地球温暖化防止に向けた国家間の協調の可能性

抄録

This paper aims firstly to clarify the fundamental structure of international negotiations concerning global climate change, and secondly to find the possibilities of world-wide cooperation and effective policies for the cooperation. The game theory and quantitative analyses have been applied to analyze interrelations between nations' attitudes toward global warming abatement and their background situations, and to find conditions for formulating world coalitions. It has been clearly shown from these analyses that (1) nations' attitudes are affected by domestic political conditions and net benefit of climate stabilization which will be increased by international cooperation, (2) international coalition would be formed in the condition that the world's total benefit from climate stabilization is more than about 1% of world GNP, and (3) international coalition could be disturbed by the compulsory rule, such as polluter-pay rule which would increase side payment for developing countries.