The special theory of relativity (STR) is often used to oppose presentism because STR denies the existence of absolute simultaneity. According to the general theory of relativity (GTR), which generalizes upon STR, we can consider the notion of ‘cosmic time’, which is common to the whole universe. Accordingly, cosmic time could be a candidate for absolute time, which would provide a means for presentism to be maintained. Nevertheless, GTR can also be said to be incomplete because it is not unified with quantum mechanics (QM). In this paper, I argue that if a certain variety of the multiverse hypothesis is correct, then presentism cannot be supported.
Special Section: Philosophy of Science in East Asia
Philosophers of science often ask a key question: What does it mean when we say that someone has rightly claimed that a proposed theoretical hypothesis is a true explanation of a certain phenomenon in the world? The decline of the justificatory power of perceptual observation has triggered a bifurcation in the study of the nature of justification in science―namely, the logical (or empirical) school and the practical (or social) school. This duality calls for a mediatory account, one that would provide a compromise explanation that accommodates the concerns of these two seemingly contradictory schools. Neurath's idea of scientific justification qualifies as a mediatory account, but it is incomplete, in that it is ineffective in explaining two problems: the problem of entitlement requirement and the problem of the initial learning of norms. McDowell's ideas about conceptual capacities and Bildung, and Brandom's inferentialist approach of conceptual content, which are developed under the ontological presumption that reason and nature are on the same earthly plane, seem to be helpful in bridging the chasm, or even in eliminating it, thereby making Neurath's account complete. This paper represents an attempt to apply Neurath's, McDowell's, and Brandom's ideas to resolve this key problem in the philosophy of science.
The purpose of the paper is to examine critically Giere's view of distributed cognition. Giere has treaded a tricky path between extreme ends in the disputes about the notion of distributed cognition and, as a result, two kinds of complains have been leveled against his view. On the one hand, conservatives like Vaesen criticized him for misusing the notion of distributed cognition. On the other hand, radicalists like Clark and me thought of him as a conservative for defending the traditional idea of the mind.
My argument unfolds as follows. In section two, I review briefly the typical cases of distributed cognition found in the works of Clark and Chalmers, Hutchins, and Knorr Cetina and extract a common characteristic of distributed cognition. In section three, I examine Vaesen's response to Giere's view of the distributed cognition around the debate between i-cog and d-cog. In section four, I show that Giere's reply to Vaesen's criticism is not appropriate for defending his version of distributed cognition and suggest a way towards the proper direction without breeding misunderstanding of the notion of distributed cognition.
This paper proposes an experiment-based methodology for both classical genetics and molecular biology by integrating Lindley Darden's mechanism-centered approach and C. Kenneth Waters' phenomenon-centered approach. We argue that the methodology based on experiments offers a satisfactory account of the development of the two biological disciplines. The methodology considers discovery of new mechanisms, investigation of new phenomena, and construction of new theories together, in which experiments play a central role. Experimentation connects the three type of conduct, which work as both ends and means, occurring in a circular way and constituting an overall process of scientific practice from classical genetics to molecular biology.