The jāti in the Mādhyamika

Abstract

It has been argued by Prof. Kajiyama that the concept “xiang ying (相応)” in the fourth chapter of the Chinese version of the *Upāyahṛdaya, namely, the Fanbian xin lun (方便心論), is the origin of the concept of “jāti” as described in the Nyāyasūtra as well as by later Bu­ddhist logicians. In addition to his discussion of the authorship issue of the Fanbian xin lun, Kajiyama has shown that the so­phi­stic arguments called “xiang ying,” which are regarded as valid arguments in the Fanbian xin lun, are indeed very similar to Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅga arguments. It thus seems interesting to investigate how later Mādhyamika philo­sophers treated the concept “jāti” that had resulted from the Nyāyasūtra’s criticism of the concept “xiang ying” and was accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Vasu­bandhu and Dignāga. This paper will show that there were two entirely opposite positions in the Mādhyamika re­gar­ding the concept of “jāti.” As examples of this, I pay attention to state­ments on “jāti” appearing in various treatises, including Bhā­vi­ve­ka’s Pra­­jñāpradīpa and the Dasheng zhangzhen lun (大乗掌珍論), Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā and Madhya­ma­kā­va­tā­ra, and others. The differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences of how Dignāga’s logic was evaluated by the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Mādhyamika.