雇用保障の法と経済学

抄録

The law for protecting long-term employment in Japan is mainly done by case laws, which are implicitly based on common practices of large firms in the period of high rate of economic growth in the past but are not appropriate under the stagnated economy since the early 1990s. This paper first analyzes the implicit assumptions of judges to settle the disputes for dismissals such as monopolistic labor demand by a firm, homogeneous quality and preference of workers, but they are necessarily applicable to the actual labor markets. Also, there is a trade-off of interests concerning too strict employment regulations between those who are already employed and those who seek for jobs, accounting for possible impacts on the employment behavior of Japanese firms. Secondly, the framework of desirable rules for dismissals in recession is suggested. This is to put an emphasis on procedures, rather than the judgment on adequacy of the dismissals. The procedure could be pecuniary compensations, the company's assistance to the workers for finding new jobs based on the consent of the labor union. Finally, in the Japanese labor market where the long-term employment commitment and seniority-based wages are prevalent, it is rather difficult to move from a firm to another either voluntary or involuntary. Thus, the principle of equal pay for equal work in the flexible labor markets would be an important safety-net for workers facing risks of bankruptcy or laying-off.