Abstract
The bioethical law in France dictates that the organ extraction from a dead body is permitted to perform inasmuch as the person concerned has not explicitly states in life his or her will to refuse the extraction (called "presumed consent"). It may seem that the duty of offering organs is implicit in this concept of "presumed consent," but this inference in fact is in contradiction to the principles of "inviolability and indisposability of a human body," the ethical principles which "the public order" requires prior to any regulation in French society. These two principles, which appear to be originated from a feeling of esteem for a human body, at first never oblige one to offer one's own organs, and then do not equalize the absence of will of refusal to any voluntarily consent, and lastly require agreement by the bereaved family in performing the organ extraction from the body in spite of the absence of the "owner." Another important concept "solidarity" may be called for in this respect to justify the duty of offering organs, but it also stipulates for the voluntary consent of both the person and the family concerned. If, however, the term "solidarity" should appear and prevail in such an ideal society that are so matured as to freely transcend the distinction between one and the others, or the individual and the society, it would be possible that "presumed consent" could be justified by the idea of "solidarity," in terms that the act of offering organs is not merely donation for others but is equal to donation for oneself, since this altruistic action operates only in a unified world of all human beings.
