The Nature of Physical Theories

Abstract

In the present paper recent topics of rationality of schience is discussed. It is asserted that physics should be talked about instead of science at large, that two types of theories in physics must be distinguished, one primary and one secondary. Failure in noticing these points on the part of philosopherss led to mistaken conclusions concerning the nature of scientific theories, physical theories, in particular. The author stresses further the importance of elucidating such terms as “physical phenomena, ” “data, ” and “semantic rules.” Every theory is constructed on the ground of existing data, theories, and semantic rules. Thus theories are not to be refuted by new theories, for they are essendtially hereditary, and true thoeries remain true in spite of emergence of new theories. The position of realism is maintained in this way. The criteria of rationality of physical theories is found in achieving greater coherence of theories. Metaphysical presuppositions occupy an essential place in theories and drastic changes in such propositions form the cardinal elements of “revolution.”