Abstracts of Annual Conference of Japan Society for Management Information
Annual Conference of Japan Society for Management Information 2003 Spring
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Superior strategies in iterated game with information exchange
*Naoki SHIBAAkira NARITA
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Pages 43

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Abstract
In previous paper one of the authors proposed the way for analyzing the effect of firm's strategy for information disclosure using a repeated game based on the prisoner's dilemma. This article presents the result from the search using selection mechanism for a set of strategies with a lot of variety including three typical ones that were treated in the previous paper. Superior strategy sets are sought from 4096 strategies that are based on TFT(tit-for-tat) strategies in the ordinary prisoner's dilemma. We show that changing the parameter representing the selection pressure gives different strategy sets after selection, and a common pattern can be seen in superior strategy sets.
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© 2003 by Japan Society for Management Information
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