抄録
Electricity markets are experiencing widespread changes that are significantly altering the industry. In this paper, we study economic load dispatching rules in power systems under competitive environment when independent power producers (IPP) are introduced, and analyze their economic consequences by using game theory. An electric utility and several IPPs are viewed as players of a game in the model. We consider an extensive game model of electricity market where IPPs enter into the game, firstly as a group and secondly as individuals. Both the Utility and IPPs intend to maximize their own profit. The prices between the electric utility and IPPs are determined in such a way that they are equilibrium points of a noncooperative game. In this paper, we employ the Stackelberg strategy and Nash equilibrium solution method to analyze negotiation processes between utility and IPP since it is widely recognized as a rational decision for competitive markets in terms of axiom. It is shown in this paper that all obtained simulation results can be viewed as an extension of the equal incremental cost from regulated power systems to competitive power markets.
