka’s explanation of ahetu as *kuhetu. Kamalaśīla does not defend Bhāviveka on this point, and Kamalaśīla himself does not explain ahetu as *kuhetu. Because of this, Kamalaśīla does not explain ahetu as *kuhetu as does Bhāviveka, and in regard to this point, Kamalaśīla does not always hold the same standpoint as does Bhāviveka.