セクストス・エンペイリコスにおける相対主義の問題

抄録

In Sextus' argument against moral values, especially in Outlines of Pyrrhonism III (PH3) and Against the Ethicists (M11), we are shown statements which appear to subscribe to relativism (SR), e g "Nothing is by nature (φνσει) good" The purpose of this paper is to consider whether these SR are coherent with the sceptical attitude manifested in PH1, that is εποχη (suspension of judgment) Over the last few decades, this problem has been the subject of controversy One reaction has been to accuse Sextus of incoherence Annas & Barnes have held that Sextus conflates relativism with scepticism Annas concludes that Sextus is a phihstine about ethics The other reaction has been to try to defend Sextus McPherran regards SR as the reports of subjective affections, which involve no commitment to the truth of the external objects, and locates SR in the sceptical strategy In both cases, however, it is agreed that SR in themselves are alien substances to scepticism In recent studies, Bett proposes a new interpretation He regards SR as the conclusion, which Sceptic himself adopts He pays attention to the relation of SR with Sceptic's happiness For Sextus says in M11 that SR lead to αταραξια (tranquillity) In addition, Bett emphasizes the difference between M11 and PH3 Considering the chronology of Sextus' works, he presumes that SR (in M11) are relics of a phase in the history of Pyrrhonism far earlier than Sextus himself, whose attitude is suspension of judgment (in PH1-3) I agree with Bett in thinking that SR are Sceptic's conclusion However, I do not share his chronological solution, because similarly in M11 and PH3, both SR and εποχη play important roles in relation to the sceptical aim The question arises again Are SR coherent with the suspension of judgment? I want to throw new light on the concept of μετριοπαθεια (moderate affection) which is another aim of scepticism Sextus says "The aim of Sceptic is tranquillity in regard to belief and moderate affection in regard to things unavoidable" (PH1 30) Moreover, it is noteworthy that this concept can be found only in arguments against moral values, and that Sextus explicitly declares SR only in that case It will be clear from these facts that Sextus has been aware of a property of moral values However, I do not mean that Sextus affirms this distinction For Sceptic is, as Sextus says, the person who suspends judgment about everything (M11 150) I therefore conclude that SR remain as a result of suspension of judgement in regard to things unavoidable Concerning moral values, after we suspend judgment about their nature, we can not detach ourselves from them perfectly This is because we are placed unavoidably and accidentally into definite circumstances, that have definite moral values SR mean this To accept SR is not the defeat of scepticism For only Sceptic can be in a state of moderate affection without having additional belief this is good/bad by nature It is not too far from the truth to say that SR belong to a different category from two categories, what is the case by nature and what appears