複数の送電アクセス者に対する公平性を考慮した託送費用配分の検討

抄録

One of the most important questions on the wheeling of electricity is how to set its service rate. We had already reported the model of setting the wheeling rate on the basis of long-run marginal cost theory, which includes capacity expansion costs both in power generation and transmission lines. Rut the model was applied only in the case where one independent power producer (IPP) sells electric power to one specific customer, and the fair allocation of wheeling costs among multiple network users was not taken into consideration in the previous paper.
In this paper, we propose a new model for allocating the wheeling costs among multiple network users on the basis of cooperate game theory, and investigate the impartial allocation of wheeling costs by comparing the results with those derived on the basis of long-run marginal cost theory. We also calculate the allocation of wheeling costs in the case where the costs of transmission lines have scale-merit, and the case where expansion of transmission capacity is treated as a discrete variable.