While one of the most fragrant epithets καλο&b.sigmav; και αλαθο&b.sigmav; (καλο&b.sigmav; καλαθο&b.sigmav; was used by many early Greek poets, historians, rhetoricians and philosophers, καλοκαλαθια, the compound noun derived from it, is rather rarely to be found in the ancient Greek writings. For instance, this abstruct noun does not occur in Plato, who makes habitual use of the words καλο&b.sigmav; τε καγαθο&b.sigmav;, only a few instances of its use being found even in the Corpus Aristotelicum, as Bonitz' Index shows. As far as I know, Xenophon is the only exception; he uses it very commonly throughout his whole works. In spite of this, however, it is a well-known fact that there is an interesting contrast to be observed in the manner of treating καλοκαλαθια among the three Ethics contained in the Aristotelian works. The theme of this article is to show what gives rise to such a difference in the treatment of καλοκαλαθια and thereby to contribute to certify the development of the Aristotelian thought of ethics. First, the passage in which the definition of this words is given in the Magna Moralia (B 9) , meaning "the sum of internal and external well-being" (Grant), is written in quite Aristotelian style, but it is so formal, rather pedantic as well, that it should be attributed to one of the later Peripatetics. Second, the most reliable topoi elucidating the meaning of this word is, as generally acknowledged, the Eudemian Ethics (Θ 3). Though here also καλοκαλαθια means "omnium virtutum cumulus et complexio" (Fritzsche), differing from the meaning given it in the Magna Moralia, a sharp line is drawn between καλο&b.sigmav; καλαθο&b.sigmav; and its ingredient αλαθο&b.sigmav;, and the lines in which ορο&b.sigmav; of καλοκαγαθια is given, leads one to the idea of 'the contemplation of God and service of God' as the noblest standard of the good, which suggests the reciprocal relation between the Eudemian Ethics and the Protrepticus. At the same time, this very fact let us assume the reason why Aristotle, who could succeed in putting his fundamental basis on the empirical theory of philosophy at Lyceum, ceased to favour the use of this word in the Nicomachean Ethics. In fact, the Stagirite uses this word only in two places, without attaching to it any importance. For instance, a comparison of the statement ref ering to μεγαλοψυχια in the Nicomachean Ethics (Δ 3), namely, "therefore it is hard to be proud; for it is impossible without καλοκαγαθια", with the corresponding place in the Eudemian Ethics, where there is no use of this word, may verify that in the former Ethics the real example of καλοκαγαθια can be substituted μεγαλοψυχο&b.sigmav;, and so is not indispensable. καλο&b.sigmav; και αλαθο&b.sigmav; was, as above suggested, an adjective characteristic of the so-called "Adelsethik" in ancient Greece and the recession of Platonism in the Aristotelian thought caused the alteration of Philosopher's long cherished feeling to the word as of noble origin and the disuse of it in his later Ethics. In this light, we can trace the development of the philosophical thought of Aristotle through the change in meaning of this word

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Cette etude vise a decrire certains aspects des termes δομο&b.sigmav;, δωμα et δω qui sont consideres comme appar tenant a la famille de la racine *dem-, c'est-a-dire a une des deux grandes familles de moth designant "l'habitation" en grec ancient-l'autre etant celle de la racine *woik-. En examinant l'emploi de ces termes, on essaie de delimiter le domaine semantique propre a chaque terme et on se demande si en realite on peut les faire remonter a une seule etymologie. Chez Homere le mot δομο&b.sigmav; designe toujours "un edifice, une construction". Ce sens est remarquable en comparaison avec le sens du terme οικο&b.sigmav; qui, a son tour, peut exprimer l'aspect moral de la maison. A cete de cette forme thematisee δομο&b.sigmav;, l'existence du terme δεσποινα, qui doit etre tres ancien et dont la racine *dem-est certaine, semble indiquer le sens premier de *dem-: "maison en tant qu'unite sociale". Il y a, cependant, chez Herodote, trois exemples de δομο&b.sigmav; designant "une couche de briques ou de pierres". S'etant fonde sur l'emploi homerique, on serait tente de considerer ce dernier cas comme particulier, δομο&b.sigmav; "edifice" pouvant etre derive du verbe δεμω "construire". Ainsi la diversite de sens nous permet-elle de poser une seule racine *dem-pour οδεμω-δομο&b.sigmav;-δεσποια? Notre deuxieme terme δωμα a ete transmis dans la formule traditionnelle de la langue epique: 'Ολυμπια δωματ' εχοντε&b.sigmav;. Il s'agit d'un mot expressif et son role essentiel est d'exprimer l'idee d'une demeure magnifique, d'un palais. Meme en dehors de la formule notee ci-dessus, c'est le mot δωμα-δωματα, et non δομο&b.sigmav;-δομοι, qui s'emploie pour designer les demeures des Olympiens. Quant a son etymologie, it est difficile d'accepter l'explication par alternance vocalique de *dem-(de δομο&b.sigmav;): *dom-: *dom-; parce que -m- n'appartiendrait pas a la racine mais au suffixe -μα. On doit done adopter l'idee que le mot δωμα est un arrangement du mot δω. On sait que δω est interprete ou bien comme etant un vieux nom racine rapproche, de facon ou d'autre, de *dem-(de δομο&b.sigmav;), ou bien comme etant d'origine adverbiale: en indo-europeen *do indiquant la direction (en grec, particule lative-δε) . Elle se fonde sur le fait que le terme δω est employe toujours a la fin du vers dans des tournures quasi-formulaires, notamment celle du type: ημετερον δω. L'expression ημετερον δω a une meme valeur metrique que ημετερονδε qui est egalement homerique. Zenodote le grammairien deja propose de lire ημετερονε au lieu de ημετερον δω en Il. 18. 385 et 424. On s'est applique, dans cette etude, a ajouter une autre remarque concernant ce probleme: il s'agit du parallelisme qui existe entre ημετερονδε et ονδε de la formule homerique ονδε δομονδε qui occupe toujours les deux derniers pieds du vers. Dans l'exemple: ει&b.sigmav; 'Οδυσηα δομονδε κιον (Od. 22. 479), on voit bien que l'idee du mouvement vers la maison d'Ulysse est suffisamment exprimee par ει&b.sigmav; 'Οδυσηα et que δομονδε est un element plutot superflu, ajoute sans doute pour raison metrique. Aussi pourra-t-on penser que dans l'expression ονδε δομονδε egalement, le seul adverbe ονδε suffit pour dire "vers sa maison, chez lui"; it en est de meme de ημετερονδε et it n'est pas necessaire de sous-entendre So iov apres l'adjectif possessif ημετερον. Ii resulte que δω de ημετερον δω n'est pas forcement un substantif, a son origine du moins. On pourrait faire remonter le terme δω a l'adverbe indo-europeen *do; apres son passage en grec, le δω du type ημετερον δω a ete interprete comme un substantif neutre, d'ou

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1) Every Form has its own peculiar nature, and just because this nature is peculiar and unique, every Form has its difference distinguishing it from any other. However it is also because of their natures that some relation can be established among some Forms. Motion and Rest cannot blend with each other since their natures are in contradictory opposition, but Existence can be blended with Motion since their natures are not in the same relation mentioned above. Therefore it can be said that κοινωια comes between some Forms whose natures do not contradict each other. 2) What is κοινωια? κοινωια means, briefiy, that a Form (A) partakes of another Form (B); this partaking enables the first Form (A) to possess the character of the other (B). For example, if a Form partakes of Motion, then it is in motion, but if it partakes of Rest at another time, then it is at rest. In κοινωια, what a Form partakes of is more important than what the partaking Form is in itself. κοινωια can be described as follows: (i) A partakes of Difference. (ii) A is different from B. (iii) A is not B. In case of Difference we can understand these three stages most clearly. But every instance of xorocovfa has these three stages. Among these stages which are indispensable to κοινωια, the most important is undoubtedly the first one. Plato used such terms as μετεχειν, μεταλαμβανιεν, to explain the fact of participation. And, strictly speaking, xotvcovfa exists only in this stage. For the second stage only represents the outcome of the participation in the first stage, and the last stage gives the form of judgement to the second stage. When one of the three Forms, namely Existence, Sameness, or Difference, is partaken of, everything can occupy the position of A, but when Motion or Rest is partaken of, circumstances change considerably. When Motion is partaken of, Rest cannot occupy the position of A, since it is impossible that Rest should partake of Motion. The two natures contradict each other. Therefore κοινωια can come into being only between the two Forms which can blend with each other. Motion is different both from Rest and Existence. But the difference from Rest contains the contradictory opposition, while the difference from Existence does not. These are the two kinds of difference. 3) A partakes of Difference, then A is different from B. When B is fixed by only one Form and A is changing from one into another, all Forms except B are different from B and, in the third stage, all Forms but B are not B. If B is replaced by Existence, all but Existence are not Existence, that is μη ον. This το μη ον is not in contradictory opposition with Existence. For the difference gave birth το μη ον and does not contain the contradictory opposition since Existence pervades all the Forms and nothing contradicts it. 4) το μη ον has its own parts. We usually deal with not το μη ον itself but its parts; the not-beautiful is in contrast with the beautiful, the not-large with the large. Such a not-X is a part of το μη ον and all the parts are supported by το μη ον. But we cannot give any positive explanation of το μη ο itself.

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In this article the writer tries to make clear one of the main purports of the Tenth Book of the Laws, through reviewing the difference that Plato held to exist between his own proof of God's existence and his opponent's atheistic argument. Plato seems, in his argument for God, to imply that he has given up the physical viewpoint, from which every movement is seen going on endlessly, and, while using the same terms as the atheists, like "change" and "movement", he shows himself seeing the movement from quite a different angle, freed from the difficulties otherwise involved in the concept of the movement. Having wiped out the transitive aspect of the movement in the phenomenal world, he is reinterpreting the same movement as self-caused motion or life. When the atheists, as mechanistic materialists, see one movement inducing another or being induced by another, Plato would rather say that in reality both one and another are moving themselves successively by the participation in the original self-caused motion, just in the same way as a beautiful thing is said to be beautiful by its participation in the Idea of beauty. He himself writes that every thing in the world is full of life, because the life or the psychic operation is the same thing as the self-caused motion. Thus Plato established the priority of the soul to the material thing, and concluded that God exists as the first self-moving soul. The construction of Plato's proof consists of the three stages, starting from an experience of movement, which is seen as moving or moved, not in the narrow sense of the transitive verb, but in a wider sense implying a participation in some ultimate source, and then going back to the first self-moving soul, and lastly from this original soul explaining deductively every thing in the world. Almost the same argument, however, is seen on the side of the atheists. They also start from an experience of movement, which, however, they conceive only in the transitive sense and as induced from outside, and then trace back along the series of such induced motions to the ultimate elements or atoms-atoms, to which they also, just as the atomists did, would finally have reduced the elements, and which would be also self-moving at least in their empirical eyes-, and lastly they reconstruct from these sources every thing in the world. Therefore, the significant difference between Plato's proof and atheistic argument is after all only that of the starting points, whether a movement is seen from the physical angle, or from the "super-physical" angle. Otherwise the two arguments are the same both in logical structure and in persuasiveness. From these considerations, the writer concludes: Plato's argument for God here, so far as it pretends to have "refuted" the opponent who would not accept Plato's premiss, must be said to be somehow forced, though it can be valid enough in the eyes of the man who will start from the same premiss as Plato did; Plato's main task in this Book, however, must have lain rather in urging people to change their viewpoints, from the empirical to the broader one, so that they can retrace by their own reflection to the first cause of the world, Gcd; and his "refutation" of the atheists seems to have been no more than an atempt to carry out this main task of his.

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It is the object of the present article to analyze and understand the characteristics of peace consciousness of Polybius who lived in the Hellenistic age of chronic wars and wrote a world history in the true sense. We can see in his book, especially in IV. 31. 3-8 and IV. 74. 3, what kind of attitude he took toward the problem of peace. There he wrote as follows: "That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. ......Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful." Thus, Polybius insisted that liberty and justice were indispensable conditions for peace. We can also recognize the same idea of connecting peace with liberty and justice in many other Greek politicians and historians such as Thucydides. The Greek thought of peace, however, was metamorphosed gradually by historical conditions in the development of the ancient world. Thucydides advocated the war for justice and took a rather aggressive attitude against other city-states such as Sparta, putting stress on Athenian hegemony, although he admitted that peace was naturally desirable. His conception of peace could never depart far from the narrow idea of ομονοια within a πολι&b.sigmav;. The Greek idea of peace was widened by Isocrates to Panhellenistic homonoia, but he had a strong antagonism against Barbaroi. In the historical development of peace theory, the Hellenistic age played a very important role, giving birth to the cosmopolitan pacifism. This kind of pacifism, however, could not become a historical force to attain world peace, because it had a tendency to escape from reality. Though Polybius was influenced by Stoicism he was able to reach a sort of realistic pacifism and wanted to cooperate with Rome, cherishing the idea of a united and organic world consisting of the cultural Hellas and the political Rome, where the common freedom of Hellas should be fundamentally respected. Moreover, he evaluated highly the value of unions of city-states such as the Achaean league. He had not merely a Stoic, philosophic and abstract idea of cosmopolitanism, but a positive, ego-involving and realistic attitude of international cooperation. Thus, the freedom of Hellas as a condition of peace was connected by him with a kind of internationalism and with a Hellenistic idea of one organic world founded on the principle of equality among races and nations. In this sense, we may recognize that Polybius was indeed a pioneer of realistic pacifism, that is of internationalism, though of course in an ancient pattern, which has its limitations for us. It was regrettable after all that the ancient world could not develop this kind of pacifism, but had to seek for a key to solve its problems in Pax Romana and eventually in Pax Dei.

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"The Verrine Orations", the document drawn up in 70 B. C. by Cicero prosecuting C. Verres, ex-governor of Sicily, for extortion, peculation and spoliation, is the most important of the source materials which enable us to investigate the details of provincial administration under the late Roman Republic. Since the latter half of the 19th century this text, especially in its economic aspect, has been scrutinized by many students of Roman history. Most of them suspect that it contains too high a degree of exaggeration for them to placetheir unconditional reliance on it; for example, Liebenam observes in "Pauly-Wissowa's Realenzyklopadie" that we must take into account a great deal of exaggerations and forensic sophistries used by Cicero in Book Three (of the second speech) of the Verrine Orations. We have to ask whether any exaggeration exists or not in Cicero's statements and, if any, in what respect or to what degree it exists. On the other hand, we must inquire into the authenticity of those official records submitted by the cities of Sicily which constitute the essential materials of the Verrine Orations, though Cicero asserts that no inventions or interpolations or perversions are found in them. I should think that the best way to ascertain the authenticity of both the Sicilian official records and Cicero's treatments of them is to select the correlative statistical figures out of the text and to make clear their logical and mathematical consistency. The most suitable part of the Verrine Orations for this purpose is Book Three of the second speech, because it deals chiefly with the economic problems concerning taxation and abounds in the rather exact statistics. In this paper I tried to throw light on the above-mentioned questions by examining Book Three under four headings: (1) "additional fees (accessiones)", (2) cities on which "the purchased corn (frumentum emptum)" was imposed, (3) "clerical fees (scribae)" subtracted when the purchased corn was paid for, and (4) "tithes (decumae)" and "bonus (lucrum)". Eventually, my investigations brought me to the following conclusion....... As a rule the statistical figures mentioned in the Verrine Orations proved to be logically and mathematically correct, and so we might say that both the Sicilian official records and Cicero's descriptions are trustworthy as far as the figures are concerned. But we cannot always rely on Cicero's statements at face value, because he exaggerated their dimensions, in order to make Verres' villainies appear much worse and because he displayed so rhetorical skill as to expand the evil deeds of Verres, virtually limited to some cities, into those to all the cities of Sicily. That Cicero, though attached to strict Stoic principles from his early days, yet accused Verres rather dishonestly is perhaps due to his aspiration to deprive Hortensius, then on the defendant's side, of his acknowledged pre-eminence among Roman pleaders.

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In the envoy of the Peleus-epyllion Catullus praises the happiness of the Golden Age and compares with it the sin and unhappiness of the present time. This is not a mere imitation of Hesiod, but something he obtained from his own experience. For, first, since this epyllion is closely connected with the love experience of the poet himself, the envoy cannot be quite unrelated to it. Secondly, the first half of the envoy indicates the happiness of the Golden Age, which has been described in the story of Peleus, with some other examples of epiphany and for this reason it is a suitable epilogue of the story; but the fact that the unhappiness of his own age related in the latter half has no relation to the story of Peleus except that it is an antithesis shows that the poet, having finished his objective description, has returned to his subjective standpoint. Thirdly, though in the envoy he makes pietas the moral criterion of happiness, in the narrative he only describes the hero's happiness without being conscious of his pietas. This shows that he inquires into the reason for the happiness only after he had finished the story, and so the envoy contains the poet's subjective interpretation of the story. Fourthly, pietas is the kernel of his moral conception, which has matured through his love experience with Lesbia. For at the time of demoralization, when the pietas, the most fundamental moral concept of Rome, was about to lose its original power, he tried to revive it as the moral basis of a new republic, "the republic of love and friendship", which he founded with his intimate friends and loves, and thus he intended to rescue both the people from decadence and the pietas from oblivion. In this republic there was no difference between love-affairs and married life, if only they were supported by the new interpretation of the principle of pietas. Moreover pietas changed,. through Catullus' experience of Lesbia's faithlessness, from mutual duty of faith and service into unilateral devotion. For he passionately idealized the fickle mistress, who then turned into a goddess and demanded of her loyal lover absolute submission. This did not last long, and at last he laid the blame on her in the name of pietas and broke off with her. But through the Lesbia-experience he thus reflected upon the concept of pietas, purified it, and gave it a new meaning. It may be said from our objective point of view that his moral consistency is doubtful; but Catullus, who constantly claimed pietas in every human relation and who believed himself to have maintained it, was surely a truly Roman poet. So the envoy of the Peleus-epyllion is both a retrospection of the old days and a general survey of the present time from the same moral standpoint, as he adopted in criticizing all sorts of conduct in his epigrams, iambics and hendecasyllabics. It may have no close relation to his love with Lesbia, nor is his thought original; yet it is a genuine reflection of his own experience.

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Both Aristobulus and Philo, the former in what is called F V/apud Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XIII. 12, 9-16, esp. 11 b-13, the latter in the Legum Allegoriae, I. 2-16, put an allegorical interpretation on Genesis(2 : 2), trying to justify the holiness of the Sabbath and further to prove the eternity of God's creativity, from the viewpoint, founded in arithmology, that the number 7 has its own peculiar significance in the decade. As to Aristobulus, scholars have hitherto placed him later than Philo in chronological order, and agreed that it is not until we check his fragment against the corresponding section of Philo's text that we can fully comprehend him. And yet εβδομο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; in that fragment is the important proof of the above-mentioned argument, in which they, getting a clue from Philo's argument of ψυχη in his De Abrahamo (30), regard εβδομο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; as the 7th part of ψυχη, that is νου&b.sigmav;. But εβδομο&b.sigmav; λογο&b.sigmav; should not be confined to such a narrow sense, but be understood cosmologically. This is because the number 7 had been cosmologically highly estimated not only by the Greeks but by the Semites. I think Aristobulus, in this fragment, tried to emphasize the rationality of God's creation. We should see that his true intention is that the 7th day in Genesis is to be regarded, not in the sense of time, but as a symbol of the cosmic order. In the Corpus Philonicum, he made many references to numbers, especially 7. This reflects his persistent attitude to grasp the creation in connection with this number, as can clearly be seen in the section in question in the Legum Allegoriae. He intends to conclude from the homogeneity in the number 7 and the μονα&b.sigmav;, that the number 7 and further the 7th day are inherently holy. It is necessary in this case that we should pay attention to the fact that there is, in his discourse on the significance of the number 7, the hierarchy of the whole existence, against the background of Genesis (2 : 2) and the homogenity in the number 7 and the μονα&b.sigmav;. His thought is based on the Platonic dualism, which he develops into the hierarchical system by way of the arithmological viewpoint. Such a conception comes from the later Platonic writings and the Old Academy's interpretations of them. I think his allegorical interpretation of Genesis suggests the whole system of his thought and its origin. From the above-mentioned point of view, it is impossible to put Aristobulus chronologically later than Philo and to think the former indebted to the thought of the latter. Philo, in his allegorical interpretation of the section in question, gives far more speculative development of ideas, compared with Aristobulus' discourse based on simple cosmology.

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