Consistency and Truth in Elenchus

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the philosophical significance of the Socratic elenchus in the Gorgias. The Socratic elenchus is based on an investigation into the grounds for an interlocutor's effective use of such evaluative terms as 'right/wrong' and 'beautiful/ugly'. Polus initially states 'Doing injustice is better than suffering it' but later changes his mind and acknowledges Socrates' assertion because he admits 'Doing injustice is uglier than suffering it'. On the other hand, Callicles denies that. He considers gratification or pleasure as a determinator of 'beauty'. But gratification has no attainment and changes all the time(493a) ; therefore, we usually talk about desire with the assumption that it is something determinate. This does not mean that we rightly appreciate its nature. Socrates says to Callicles, "These all come to a head in the life of catamites ; isn't that strange and shameful and wretched?" (494e). Callicles has no reply because he already understands that pleasure is open to evaluative criticism. By introducing 'good pleasure' into the discussion (494e-495a) Socrates suggests that study of 'good' is essential for discussing 'pleasure'. If our world of value consists of these words, we cannot reach the truth without investigating the relationship between these words. But people other than Socrates have no definite idea about the relationship between 'beauty' and 'good'. Indeed 'Iron and adamantine logos' (508e-509a) formally represents consistency, but we need to pay attention to its content. Socrates examines value terms and combines 'doing injustice' with 'shameful' and 'evil', and reveals a strong relationship of necessity between these terms. Because of this necessity he 'can say nothing else' (522c, cf. 507a) about (Vlastos') non-p and he is 'always saying the same thing'(491b) as philosophy does. This leads to his clear assertion of the truth. Polus' and Callicles' statements are not concerned with the 'thing (pragma) ' itself, therefore the elenchus, which is based on necessity of logos, is required. The Socratic elenchus is carried out in logos but urges us to reconsider logos itself. By introducing 'flattery' (463b, 464e)and 'temperance' (491d) into the discussion, for example, elenchus breaks up the interlocutors' doxa about value and prompts us to understand the world of value. Taking this into consideration we can say that Vlastos' assertion that we have 'acquired knowledge about everything in the form of true covert beliefs' is reasonable in as much as we possess elements necessary for elenchus in our logos. But we can put it more accurately as follows: we possess elements necessary for elenchus not as 'knowledge in the form of true covert beliefs' but as the 'form (scheme) of logos as a whole' in which we form our life. In this 'form' the investigation becomes possible and significant. I would like to go further and claim that it is impossible to simply say that Socrates draws non-p from premises {q, r}. Socrates firmly believes 'doing injustice is worse than suffering it' because that is backed up by his examination of 'pragma' itself. This work is carried out by disjoining this central belief into the collection of statements with all clearness for Socrates and his interlocutors (Vlastos' q, r are keys to it) and putting it together again. While Polus approves the statement that 'Doing injustice is uglier than suffering it', Callicles does not. In this case, Socrates disjoins this statement into the collection of premises (logos) with all clearness for both and reestablishes the original proposition. The deeper

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