Journal of Classical Studies
Online ISSN : 2424-1520
Print ISSN : 0447-9114
ISSN-L : 0447-9114
ΘΑΤΕΡΟΝ in ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ : Plato's Sophistes 251 a-259 b
Uruwashi ITO
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1967 Volume 15 Pages 25-36

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Abstract
1) Every Form has its own peculiar nature, and just because this nature is peculiar and unique, every Form has its difference distinguishing it from any other. However it is also because of their natures that some relation can be established among some Forms. Motion and Rest cannot blend with each other since their natures are in contradictory opposition, but Existence can be blended with Motion since their natures are not in the same relation mentioned above. Therefore it can be said that κοινωια comes between some Forms whose natures do not contradict each other. 2) What is κοινωια? κοινωια means, briefiy, that a Form (A) partakes of another Form (B); this partaking enables the first Form (A) to possess the character of the other (B). For example, if a Form partakes of Motion, then it is in motion, but if it partakes of Rest at another time, then it is at rest. In κοινωια, what a Form partakes of is more important than what the partaking Form is in itself. κοινωια can be described as follows: (i) A partakes of Difference. (ii) A is different from B. (iii) A is not B. In case of Difference we can understand these three stages most clearly. But every instance of xorocovfa has these three stages. Among these stages which are indispensable to κοινωια, the most important is undoubtedly the first one. Plato used such terms as μετεχειν, μεταλαμβανιεν, to explain the fact of participation. And, strictly speaking, xotvcovfa exists only in this stage. For the second stage only represents the outcome of the participation in the first stage, and the last stage gives the form of judgement to the second stage. When one of the three Forms, namely Existence, Sameness, or Difference, is partaken of, everything can occupy the position of A, but when Motion or Rest is partaken of, circumstances change considerably. When Motion is partaken of, Rest cannot occupy the position of A, since it is impossible that Rest should partake of Motion. The two natures contradict each other. Therefore κοινωια can come into being only between the two Forms which can blend with each other. Motion is different both from Rest and Existence. But the difference from Rest contains the contradictory opposition, while the difference from Existence does not. These are the two kinds of difference. 3) A partakes of Difference, then A is different from B. When B is fixed by only one Form and A is changing from one into another, all Forms except B are different from B and, in the third stage, all Forms but B are not B. If B is replaced by Existence, all but Existence are not Existence, that is μη ον. This το μη ον is not in contradictory opposition with Existence. For the difference gave birth το μη ον and does not contain the contradictory opposition since Existence pervades all the Forms and nothing contradicts it. 4) το μη ον has its own parts. We usually deal with not το μη ον itself but its parts; the not-beautiful is in contrast with the beautiful, the not-large with the large. Such a not-X is a part of το μη ον and all the parts are supported by το μη ον. But we cannot give any positive explanation of το μη ο itself.
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