2024 Volume 33 Pages 1-41
The paper addresses how empirical rationality developed in cognitive science and AI can be bridged to epistemic knowledge argued in epistemology and philosophy of science, as a part of the effort for bridging the former, empirical sciences to the latter, philosophical inquiries. The empirical concepts of bounded and procedural rationality are applied to interpret the procedural theories of learning by doing and interaction by information sharing; empirical notions of knowledge and expertise widespread but underspecified in cognitive science and AI are more rigorously defined as cognitive knowledge and expertization process; and concepts of view, composite view, shared view and shared cognitive knowledge are introduced. Then, those arguments are deployed altogether to provide sufficient conditions for cognitive knowledge of a goal-directed adaptive agent to be epistemic knowledge (or justified true belief), and to demonstrate that cognitive knowledge shared by socially interacting agents exists (in the sense of epistemological realism) as epistemic knowledge under assumptions on motivateness, expertise and evolutionary processes of those agents.
