Rational Acceptability and Truth

Abstract

　In “From Alethic Anti-realism to Alethic Realism” Künne distinguishes between alethic realism and alethic anti-realism. This article examines whether or not alethic anti-realism is appropriate, when we take the position of using commonsense to settle a philosophical problem. To that end, I will first review Künne's theory. Next, I will point out that Putnam's natural realists are alethic realists, that Wright's moderate internalists are alethic ani-realists, and that Wright argues against Putnam. Then, I will argue that Künne's conception of truth escapes the criticism of Wright's argument. Lastly I will also review Tennant's argument for anti-realism, and argue that in spite of Tennant's argument, alethic anti-realism is not appropriate when considered from a commonsense point of view.