オレンジ革命後のウクライナにおける半大統領制の機能不全―執政部門内の紛争の発生過程の解明

抄録

The amendments in the Ukrainian constitution in the aftermath of the Orange revolution brought about sweeping changes in the semi-presidential system. It formally strengthened the parliamentary role in the political process, particularly in cabinet appointments and dismissal. Although the transition to democracy in Ukraine had been anticipated, the semi-presidential system that was introduced after the Orange Revolution proved to be a failure.

Scholars have paid attention to the institutional design and patronalism, which is defined as a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments, besides the electoral system that emerged after the Orange Revolution. In particular, they have argued that the president had an initiative to form the cabinet in a multi-party system. However, this led to an intensification of the intra-executive competition between the president and the prime-minister after the formation of the cabinet. How did the semi-presidential system, introduced after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, fail? Although presidential commitment is an important component to consider when trying to understand the reason for institutional dysfunction, the interaction between the president and the prime minister is not clear.

Focusing on the intra-executive competition, this article attempts to outline the process of failure of the semi-presidential system following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. First, this article analyzes the wording of the constitutional amendments, comparing it with that of the 1996 Ukrainian constitution. While the constitutional amendments strengthened the role of the Verkhovna Rada, which is also referred to as the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in the political process, the president retained other legislative powers, including the power to veto bills and dissolve the assembly. These amendments authorized the president to intervene in the legislative process.

Second, utilizing a case study of the second Yanukovych government (2006-2007), and the second Timoshenko government (2007-2010), the author analyzes the process of intra-executive competition. When Yanukovych and Timoshenko became prime minister in 2006 and 2007, respectively, president Yushchenko was committed to maintaining decisive power over the Verkhovna Rada while appointing a prime minister. The case studies demonstrate that the coalitional cabinet would not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention because of the multi-party system. After the formation of the coalitional government, the president continued to intervene decisively in the legislative process, using both formal and informal power. However, under the 2004 constitutional system, the cabinet alone was responsible for running the parliament. Because the president’s party was a minority party in the parliament, he could not control the activities of the coalitional cabinet. The presidential interventions intensified the conflict with the prime minister over several issues, including NATO membership, the Russia-Georgia war, and so on. The conflict between the two also made parliamentary law-making much less efficient.

Thus, the presidential commitment to the parliament produced different results during different periods. While the coalitional cabinet could not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention, the presidential commitment after the formation of coalitional cabinet led to a confrontation with the prime minister, and divided the members of the coalitional cabinet. The intensification of the intra-executive conflicts led to the failure of the semi-presidential system adopted after the Orange Revolution.